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ABSTRACT 
If the aftermath of a crisis should be fertile territory for policy change, then housing in 
England in the period since 2007 should be a textbook case. The period began with a Global 
Financial Crisis that brought the financial system to the point of collapse and has been 
punctuated by the political crisis of Brexit, the calamity of the Grenfell Tower fire and then 
the Covid-19 pandemic. All this amidst a growing sense of ‘housing crisis’ that encompasses 
unaffordable house prices and rents, rising homelessness and insecurity and a sense that 
the opportunities of home ownership are being denied to younger generations. 
This research seeks to test the extent and the nature of policy change in housing since the 
financial crisis. It uses the concept of policy paradigms to study the ideational frameworks 
that guide policy makers’ understanding of how their world works and should work and the 
nature of the problems that policy is meant to be addressing. Putting housing in the context 
of wider developments in welfare and macro-economic policy and political economy, it 
investigates how policy has changed since 2007 and whether this amounts to a change in 
policy paradigm.  
Interpretive analysis is used to study the cognitive and normative frames that policy actors 
use to make sense of policy problems and solutions and the different understandings that 
result. The research analyses data from two sources - key policy documents and semi-
structured interviews with key policy actors inside and outside government – and 
triangulates between them.  
The study finds that a ‘social housing’ paradigm in operation in England since the 1980s has 
undergone ideational collapse under the impact of changes in welfare, fiscal and monetary 
policies and financial regulation. A new framework of ‘affordable housing’ looks more like 
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CHAPTER ONE  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 HOUSING AND POLICY PARADIGMS 
Whether it is categorised in terms of declining home ownership, rising homelessness, 
unaffordable house prices and rents or insecure and inadequate accommodation, it is 
widely accepted in political and media discourse that England is experiencing a ‘housing 
crisis’. This poses a fundamental challenge for contemporary housing policy and for the aim 
of successive governments of ensuring that everyone has access to a decent home at a price 
they can afford (DoE, 1977, 1995; DCLG, 2007, 2017; MHCLG, 2018).  
In the aftermath of a Global Financial Crisis that had its origins in derivatives based on 
mortgage debt and was followed by a long period of austerity that meant deep cuts in 
housing investment and support, the study tests the extent of, and the reasons for, policy 
change in housing in England since 2007. After the research began, this sense of crisis was 
amplified by a succession of other events with ramifications across society, politics and the 
economy. The political crisis that followed the Brexit referendum result in 2016 has been 
marked by a loss of confidence in established political and economic ideas. The Grenfell 
Tower fire in 2017 has raised fundamental questions about the quality and safety of the 
built environment and about social relations in housing. Most recently, the Covid-19 
pandemic has meant a crisis in public health that has required public spending on a 
previously unimaginable scale to protect the economy.   
This state of perceived crisis in the housing system and in the political, economic and social 
systems that surround it should offer fertile ground for policy change (Hall, 1993; Blyth, 
2002). These endogenous and exogenous shocks to the system have undermined 
confidence in existing policies and led both to a proliferation of new ideas and a revival of 
previous policy agendas. In conditions that appear ideally suited to radical policy change, 





1.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The approach is based on the concept of policy paradigms (Hall, 1993) as developed in the 
literature that followed (Greener, 2001; Oliver and Pemberton, 2004; Howlett & Cashore, 
2007; Carson et al, 2009; Carstensen, 2011; Kay, 2011; Kern et al, 2014; Daigneault, 2015; 
Nicholls & Teasdale, 2017). Hall (1993, p279) defined a policy paradigm as a ‘framework of 
ideas and standards’ used by policy makers ‘that specifies not only the goals of policy and 
the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them but also the very nature of the 
problems they are meant to be addressing’.  
Under this approach, policies are broken down into their ideational elements, together 
making up a policy paradigm. Hall argued that policy instrument settings, the instruments 
themselves and the hierarchy of goals behind policy are three different orders of change. 
The components of a paradigm have subsequently been classified in a range of different 
ways but with a shared focus on abstract ideas, policy objectives and policy means. This is 
one strand in a broader ideational and institutionalist literature (Blyth, 2002; Campbell, 
2002; Fischer, 2003; Béland, 2009, 2016; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010) that has informed 
studies of policy change. 
Hall argued that an accumulation of policy anomalies and failures undermined the dominant 
Keynesian economic policy paradigm in the 1970s and created space for the adoption of 
alternative Monetarist ideas before this new paradigm was consolidated with the 
Conservative victory at the 1979 election. In this technical field of policy making he held that 
paradigms operate like gestalts, ways of thinking about the world that are 
incommensurable. Most of the literature that followed has adopted a softer version of 
paradigms in which there can be some commensurability between ideational frameworks 
and change can take place gradually and endogenously rather than suddenly as a result of 
an exogenous shock.  
An investigation of the extent to which paradigmatic change has occurred in the case of 
housing in England since 2007 involves the underlying, and often unquestioned, 
assumptions that lie behind policy. It must also consider the relationship between housing 
policy and policy paradigms in related fields such as economic and welfare policy (Nicholls 
and Teasdale, 2017).   
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1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
My project seeks to answer two main research questions: 
1) What have been the factors influencing policy change in housing in England since the 
Global Financial Crisis?  
2) Does this change amount to a change in policy paradigm? 
Within this overall structure, it will also seek to answer these sub-questions: 
i) Was there an identifiable policy paradigm for housing in 2007? 
ii) What policy ideas have emerged in housing over the period? 
iii) What have been the key factors and/or actors influencing policy change? 
iv) How has housing policy changed since 2007? 
My first question asks about policy change in housing rather than changes in housing policy 
to allow for a broader assessment of developments outside formal ‘policy’. Section 4.2 of 
Chapter 4 explains the decision to restrict the study to England and the need to cover the 
period before as well as after the start of the financial crisis in 2007. Implicit in my second 
question are the issues of what constitutes a paradigm and how to define a ‘paradigm shift’. 
These are addressed in Chapter 2.  
 
1.3 STRUCTURE 
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on policy paradigms, 
tracing the evolution of the concept and ways in which has been operationalised in studies 
of policy change. Chapter 3 reviews the literature on housing and the policy developments 
that led to a sense of ‘housing crisis’. However, it also looks beyond narrow ‘housing policy’ 
to consider housing in relation to the literatures on the welfare state and political economy. 
Chapter 4 sets out the methodology and outlines how the paradigms framework will be 
used to assess policy change in housing. 
This is followed by two chapters of research findings. Chapter 5 uses official documents to 
establish whether there was an identifiable housing policy paradigm in the years leading up 
to the Global Financial Crisis and makes a tentative assessment of whether there has been a 
paradigm shift since. Chapter 6 is based on interviews with key policy actors inside and 
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outside government and investigates policy change since 2007 with more nuance and 
depth. The findings also position housing in the context of developments in broader policy 
and political economy.   
Chapter 7 assesses the findings in the context of the paradigms and housing literature. 
Chapter 8 discusses the findings in relation to my research questions, reflects on the 




IDEAS AND POLICY PARADIGMS 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This study takes a policy paradigms approach to assessing policy change in housing in 
England since the Global Financial Crisis. It does so within a broader context of the literature 
on the role played by ideas and institutions in explaining policy change (Surel, 2000; 
Campbell, 2002; Béland and Cox, 2010; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Mehta, 2010; Béland, 
2016). Broadly, there is ‘agreement among scholars of comparative politics that “normal” 
policy making is guided by more or less coherent interpretive frameworks that consist of 
beliefs about how the world works and should work in a policy domain’ (Skogstad and 
Schmidt, 2011, p6).  
The starting point is the approach proposed by Hall (1993) in explaining the shift from 
Keynesian to Monetarist macro-economic policy in the UK in the 1970s and 1980s. Hall drew 
on Kuhn’s (1970a) work on the philosophy of science and Heclo’s (1974) work on ‘social 
learning’ in an attempt to understand politics and policy making as more than just the 
products of material interests. General criticisms of policy paradigms include its 
‘structuralism’ in denying agency to policy actors and its reliance on a ‘punctuated 
equilibrium’ model of policy change (Carstensen, 2011). Nevertheless, his widely-cited 
paper was hailed on its 20th anniversary for the way it had brought ‘ideas back in’ to an 
understanding of the policy process while retaining a focus on institutions (Blyth, 2013).   
The study is based on the development of the paradigms framework in the literature that 
followed Hall in a variety of different policy contexts. These approaches have moved beyond 
Hall’s three orders of change  to shine additional light on policy means and policy ends and 
embraced a ‘softer’ version of paradigms that allows for some commensurability between 
them (Daigneault, 2014; Hannah, 2020). The study draws in particular on Daigneault’s 
(2015, p50) four ‘fundamental, constitutive dimensions of the concept’: ideas about the 
nature of reality, social justice and the role of the state; a conception of the problem that 
requires public intervention; ideas about policy ends and objectives; and ideas about 
appropriate policy means to achieve those ends. Considering the relationship between 
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housing and policy in other areas, and especially its relationship to Hall’s case of macro-
economic policy making, it also draws on Nicholls and Teasdale’s (2017) idea of ‘nested 
paradigms’.  
While widely used in the policy studies literature, policy paradigms and historical 
institutionalist approaches are still relatively rare in the housing literature (see Section 3.7), 
in which paradigms are mostly used as metaphors or heuristic devices rather than in more 
systematic accounts of policy change. The chapter that follows looks first at Hall’s 
conception of policy paradigms, then at critiques of his framework and conceptions of how 
‘paradigm shift’ happens. It then considers how paradigms have been operationalised in 
different policy contexts, and in particular in economic policy making before and after the 
financial crisis, before briefly assessing how they might be useful in the context of housing 
policy. 
 
2.2 HALL, KUHN AND PARADIGMS 
Kuhn (1970a) argued that scientific communities work within a set of received beliefs that 
set a framework for ‘normal science’ but that these can be subverted by anomalies until 
they reach a crisis point and go through a period of ‘extraordinary science’ and a shift to a 
new paradigm. Though the idea was controversial and provoked extensive debate (Wilder, 
2015a), it has had an enduring influence that continues to be felt in fields such as 
technological innovation (Perez, 2010) as well as in public policy.  
Hall also drew on Heclo’s (1974, p306) conception of policy making  as ‘a form of collective 
puzzlement on society’s behalf’ in which ‘much political interaction has constituted a 
process of social learning expressed through policy’. For Hall, social learning had potential to 
illuminate what happens inside the ‘black box’ of the state but lacked a clear picture of the 
way that ideas fit into the policy process. The key questions for him were how the ideas that 
underpin policy change course, whether the process of social learning is incremental or 
marked by upheaval, and the nature of the roles played by bureaucrats, politicians and 
societal organisations as actors in these processes.  
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However, while highlighting the importance of ideas in policymaking, this still did not 
explain their role. Hall drew on the literature, including Jenson’s work on ‘societal 
paradigms’ (1989), to argue that: 
‘Policymakers customarily work within a framework of ideas and standards that 
specifies not only the goals of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to 
attain them, but also the very nature of the problems they are meant to be 
addressing. Like a Gestalt, this framework is embedded in the very terminology 
through which policy makers communicate about their work, and it is influential 
precisely because so much of it is taken for granted and unamenable to scrutiny as a 
whole. I am going to call this interpretive framework a policy paradigm.’ (Hall, 1993, 
p279) 
The concept of a paradigm was borrowed from Kuhn along with the idea that first and 
second order change can be seen as cases of ‘normal policymaking’ that ‘adjusts policy 
without challenging the overall terms of a given policy paradigm’. Third order change was ‘a 
very different process, marked by the radical changes in the overarching terms of policy 
discourse associated with a “paradigm shift” (ibid, p279). His case of macro-economic 
policymaking in Britain from 1970 to 1989 was chosen on the basis that paradigms are likely 
to be most evident in contexts in which the learning process is managed by officials and 
experts with long tenures in office. For Hall ‘the radical shift from Keynesian to monetarist 
modes of macro-economic regulation’ (Hall, 1993, p279) involved all three orders of change. 
Hall was writing in a context in which ‘new institutionalisms’ (Béland and Cox, 2010) had 
turned to ideas as a way of moving beyond materialist explanations of policy change. Others 
were proposing similar ideas expressed in different language at the same time. 
Baumgartner and Jones were arguing that ‘the emergence of a new policy “image” can 
weaken the claim of jurisdictional authority that a “venue” has over an issue’ (Baumgartner, 
2013, p240). Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) were distinguishing between ‘deep core’ 
and ‘policy core’ beliefs in their work on the Advocacy Coalition Framework. The literatures 
on welfare state regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990) and varieties of capitalism (in which Hall 




2.3  CRITIQUES OF HALL 
Hall’s account of policy paradigms raises many points that have been influential, and 
sometimes controversial, in the literature. Two issues in particular stand out: the 
commensurability or otherwise of paradigms; and how paradigmatic change takes place.  
 
2.3.1 (IN)COMMENSURABILITY 
Incommensurability appeared to be an essential feature of Kuhn’s original conception of 
paradigms, as he argued that it is not possible to have two gestalts at once or elements of 
one gestalt as parts of another (Wilder, 2015a, p21). However, Kuhn later acknowledged 
that he had used paradigms in different ways, first as ‘the entire constellation of beliefs’ and 
second as ‘one sort of element in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which, 
employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the 
remaining puzzles of normal science’ (Kuhn, 1970b, p175).  
Hall too seems at first to argue for a hard distinction between paradigms: 
‘Paradigms are by definition never fully commensurable in scientific or technical 
terms. Because each paradigm contains its own account of how the world facing 
policy makers operates and each account is different, it is often impossible to agree 
on a common body of data against which a technical judgment in favour of one 
paradigm over another might be made.’ (Hall, 1993, p280).  
This has been taken to mean that he is arguing that paradigms must be incommensurable 
(Princen and Van Esch, 2016) but this may miss his caveat about this being ‘in scientific or 
technical terms’. Hall (1993, p280) goes on to draw implications from this that suggest he is 
making a more complex argument: that the process of paradigm replacement ‘is likely to be 
more sociological than scientific’ and involve politics, competing factions and exogenous 
factors; that ‘issues of authority’ are likely to be central to the process; and that ‘instances 
of policy experimentation and policy failure’ are likely to play a key role.  
Hall anticipates that policy paradigms may not always work in the same way in different 
policy fields as not all of them ‘will possess policy paradigms as elaborate or forceful as the 
ones associated with macro-economic policy making’ (ibid, p291). By contrast, there will be 
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other fields of policy that do not have ‘a fully elaborated policy paradigm’ and where ‘the 
web of ideas affecting the direction of policy will be looser and subject to more frequent 
variations’. Even here, though, ‘we should not discount altogether the impact that an 
overarching set of ideas can have on policy’ as ‘even the most cynical bureaucrats and 
politicians must still rationalise their actions’ in terms that gain support (ibid p291). He goes 
on: 
‘Moreover their actions are invariably based on a particular understanding of that 
sphere of the world which policy addresses. The terms of discourse in which that 
sphere and the policies appropriate to it are discussed constrain and often enable 
often in highly specific ways. Even where the leitmotif of policy is simply an 
overarching metaphor, such as the “war on drugs” or the “problem of welfare 
mothers”, the metaphor and its attendant elaborations can structure many aspects 
of what is to be done. Policymaking in virtually all fields takes place within the 
context of a particular set of ideas that recognise some social interests as more 
legitimate than others and privilege some lines of policy over others.’ (ibid p292). 
In 2013, 20 years after his original paper, Hall drew a more explicit distinction between 
different types of paradigm as he argued that those who detected a return to Keynesianism 
at the time ‘underestimate the extent to which a paradigm overarching enough to usher in a 
new era (as distinct from narrower paradigms that often dominate specific areas of policy) 
must speak to broader political issues if it is to have a compelling appeal’ (Hall, 2013, p191).  
In the literature that followed Hall, a softer version of the concept has come to predominate 
in which new paradigms can be layered on top of existing ones in ‘policy hybrids’ (Béland, 
2007) and ‘paradigmatic contestation’ (Alons, 2017) and ‘relative incommensurability’ 
(Wilder, 2015b) are highlighted. Oliver and Pemberton (2004) challenge Hall on an empirical 
as well as conceptual basis, arguing that economic policy making in the UK was marked by 
partial, rather than wholesale, paradigm change. Schmidt (2011, p42) questions the extent 
to which any one paradigm can be dominant at a time or over time: paradigms never expire 
but wait to be resuscitated when new events call for new explanations; and conflicts are 
embedded within paradigms as a result of past compromises among actors with different 
ideas. Surel (2000, p502) argues that a paradigm acts more as a ‘bounded space for conflict’ 
than as something that homogenises the social sphere.  
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Paradigms have faced a challenge from an alternative conception of policy change in which 
policy makers act as ‘bricoleurs’ rather than as ‘paradigm men’ whose actions are 
determined by a particular mode of thinking (Carstensen, 2011). Bricolage – ‘mediating 
between ways of thinking’ (Freeman, 2007) – leaves space for power to determine what 
actors treat as anomalies (Carstensen and Matthijs, 2017). However, anomalies continue to 
be considered as important variables that stretch dominant ideational frames and help 
bring ‘solutions previously not deemed worthy of consideration into the ambit of acceptable 
ideas’ (Wilder and Howlett, 2015, p103). 
Others perceive more of a spectrum spanning strong and weak versions of paradigms and 
bricolage (Hannah, 2020). Béland and Petersen (2017, p17) argue that ‘it is probably better 
to see paradigms and bricolage as two poles between which most policy alternatives 
formulated within the policy stream are located, rather than as two radically distinct and 
incompatible realities’. Empirical support for a more pragmatic version of paradigms comes 
from Skogstad (2011, p239) in a summary of a series of case studies in different policy areas 
across different countries that show that some paradigms are incommensurable and 
coherent while others ‘contain conflicting ideas that are at least partly commensurable with 
one another’.  
 
2.3.2 THE NATURE OF POLICY CHANGE 
Hall’s conception of paradigms has been seen in part as a response to criticism about 
historical institutionalism being better at explaining continuity than change (Rayner, 2015, 
p64). He was in turn criticised for relying on a ‘punctuated equilibrium’ model and for 
making an artificial distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ times. Accepting that policy 
paradigms can be commensurable has epistemological consequences, most notably that 
policy change should be conceived as an evolutionary rather than revolutionary process 
(Wilder, 2015a, p33).  
Howlett and Cashore (2007) criticise a ‘new orthodoxy’ that sees policy change as a 
homeostatic process in which exogenous upheaval plays a key role as opposed to a 
‘thermostatic’ one in which change can occur via endogenous processes. The problem, as 
they saw it, was that Hall’s original conception of paradigms had incorrectly juxtaposed 
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different levels of policy making. Rather than Hall’s three orders, ‘every “policy” is in fact a 
more complex regime of ends and means-related goals (more abstract), objectives (less 
abstract), and settings (least abstract)’ (Howlett and Cashore, 2007, p54).  
Most of the literature now accepts a more nuanced view of the sources of policy change 
that considers endogenous and exogenous factors and the interplay between them. 
Historical institutionalists have developed a more incremental conception of change 
encompassing endogenous processes such as drift, layering and conversion (Mahoney and 
Thelen, 2010) that also links to the literature on bricolage. Carstensen (2017, p140) 
distinguishes between ‘limited bricolage’ that is akin to conversion as  institutional elements 
with a different logic of action are grafted into the existing set-up and ‘expansive bricolage’ 
that is more like the layering of new elements into it.  
Others have continued to emphasise the importance of crises, not just as moments of 
breakdown but also as moments that create the possibility of political agency or challenge 
(Hay, 2001; Kern, Kuzemko and Mitchell, 2015).  Constructivists have analysed crises as 
events that need to be narrated and explained as problems that need the attention of policy 
makers (Blyth, 2002). Critical juncture theory draws on discursive institutionalism (Schmidt 
2008; 2011) to overcome the allegedly static and overly determinist nature of traditional 
institutionalism; it argues that a crisis can lead to the displacement of a paradigm by a new 
set of ideas but that without ideational change policy change will be relatively minor (Hogan 
and O’Rourke, 2015, p167-8). As Skogstad (2011, p242) sums up the debate: ‘What is 
ultimately consequential to paradigm development is the interpretation actors give of 
events and how such interpretations shape others’ understandings of appropriate and 
effective public policies’.  
 
2.4  LEVELS OF ANALYSIS 
For all these criticisms and reworkings of policy paradigms, Hall’s original paper continues to 
be highly influential in the literature. The strengths and weaknesses of his conception of 
paradigms arguably stem from the same source: the way that it straddles different kinds of 
reasoning and works at different conceptual levels (Kay, 2011). Blyth (2013) detects two 
different versions of the policy paradigm within Hall’s paper: a Bayesian version (concerned 
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with social learning as rational updating of policy) and a constructivist version (concerned 
with issues of interpretation and authority contests). This tallies with Hall’s identification of 
scientific and sociological drivers for paradigm change but Blyth argues that, while both 
sides matter, they cannot both matter at the same time. ‘This, I maintain, is the policy 
paradigms paradox.’ (ibid, p199).  
Hall’s acknowledgment that not all fields of policy will have ‘fully elaborated’ paradigms 
(Hall, 1993, p292) raises obvious questions about how paradigms might work in areas that 
come below economic policy in the policy hierarchy or those where more than one 
government department may be involved and conflict between them is part of the policy 
making process (Zittoun, 2015). These questions are addressed in more detail later but it is 
worth making some brief observations here first. 
Macro, meso and micro levels of analysis are familiar concepts in social science and in the 
literature on institutions and organisations (Scott, 2008). Between the narrow sub-system 
(micro), wider organisation (meso) and expansive organisational field (macro), change 
emerges from mismatches between how actors at different vertical levels transmit and 
interpret institutions (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013, p118) but there may also be horizontal 
connections between institutions.  
Drawing on cross-national case studies of several different policy areas, Skogstad (2011, 
p249) posits a role for ‘meta’ ideas and policy-nested effects: ‘Sectoral policy ideas are 
nested within meta ideas, even where they are complementary to, or in conflict, with them 
in some respects.’. Domestic sectoral policies could therefore be ‘nested within dominant 
polity-wide ideas’. Nicholls and Teasdale (2017) draw on Kuhn’s (1974) later work arguing 
that paradigms operate at two different levels1 to develop the idea of ‘nested’ paradigms, 
operating at macro, meso and micro levels. In their analysis, social enterprise is seen as a 
micro-paradigm nested within, and framed by, meso-paradigms such as welfare and 
economic policy that in turn are nested within an overall neo-liberal political-economic 
paradigm.  
 
1 A global level across the scientific community and a local level within a particular scientific professional group  
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Bearing in mind Hall’s observation that policy paradigms may operate in different ways in 
different fields of policy, this suggests a need to keep an open mind on classification and 
categorisation and to develop a framework suited to the particular field under investigation.  
 
2.5 OPERATIONALISING PARADIGMS 
Scholars have drawn on Hall’s framework to analyse policy change in a wide range of 
different fields. In some of this literature, Hall’s three orders of change are used relatively 
uncritically, with scholars seeking to confirm the presence or absence of changes in settings, 
instruments and the hierarchy of goals behind policy. Fewer attempts have been made to 
operationalise a softer version of policy paradigms that embraces evolutionary as well as 
revolutionary change. The first section below looks at the application of policy paradigms 
and proposed conceptual refinements. The second looks specifically at the literature on 
paradigms in economic policy, the case on which Hall based his argument, but also begins to 
make connections with housing. The third considers the implications of this for a study of 
policy change in housing and reviews the few studies that have adopted this approach.  
 
2.5.1 CONCEPTUAL REFINEMENTS  
Policy paradigms have been applied in a range of policy areas and national and cross-
national contexts. International examples include health insurance in Australia (Kay, 2007), 
social assistance and trade-industrial policy in Canada (Daigneault, 2015; Wilder, 2015b), 
forestry policy and healthcare in the United States (Howlett and Cashore, 2007; Hannah, 
2020), financial capitalism in Germany (Röper, 2018), industrial policy in Ireland (Hogan and 
O’Rourke, 2015) and biofuel technologies in the US and EU (Skogstad and Wilder, 2019). In a 
UK context, examples include studies of energy policy (Kern, Kuzemko and Mitchell 2014, 
2015), local government (Gardner, 2017) and social enterprise (Nicholls and Teasdale, 
2017).  
Scholars have sought to refine Hall’s three orders of change to devise a model that better 
captures the ideational aspects of policy change. Oliver and Pemberton (2004) outline an 
evolutionary, iterative framework that runs from paradigm stability to anomalies, 
experimentation, fragmentation of authority, the adoption of new ideas and the battle to 
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institutionalise a new policy framework to the institutionalisation of a new policy paradigm, 
with potential for success or failure, rejection or acceptance at each stage.  
Howlett and Cashore (2007) develop a modified taxonomy of policy components, three 
related to policy ends or aims (goals, objectives and settings) and three related to policy 
means or tools (instrument logic, mechanisms and calibrations). This was in turn adapted by  
Wilder (2015a) as a six-part disaggregation into three means-related (instrument settings, 
selection and implementation preferences) and three ends-related (instrument targets, 
programmatic objectives and paradigmatic goals) components. 
Greener (2001) argued for four dimensions: beliefs about cause and effect; desired policy 
outcomes; main policy instruments and indicators; and under-girding ideas. Kern, Kuzemko 
and Mitchell (2014, 2015) also outline four dimensions – ideas about the subject and how it 
should be governed, goals, instruments and governance institutions – and proposed a fifth 
(changes in system actors and their behaviours). Daigneault (2015) proposes a framework of 
four elements: ideas about the nature of reality, social justice and the role of the state;  a 
conception of the problem that requires public intervention; ideas about policy ends and 
objectives; and ideas about appropriate policy means to achieve those ends. 
These approaches all attempt to build on Hall’s ideas by moving beyond his three orders of 
change and share a focus on means and ends and cause and effect. A paradigm shift is still 
taken to mean a significant change between two periods in time (Daigneault, 2015; Kern, 
Kuzemko and Mitchell, 2015). However, change is conceived as a complex ‘thermostatic’ 
process with exogenous and endogenous sources rather than a ‘homeostatic’ one requiring 
an exogenous shock (Howlett and Cashore, 2007).  
Much of the literature also finds problematic the notion of a logical order running from 
principles to instruments to settings (Kay, 2011; Zittoun, 2015). For example, instruments 
may have ideological as well as technical properties and be more significant than Hall allows 
(Greener, 2001). Policy instruments may become institutions that ‘will eventually privilege 
certain actors and interests and exclude others; they constrain the actors while offering 
them possibilities; they drive forward a certain representation of problems’ and open new 
perspectives for interpretation by actors (Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2007, p9). They may also 
become ‘instrument constituencies’ that develop a life of their own (Simons and Voss, 2017) 
as actors gather together and advocate particular solutions, ‘often regardless of the nature 
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of the problem to which they might be applied’ (Capano and Howlett, 2020 ). In a similar 
vein, ambiguous ideas can act as ‘coalition magnets’ (Béland and Cox (2016) that appeal to 
different groups to open a path for policy reform. 
 
2.5.2 ECONOMIC POLICY PARADIGMS 
The paradigms framework has been applied in several different studies of Hall’s case of 
macro-economic policy making in the UK. Some examine the same transition from 
Keynesianism to Monetarism (Oliver and Pemberton, 2004), others look at a broader sweep 
of policy in the second half of the 20th century (Greener, 2001) or policy since 1990 
(Carstensen and Matthijs, 2018) and analyse developments since the Global Financial Crisis 
(Kay 2011, Baker 2013, Clift 2018).  
While Hall concluded that the transition to Monetarism constituted a paradigm shift, other 
scholars have reached different conclusions about the same case and as a result questioned 
his broader claims about incommensurability and internal coherence. In an alternative 
account of the case, Oliver and Pemberton (2004)  found that more than one paradigm had 
co-existed at different points in the 20th century and that ‘partial’ acceptance and rejection 
of new policy goals was common as political and administrative battles took place over the 
institutionalisation of new paradigmatic frameworks. They concluded that ‘paradigm change 
seems to be far more evolutionary than Hall’s typology of change allows’ (Oliver and 
Pemberton, 2004, p436).  
Support for this view comes from other scholars looking at economic policy before and after 
the period analysed by Hall. Clift (2020) claims that Monetarism had already been ‘hollowed 
out’ by the late 1980s with economic ideas adopted from New Keynesianism but that this 
has been under-appreciated because of the ‘blinkers’ of the paradigm framework. 
Daugbjerg and Kay (2020) argue that New Consensus Marcroeconomics (NCM, Arestis and 
Sawyer, 2008) had already superseded Monetarism by the time Hall published his paper in 
1993. This empirical evidence of a synthesis of ideas from what should, in Hall’s terms, be 
incommensurable paradigms undermines the ‘hard’ version of his conceptual framework 
and lends support to Oliver and Pemberton’s more evolutionary view. However, like all 
frameworks, NCM embodied cognitive and normative assumptions about the way that the 
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economy works. It emphasised fiscal discipline and monetary policy that focussed narrowly 
on consumer price inflation, it excluded wider financial system variables, and it made 
assumptions about perfect capital markets (Clift, 2018). Regulation of the financial system 
was marked by ‘regulatory liberalism’ (Mügge 2011) while the effect of the Labour 
government’s decision on Bank of England independence in 1997 was to ‘institutionalise low 
inflation as the primary goal of monetary policy’ (Carstensen and Matthijs, 2018, p441).  
This was the economic policy paradigm that was fundamentally challenged by the Global 
Financial Crisis. For a time it seemed as though policy had responded by re-adopting 
Keynesian ideas about counter-cyclical stimulus (Palier, 2013; Clift, 2018) but this gave way 
to a sense that little had fundamentally changed. What followed has been variously 
interpreted in the literature as ‘intra-paradigm change’ (Carstensen and Matthijs, 2015) and 
extraordinary innovation in monetary policy that was nevertheless ‘normal policy making’ 
(Kay, 2011). Contrary to Hall’s expectations about the role of anomalies at the level of 
instruments and settings in undermining the paradigm, Daugbjerg and Kay (2020) find that 
such ‘negative feedback’ had helped to generate the innovations in monetary policy that 
helped to stabilise it, while Matthijs and Blyth (2018) argue that social learning from the 
Euro crisis led to paradigm maintenance rather than change. At the level of policymaking 
involving technical issues where Hall had posited that forceful paradigms were most likely to 
be found, studies instead found officials at the European Commission (Schmidt, 2016) and 
International Monetary Fund (Clift, 2018) engaged in bricolage as they pragmatically sought 
policy solutions. However, Princen and Van Esch (2016) argue that the evolution of the EU’s 
Stability and Growth Pact was more than bricolage and amounted to a ‘moving 
paradigmatic core’, while Johnson, Arel-Bundock, and Portniaguine (2019) offer an account 
of a similar process of layering of new elements into the paradigmatic core among central 
bankers.  
On the face of it, the post-GFC literature confounds many of Hall’s basic assumptions and 
casts doubt on the efficacy of the paradigms framework. However, this ignores a debate 
concerning the level of analysis. Scholars who see political economy as governed by 
neoliberalism tend to detect little change in this paradigm, with resilient neoliberal ideas 
‘one of the major themes of our epoch’ (Schmidt and Thatcher, 2013,  p40). Drawing on 
Blyth’s (2013) argument about the two different versions of learning embodied in Hall’s 
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framework, Carstensen and Matthijs (2018) argue that constructivist learning trumps 
Bayesian learning in the evolution of ideas within neoliberalism, helping to explain why it 
endured. Ban (2020) argues that rather than engaging in the bricolage detected by Clift 
(2018), officials at the IMF were instead adapting neoliberalism.  
By contrast, those who reject such an all-embracing view of neoliberalism tend to see more 
sensitivity to change. Dodson (2020, p97) calls neoliberal accounts ‘simplistic’ and 
neoliberalism itself ‘somewhere between a strawman and a bogeyman’. From this 
perspective, neoliberalism is more a ‘polysemic cluster’ than a policy paradigm (Béland and 
Cox, 2016, p431) and defining it as the latter ignores a transformation in discourse about 
the economy since 2008 (Hunt and Stanley, 2019).  Clift himself calls the terminology 
‘analytically debilitating’ and points out that the IMF shifted from, for example, a pre-crisis 
acceptance of Ricardian equivalence to a post-crash position where it rejected it: ‘Those are 
two incommensurable world-views and fundamentally different understandings of the 
economy and policy. If this shift remains within a paradigm with the same label, then the 
concept risks being stretched in ways which limit its analytical purchase.’ (Clift 2020a, p102).   
These more nuanced accounts detect far more policy change since 2007. Kay (2011) argues 
that, while it is difficult to establish paradigm change in UK monetary policy, ‘policy 
spillovers’ led to considerable change elsewhere. Baker (2013) sees the post-crisis switch to 
macro-prudential regulation as third order change in Hall’s terms even if first and second 
order change were more contested. Daugbjerg and Kay (2020) find that, counter-intuitively, 
‘positive feedback’ on the pre-crisis regulatory regime dulled incentives for policy makers to 
anticipate problems and so left the paradigm vulnerable to change.  
 
2.5.3 PARADIGM SHIFTS  
So what constitutes a paradigm shift – and how does paradigmatic change differ from policy 
change that might be seen as part of ‘normal’ policy making? Answering these questions 
involves a series of judgements about what sort of change is detected, over what period it 
takes place, and who is involved.  
Daigneault (2015, p52, original emphasis) contends that: ‘A paradigm shift occurs when 
there is significant change on all four dimensions of the concept between two periods.’ He 
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takes ‘significant’ to mean ‘substantial departure’ from a given policy equilibrium while also 
arguing that change can be ‘significant’ yet gradual and cumulative. However, he insists that 
his other conditions for the existence of a paradigm – internal coherence and prevalence 
within a given policy community – must also be satisfied.  On the point about internal 
coherence, Carson, Burns and Calvo (2009, p392) argue that it is the ‘seemingly coherent 
approach’ to phenomena that is important rather than a detailed policy prescription 
because open-endedness brings with it possibility and promise (ibid, p393) while Skogstad 
(2011, p238) contends that paradigms may vary in both their commensurability and their 
coherence. 
A softer version of policy paradigms allows change that is incremental rather than abrupt 
and that may be something less than wholesale paradigm shift but nevertheless more than 
the first or second order change specified in Hall’s framework. The discursive battle to 
institutionalise ideas may end in defeat, raising the possibility that some elements of the 
existing paradigm may not be replaced (Wilder and Howlett, 2015, p106) and the result may 
be ‘synthetic paradigms’ (Kay, 2007) that mix sometimes contradictory policy ideas.  
The nature of a paradigm shift (if any) may also depend on the particular policy context. 
Carson, Burns and Calvo (2009, p95) conclude from their study of paradigms in multiple 
policy contexts in the European Union that paradigm shifts constitute ‘what amounts to 
conceptual and organisational tipping points in an ongoing, often incremental process that 
began long before the “shift” is said to occur – and is likely to continue for some time 
afterwards’ (ibid, p375). This formulation is very different to Kuhn’s original idea of a 
‘scientific revolution’. 
Finally, there is the question of how long change must endure before it can be declared a 
paradigm shift. This is about change at a deeper level than that observed when one political 
party takes over from another following an election. The existence of a policy paradigm 
implies that the parties are operating within interpretive frameworks that share some 
cognitive and normative ideas about the policy area even if the policy emphasis is different 
and so a change in policy paradigm is about more than just one party adopting a different 
policy platform. In their elaboration of critical junctures theory, Hogan and O’Rourke (2015, 
p183) put the case for changes that take place across different dimensions of policy ‘swiftly 
and for longer than one government’s term of office’.  
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In assessing the extent of a paradigm shift, we should therefore be looking for significant 
change between two periods of time but which also endures beyond the political short 
term. The shift may occur suddenly as a result of an exogenous shock but may also happen 
incrementally. It may be immediately apparent or may only be detected in retrospect after a 
series of gradual changes. Some degree of coherence is to be expected in any new 
interpretive framework but this picture may be confused by the persistence of some 
elements from the previous paradigm.  
 
2.5.4 APPLYING POLICY PARADIGMS TO HOUSING 
Any attempt to apply policy paradigms to a policy field such as housing must confront 
questions about the level of analysis and relationships with other policy fields. Where Hall’s 
case of macro-economic policy making can be seen as being at the top level of policy, a field 
such as housing is situated further down the policy hierarchy, mostly influenced by, yet 
sometimes having an influence on, more macro fields. Housing may blur into other ‘meso’ 
fields of social and economic policy with their own paradigms; and more than one ‘micro’ 
paradigm may be in operation within the different housing tenures. 
As pointed out above, ‘nested’ paradigms (Nicholls and Teasdale, 2017) offer one way of 
making sense of the relationship between different levels of policy. Nicholls and Teasdale 
propose a structure of nested policy paradigms ranging from the macro (political-economic) 
paradigm to the meso (welfare, economic, defence etc) to the micro (social enterprise, 
social investment etc). They argue that: 
‘This conceptualisation of nested policy paradigms implies a model whereby ideas 
flow from the macro- to meso- and micro-paradigms. However, we argue, these 
relationships are not purely hierarchical, and policy paradigms can be linked both 
vertically and horizontally. Paradigms at the same level may be interdependent, 
while micro-paradigms may be partially nested within two or more meso-
paradigms.’ (Nicholls and Teasdale, 2017, p327) 
As argued earlier, the consensus in the recent literature suggests an analytical focus on 
means and ends and cause and effect and on cognitive and normative ideas. It seems 
reasonable to expect that any housing policy paradigm will not be as ‘fully elaborated’ as 
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Hall argued was the case in the specialised field of macro-economic policy but that the 
actions of policy makers will still be based on ‘a particular understanding of that sphere of 
the world’ (Hall, 1993, p292). This also suggests an analytical focus on policy discourse – as 
emphasised by Hall in his original paper and within discursive institutionalism (Schmidt, 
2008, 2011) – and on the way that policy is justified and legitimised. Any change in the 
policy paradigm is also likely to be associated with policy anomalies and policy failures.  
Finally, bearing in mind earlier caveats about not attributing policy change to exogenous 
shocks alone, the literature suggests that crises and the way they are narrated (Blyth, 2013) 
will play an important role. The ways in which the multiple crises perceived since 2007 are 
narrated should give some indications of change or stability in the policy paradigm. The next 
chapter considers how policy change has been conceptualised within the housing literature 










POLICY CHANGE IN HOUSING 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Until relatively recently, housing stood outside of debates about policy change in the 
literature on political economy and the welfare state. Seminal work on welfare state 
regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990) and varieties of capitalism (Hall and Soskice, 2001) barely 
mentioned housing and housing systems defied these typologies by failing to conform to 
their theoretical and empirical predictions (Johnston and Kurzer, 2020). While debates 
within housing studies did make some links to wider agendas, policy change was seen in 
terms of processes of ‘modernisation’ (Malpass and Murie, 1999) and ‘residualisation’ 
(Forrest and Murie, 1988). The result was that ‘housing as policy’ tended to be the domain 
of housing studies while ‘housing as asset’ was treated as economics (Aalbers and 
Christophers, 2014). 
Broader connections between the literatures began to be drawn in the wake of shifts in 
political economy of the 1980s, with housing identified as one of the first areas of conflict 
between ‘social policy’ and radical liberalism (Bourdieu, 2005, p120). This cross-pollination 
accelerated in the run-up to and aftermath of a Global Financial Crisis that was itself 
intimately connected to housing through global capital flows, mortgage-backed securities 
and sub-prime lending (Schwartz, 2009). Relationships between housing, the welfare state 
and political economy are now routinely seen through the related lenses of asset-based 
welfare (Schwartz, 2009; Doling, 2017), financialisation (Watson, 2010; Aalbers, 2016) and 
neoliberalisation (Rolnik, 2013; Jacobs and Manzi, 2020). The debate continues to develop 
about the inter- and intra-generational consequences of wealth inequality generated by 
housing (Fuller, Johnston and Regan, 2020; Flynn, 2020). Previous gaps in the comparative 
literature have been filled by work on varieties of residential capitalism (Schwartz and 
Seabrooke, 2008).  
This chapter brings together themes from the different literatures related to policy change 
in housing. It begins with a narrow perspective on changes in housing tenure and 
contemporary ideas about a ‘housing crisis’ and steadily broadens its scope to take in two of 
the main problems that are perceived to require policy intervention, housing affordability 
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and inadequate supply. It then situates these issues within wider debates about changes in 
the relationship between housing and the welfare state, financialisation and political 
economy, highlighting in particular what has been called the policy regime of House Price 
Keynesianism (Crouch, 2009). It concludes with a review of what have been a limited 
number of applications of institutionalist and policy paradigms frameworks to policy change 
in housing.  
 
3.2 HOUSING TENURES AND HOUSING CRISIS 
One starting point for understanding policy change in housing is to consider changes in the 
balance of the different tenures that make up the housing system. These are conventionally 
defined as owner-occupation, private renting and social housing. Embedded within them 
are not just social relations but also ideas of what the relationship should be between the 
state and private initiative (Harloe, 1995). At the meso level, ‘housing policy’ and its 
relationships with other fields of policy set the parameters for these tenures and for the 
operation of the ‘housing system’ as a whole. Within my conceptual framework, tenures can 
be considered as institutions (Kemp, 2015) but the ideas behind the policies that shape 
them can also become micro-paradigms (Nicholls and Teasdale, 2017).  
The relative importance of these tenures has ebbed and flowed over the last 100 years: until 
the 1980s, the broad trends were increases in owner-occupation and council housing at the 
expense of private renting; council housing peaked in the late 1970s, then went into decline 
after the introduction of the Right to Buy (Forrest and Murie, 1988), and became ‘social 
housing’ when housing associations replaced local authorities as the main providers of new 
homes; and from the 2000s private renting began to grow again at the expense of owner-
occupation and ‘affordable housing’ began to develop2.  
The concept of ‘modernisation’ has gone through several iterations, perhaps reflecting its 
teleological connotations. Malpass and Murie (1999) built on work by Harloe (1985) to 
present modernisation as a way of understanding the shift from private renting to home 
ownership in the 20th century, with public housing serving as a bridge between the two and 
residualisation (Forrest and Murie, 1983) implicit in this process. Both have developed this 
 
2 For more details of these trends in tenure, see Appendix C. 
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position in subsequent work, with Murie (2009) noting the importance of social and spatial 
divisions within tenures and Malpass and Victory (2010) pointing to the shift from a public 
to a social housing model since 1990 as a different kind of modernisation.  
A more general ‘restructuring of housing tenure’ (Forrest, Murie and Williams, 1990, p179) 
has seen the characteristics and meanings of the different tenures change over time. The 
term ‘social housing’ has only existed since about 1990 (Malpass, 2005), shortly after the 
start of stock transfer3 to housing associations. For large parts of the 20th century, the 
private rented sector was subject to rent control and security of tenure for tenants, but 
rents are now deregulated and six-month tenancies are the norm.  
Within home ownership, the legal rights of owners have also evolved over time and are very 
different for freeholders and leaseholders. This is just one of the ways in which each of the 
tenures breaks down into different sub-tenures: ownership may be outright or mortgaged, 
freehold or leasehold and the mortgage may be interest-only or not; private tenants mostly 
have short-term tenancies but some still have secure tenancies; social tenants may rent 
from a council or housing association on slightly different terms but some may be also be on 
fixed-term or introductory tenancies or licenses; and a small but growing number of 
households occupy the space between owning and renting under shared ownership (Cowan, 
Carr and Wallace, 2017) and rent to buy schemes and equity ownership.  
For most of the 20th century, some of the most important changes in housing tenure can be 
directly attributed to changes in housing policy. In the past, tenure change has been fuelled 
as much by transfers between tenures as it has been by new supply. Most obviously, since 
1980 more than two million homes have been sold under the Right to Buy to council and 
housing association tenants in England (Wilcox et al, 2017) and a proportion of these have 
subsequently been bought by private landlords.  
Home ownership peaked at 70.9 per cent of the housing stock in England in 2002. However, 
most of the 21st century has been marked by a decline in owner-occupation (Heywood, 
2011; Sprigings, 2013) and rapid growth in the private rented sector and Generation Rent 
 
3 Process by which local authorities could transfer all of part of their housing stock to housing associations 
subject to the approval of a ballot of tenants. Housing associations raised private finance, which does not 
count as public borrowing, to pay for the transfer valuation and post-transfer improvements to the stock.  
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(Kemp, 2015; Byrne, 2020) in what has been characterised as a ‘post-homeownership 
society’ (Ronald and Kadi, 2017). Alternatively, an age of ‘late home ownership’ has arrived 
in which ‘the social and economic role of residential property ownership has changed 
fundamentally’ (Forrest and Hirayama, 2018, p258). This is characterised not just by 
financialisation but also by ‘refamilialisation’ and stratification between families based on 
their property wealth. As shown below, these trends are seen to be less the result of 
housing policy than of changes in economic and welfare policy and developments in global 
finance and political economy. In the wake of the deregulation of rents and tenancies in 
1988 and the creation of Buy to Let in 1996 (Kemp 2015), the private rented sector doubled 
in size by the mid-2010s to 20 per cent of households.  
The social housing sector continued its slow decline as a proportion of the stock but also 
experienced significant policy-driven changes to the rents and tenancy conditions that could 
mark a transition from a ‘safety net’ to ‘ambulance service’ role (Fitzpatrick and Pawson, 
2014). This has been accompanied by the rise of ‘affordable housing’, almost as a distinct 
tenure category in its own right (Whitehead and Williams, 2020). The term ‘affordable 
housing’ is used both as a generic description of forms of housing at sub-market rents and 
prices, including hybrid tenures such as shared ownership and rent to buy, and as a defined 
term in housing and planning legislation for requirements placed on developers. The term 
became controversial in the wake of government decisions to fund homes for ‘Affordable 
Rent’ (at up to 80 per cent of market rents) rather than traditional social rent (around 60 
per cent of market rents) and to deliver discounted market sale homes through the planning 
system rather than homes for rent. In an international context, ‘affordable housing’ has also 
become a pejorative term for turning housing for the poor into opportunities for profit 
(Blessing, 2016) and a loaded term signalling a shift to a neoliberal regime (Friedman and 
Rosen, 2019). In a UK context, interaction between welfare and housing policies have 
created a system in which affordability assessments have become the price of access to 
‘affordable housing’ (Preece, Hickman and Pattison, 2020). 
These developments in tenure and affordability have given rise to a general perception in 
the media and in political and policy circles that there is a ‘housing crisis’, not just in the UK 
but across the developed world (White and Nandedkar, 2019). The idea of a crisis is linked 
to a view that the housing system is not working as it should and that the housing market is 
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‘broken’. In the media, this is usually a reference to reduced access to home ownership but 
can be about many other issues including homelessness and insecurity and rising housing 
costs. However, this also relates to wider notions about the ubiquity of ‘crisis’ in 
contemporary societies since the events of 2007 and 2008 (Roitman, 2014). Within the 
paradigms and ideational literature, crises are understood as events that need to be 
narrated and explained as problems that require policy intervention (Blyth, 2002; Kern, 
Kuzemko and Mitchell, 2014) and the ‘housing crisis’ is no different.  
 
3.3 HOUSING, SUPPLY AND PLANNING 
The notion of a ‘broken housing market’ that can be fixed by increasing supply has been a 
dominant idea driving policy since the Barker review of housing supply for the government 
(Barker, 2004). There has been a broad policy consensus that the solution to housing 
affordability problems is to increase the supply of new homes.  
The consensus view is supported by an array of empirical evidence from the economics 
literature. Much of this comes from the United States (for example, Glaeser, Gyourko and 
Saks, 2005; Glaeser, Gyourko and Saiz, 2008), in work connecting regulatory barriers to new 
homes with rising prices that argues that localities with more elastic housing supply 
experience fewer and shorter house price bubbles. In the UK, empirical evidence is held to 
support the view that planning constraints underpin high house prices (Hilber and 
Vermeulen, 2014). In the housing literature, modelling of housing affordability (Meen, 2011) 
and forecasts of future housing need (Bramley, 2019) make the case for increased new 
supply within a more nuanced view of the importance of the overall size of the housing 
stock. The issue is also seen in the context of micro-economic constraints within the supply 
chain for new homes, including the business model of housebuilders, the construction skills 
base and the operation of the land market (Ryan-Collins, Lloyd and Macfarlane, 2017; 
Leishman, Frey and McGreal, 2019; Murray, 2021).  
More recently, the consensus view on supply has faced empirical challenge. In analysis 
distinguishing between housing costs (rents) and asset prices, Mulheirn (2019) argues that 
the role of undersupply in the affordability of housing has been overstated and that a 
shortage of housing did not contribute to house price increases between 1996 and 2018. He 
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highlights instead the importance of the cost and availability of credit in driving up house 
prices and the distribution of supply in failing to meet housing need. In a working paper for 
the Bank of England, Miles and Monro (2019) argue that, while real house prices in the UK 
have quadrupled in the last 40 years, rental yields have been trending downwards. They 
conclude that the rise in house prices relative to incomes between 1985 and 2018 can be 
more than accounted for by substantial decline in real risk-free interest rates.  
 
3.4 HOUSING AND THE WELFARE STATE 
Housing is fundamental to some definitions of the welfare state but excluded from others. 
In one dominant metaphor it is ‘the wobbly pillar under the welfare state’ (Torgerson, 1987) 
but housing has been seen instead as a ‘cornerstone’ of welfare restructuring (Malpass, 
2008).  
These differences are in part a product of housing’s ambiguous nature and different roles as 
shelter, home and asset. However, they also depend on conceptions of the welfare state 
and its scope. Malpass (2005) distinguishes between ‘narrow’ and ‘broad’ approaches to the 
welfare state, with the former focussing on public sector provision and the latter on all 
action by the state to influence provision across the system as a whole. Similarly, Schwartz 
(2012) argues that the regulation of housing finance should be seen as a central feature of a 
broad post-war welfare state.  
The treatment of housing costs influences the relationship between housing and the welfare 
state in both directions. Seeing housing in Britain as an example of welfare retrenchment, 
(Pierson, 1994) rather downplays the switch of resources from bricks and mortar subsidy of 
new council houses to personal subsidies of rents. This process accelerated after the 
creation of housing benefit in 19824 and its role in ‘taking the strain’ of higher rents 
following the introduction of private finance for housing associations and deregulation of 
the private rented sector after 1988 (HC Deb, 30 January 1991, Vol 184, Col 940). The 
availability of housing benefit for poorer tenants acted as an implicit income guarantee that 
underpinned the expansion of lending to landlords (Kemp, 2015). However, the escalating 
 
4 Housing benefit was created in 1982 and administered by the Department of Health and Social Security (now 
Department for Work and Pensions) via local authorities rather than as part of the housing finance system 
administered by the department responsible for housing. 
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cost looked like a perverse outcome for a policy born in the era of rolling back the state 
(Murie, 2009).  
In the austerity that followed the financial crisis, a series of cuts and reforms to housing 
benefit broke the previous direct link with rents. A new Local Housing Allowance for private 
tenants was capped and then frozen. Cuts for social tenants included the ‘bedroom tax’ on 
under-occupation (Cowan and Marsh, 2019). Larger families and those living in high-rent 
areas were subject to an overall benefit cap (Grover, 2020) and a major programme of 
welfare reform saw most working-age benefits and tax credits rolled up into one means-
tested Universal Credit. Housing begins to look less like a ‘wobbly pillar’ than a trailblazer for 
the switch to means testing, for the expansion of ‘choice’ and individual responsibility. 
While they do not frame it in terms of paradigms, O’Leary and Simcock (2020, p2) consider 
this programme of housing-related welfare reform to be a ‘meta-policy’ or ‘overarching 
framework that drives individual policy and programme developments over a substantial 
period’. 
This has to be seen within the context of a wider debate within the welfare state literature 
about asset-based welfare (Searle and McCollum, 2014; Fox O’Mahony and Overton, 2015; 
Lennartz and Ronald, 2017). The term was originally used to describe approaches to tackling 
poverty via small amounts of financial wealth but has come to mean housing asset-based 
welfare (Prabakar, 2109). In this form, it has been supported by housing policies such as 
low-cost home ownership (and before that the Right to Buy), state encouragement of 
mortgage lending to lower-income households and the liberalisation of housing finance.  
In fiscal policy, though mortgage interest tax relief was phased out in the 1990s, important 
tax reliefs and expenditures remain in place5. In monetary policy, a ‘housing bubble-
monetary policy nexus’ (Broome, 2009) of financial liberalisation, expansion of credit, 
central bank independence, and lower interest rates before the Global Financial Crisis had 
reduced mortgage payments and inflated asset prices for existing owners of property at the 
same time as making purchase more expensive for new buyers.  
 
5 For example, the main residence exemption from capital gains tax and a regressive system of local property 
taxation 
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The key dilemma for an asset-based welfare state is that the rising house prices that enable 
it to work for the majority of existing asset owners also restrict access for new entrants. 
Falling house prices would enable more access but undermine asset-based welfare and the 
apparent security offered by home ownership itself (Smith, 2015). The more that wealth 
becomes concentrated in the homes of asset owners, and the less widely distributed it is 
among the general population, the less scope there is for asset-based welfare to operate 
(Doling, 2017, p263).  
The dualization of housing wealth between owners and renters (Koppe and Searle, 2017) 
has been amplified by developments in the mortgage market outside ‘housing policy’. 
Before the creation of Buy to Let in 1996, landlords did not borrow to buy property and 
building societies were not keen to lend to landlords (Kemp, 2015). For banks, Buy to Let 
was a product where competition was lower, regulations less stringent and returns higher 
than in the traditional mortgage market (Murie and Williams, 2015). Landlords could borrow 
against their future rental income and, if a conventional mortgage to buy a house 
represents the only leveraged investment vehicle available to most people (Smith, 2015), 
then Buy to Let created a new one.  
Buy to Let and, more broadly, multiple property ownership (Kadi, Hochstenbach and 
Lennartz, 2020; Kemp, 2020) represent an enhanced form of asset-backed welfare (Soaita et 
al, 2017) whose development was supported through the broad welfare state. Housing 
benefit reduced income risks for landlords and increased the profitability of letting to lower-
income households (Murie and Williams, 2015).   
 
3.5 HOUSING AND FINANCIALISATION 
These trends were also seen in the literature as evidence of financialisation. Home 
ownership had combined with asset-based welfare and financialisation to produce 
‘investor-subjects’ (Watson, 2010) and home owners who saw themselves as ‘portfolio 
managers with the equity in our property as our main asset’ (Forrest, 2015, p2).  
Aalbers (2016a, p3) argues that ‘housing and finance are increasingly interdependent and 
that the financialisation of housing is the general mechanism through which we can analyse 
this growing interdependence’. The ‘Great Moderation’ in macro-economic cycles was also 
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the ‘Great Excess’ in credit and debt and rising inequality (Aalbers, 2016b). Financialisation 
across the economy as a whole is seen not just to have fuelled house price growth but also 
to have helped to produce the insecurity and precarity in the labour market that has 
excluded people from the secure, well-paid jobs that are a condition of access to home 
ownership (Arundel and Doling, 2017). Christophers (2019) argues that financialisation 
should be seen as just part of a wider ‘rentierisation’ of the UK economy.  
Until recently, much of the literature assumed that home ownership would continue to be 
the vehicle for further financialisation of housing, via increased personal debt and 
exploitation of ‘home as asset’. Since the financial crisis, scholars and policy analysts have 
turned their attention to the growth of private renting and the decline of ownership 
(Heywood, 2011) and considered the implications of these being more than just temporary 
phenomena (Sprigings 2013, Kemp 2015). Financialisation is seen to lie behind corporate 
takeovers of rental housing (Fields and Uffer, 2014), the emergence of institutional 
investment in social and affordable housing (Aalbers, van Loon and Fernandez, 2017; 
Wijburg and Waldron, 2020) and the growth of Buy to Let (Aalbers et al, 2020) and Build to 
Let (Nethercote, 2019) investment in the private rented sector. Forrest and Hirayama (2015, 
p233) argue that ‘a more vigorous, financialised private landlordism has emerged from the 
debris of the subprime meltdown’ in Britain, the USA, Australia and Japan.  
 
3.6  HOUSING AND POLITICAL ECONOMY  
Many scholars have used periodisation as a device to make sense of these changes and as a 
means of making cross-national comparisons between housing and welfare systems. Similar 
break points are often used in all three literatures: the creation of the welfare state after 
1945; the retrenchment that followed the IMF loan to the UK in 1976 and the election of the 
Thatcher government in 1979; and the Global Financial Crisis from 2007. Change is 
associated with the shift from Keynesianism to Monetarism in macro-economics and from 
Fordist to post-Fordist regimes of accumulation. These frameworks are not policy paradigms 
but there are similarities between them. 
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Table 1 provides a rough guide to the different periodisations used in the literature, with 
room for debate about the beginning and end of each period. The conceptualisations are 
drawn from the literature in this chapter as a whole.  
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TABLE 1: PERIODISATIONS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN HOUSING IN A WIDER POLICY CONTEXT 
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Drawn from: Aalbers (2016), Bohle and Seabrooke (2020), Christophers (2019), Crouch (2009), 
Daigneault (2014), Doling (2017), Forrest and Hirayama (2015, 2018), Malpass (2008), Malpass and 
Murie (1999), Murie (2009), O’Leary and Simcock (2020), Palier (2013), Rolnik (2013), Ronald (2008), 
Ronald and Kadi (2017) Torgerson (1987) Wood (2009)  
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Aalbers (2016a, p70) proposes three periods in the development of housing since the 
Second World War: a modern/Fordist period of mass rental and owner-occupied housing, 
with housing part of, and crucial to welfare policies; a flexible neoliberal, post-Fordist period 
featuring increasingly financialised home ownership; and a late neoliberal or post-crisis 
period in which access to home ownership has become increasingly difficult, the discourse 
of asset-based welfare has spread and more households are excluded.  
Seen from a slightly different perspective, these processes are about ‘three ages of 
homeownership’ (Forrest and Hirayama, 2018) that begin with ‘the exceptionalism of the 
post-war home ownership era’. The achievement of ownership by a majority of households 
for most of the 20th century and has been credited as a major factor in reducing inequality 
during that period (Piketty, 2012). However, ‘mature homeownership’, associated with high 
levels of outright ownership and large amounts of housing equity, helped to create the 
conditions for financialisation before giving way to an era of ‘late homeownership’ 
distinguished by social re-stratification (Forrest and Hirayama, 2018).  
Other scholars have seen changes in housing and broader political economy in terms of 
processes of neoliberalisation. Within Britain, private home ownership and deregulated 
mortgage lending played an integrating role (Wood, 2018). Across developed countries, a 
post-war ‘social project’ of home ownership and Keynesian-embedded liberalism was 
undermined by the economic project of neoliberalism, raising fundamental questions about 
the future of the tenure and its role as ‘a pillar of social integration’ (Forrest and Hirayama, 
2015, p243), while neoliberal reforms of social rented housing have ‘repackaged the poor’ 
for investors (Blessing, 2016).  
However, neoliberalism has also been criticised as a catch-all term that risks being ‘a 
substitute for explanations’:  Murie (2018) highlights the way that the ‘shrinking of the 
state’ in housing has been a contested and uneven process and challenges interpretations 
that see the growth of housing associations as simple ‘privatisation’. More subtle 
interpretations emphasise processes of ‘entrepreneurial governmentality’ as housing 
associations straddle welfare and commercial imperatives (Jacobs and Manzi, 2020) and the 
role of the state in programmes like Help to Buy (Green and Lavery, 2018).  
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3.6.1 HOUSE PRICE KEYNESIANISM 
Perhaps the most influential framing of housing through the lens of political economy and 
financialisation is the concept of ‘Privatised’ or ‘House Price’ Keynesianism. As first 
proposed by Crouch (2009, p382), this consists of ‘a system of markets alongside extensive 
housing and other debt among low- and medium- income people linked to unregulated 
derivatives markets’. Crouch presents this as a policy regime rather than a paradigm 
although its ‘unacknowledged’ nature bears obvious similarities to Hall’s ‘taken for granted’ 
framework. While Crouch does not use the term, it also reflects the emphasis of New 
Consensus Macroeconomics (Arestis and Sawyer, 2008: Daugbjerg and Kay, 2020) on fiscal 
conservativism, monetary policy narrowly targeting consumer price inflation and 
assumptions about perfect capital markets (Clift, 2018). Crouch applied the regime across 
Western economies but argued that it was especially marked in the UK in the wake of the 
Right to Buy moving large numbers of households on low and moderate incomes into the 
housing market.  
House Price Keynesianism aligns closely with themes in the literature on financialisation and 
asset-based welfare. By the 1990s, this regime was operating in an international context 
characterised by disinflation, high home ownership levels, and high levels of mortgage debt 
and securitisation (Schwartz, 2008). In the UK, it was given new impetus by the Labour 
government’s decisions to give the Bank of England independent control over interest rates 
within an inflation target in 1997 and then switch the measure of inflation used for that 
target to one that did not include house prices in 2003 (Hodson and Mabbett, 2009). Hay 
(2009b) argues that this seemingly technical change in effect amounted to an instruction 
from the chancellor to the governor of the Bank of England to ignore house price inflation.  
The financial crisis and credit crunch initially appeared to mark the end for House Price 
Keynesianism. However, this was to under-estimate the extent to which it had been ‘co-
opted as central public policy’ in advanced home ownership societies (Nethercote, 2019) 
Bail-outs for the banks, plus a series of extraordinary innovations in monetary policy, 
rescued the housing market as well as the financial system. In the UK, estimates by the Bank 
of England (Bunn, Pugh and Yeates, 2018) suggest that by 2014 real house prices would 
have been 22 per cent lower without the interventions. At the same time, the introduction 
of macro-prudential regulation (Baker, 2013) and a new conduct regime for mortgage 
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lenders (Whitehead and Williams, 2020) made it significantly harder for new entrants to 
access the housing market. Since 2013, a Help to Buy scheme offering equity loans has 
enabled more households to buy new homes with smaller deposits, and supported the 
housebuilding sector, but also represents an intervention that directly involves the state and 
its balance sheet in risks within private mortgage and housing markets (Green and Lavery, 
2018). House Price Keynesianism been buttressed by House Price Interventionism. 
 
3.7 HOUSING AND POLICY PARADIGMS 
This chapter has reviewed the ways in which policy change has been conceptualised within 
the housing literature. The more this has expanded beyond traditional approaches based on 
housing tenure to a consideration of ‘broad’ housing policy and its connections with the 
welfare state and political economy, the more this has been seen in terms of different 
periodisations and policy regimes.  
These may have some similarities with policy paradigms in the way they classify different 
periods but paradigms-based approaches to explaining these changes are still rare in the 
housing literature. Where housing scholars do talk in terms of paradigms they tend to use 
them as a metaphor or heuristic device (Forrest and Hirayama, 2015; Maclennan and Maio, 
2017) and do not seek to apply the post-Hall conceptual framework in a systematic way. 
Similarly, housing has been integrated into work on the neoliberal economic paradigm 
(Wood, 2018) and paradigms in welfare (Fox O’Mahony and Overton, 2015; Lennartz and 
Ronald, 2017) and international development (Rolnik, 2013; Van Waeyenberge, 2018) but 
again more as a metaphor. Regimes and paradigms have been loosely integrated in a study 
of the shift between Fordist and post-Fordist paradigms of social housing in Germany 
(Schöning, 2020). 
Institutionalist approaches to policy change in housing are also relatively unusual, especially 
in the context of housing in the UK. Path dependence6 was used by Kemp (2000) to explain 
the Labour government’s retreat from wholesale reform of housing benefit after 1997 and 
the concept seems suited to a policy field based on a physical commodity that is slow to 
 
6 An institutionalist approach pre-dating policy paradigms in which future policy options are constrained by the 
legacy of past policy choices.  
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produce and tied to a specific place (Bengtsson and Ruonavaara, 2010) or social relations at 
the time of the creation of a tenure (Lawson, 2010). However, Malpass (2011) concluded 
that it was better to think of housing in terms of gradual, incremental change rather than 
path dependency and punctuated equilibrium. Kay’s (2005) critique of path dependence 
acknowledged social housing as a field in which instruments and settings could prove 
resistant to change at the same time as a paradigm shift in policy as a whole. Jacobs and 
Manzi (2016) looked at the critical juncture for housing policy of the IMF crisis of 1976 and 
concluded that Labour ministers at the time had retained more agency than path 
dependency might imply. They also highlighted the importance of incremental change that 
can amount to significant transformation over time.  
Examples of a more recent historical institutionalist approach include Kemp’s (2015) study 
of the growth of private renting after the financial crisis and Crook and Kemp’s (2019) work 
on housing association investment in the private rented sector. Both draw on processes of 
drift, layering and conversion (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010) to explain endogenous but 
transformative change. Kemp (2015) conceptualises tenures as institutions, with the growth 
of the private rented sector explained in terms of changes in housing policy and 
developments in domestic and global finance. Crook and Kemp (2019) examine the 
expansion of large housing associations into private renting and outline processes by which 
incremental changes to institutions can become transformative over time. Both these 
papers offer valuable insights into the dynamics of change in housing systems and the ways 
in which these are influenced by developments in international political economy as well as 
changes in housing policy but also balance these structural factors against the agency of 
institutional actors.  
Blackwell and Bengtsson (2021) use a historical institutionalist approach to assess the 
resilience of social rental housing in the UK, Sweden and Denmark. They find that the Danish 
system proved more resilient in terms of retaining security of tenure and its not-for-profit 
ethos and that this was explained by its decentralised, tenant-led structure. By contrast, the 
centralised nature of the systems in the UK and Sweden left them vulnerable when 
subsidies were slashed in the 1980s and 1990s. Cowan and Marsh (2019) examine the issue 
of underoccupation in English council housing via a sociological institutionalist analysis of 
the mechanisms  through which the issue was governed. Drawing on the policy instruments 
 43 
approach of Lascoumes and Le Galès (2007), they conclude that the mechanisms proposed 
to address underoccupation differed over time in ways that can be explained in terms of 
‘prevailing policy logics and institutional structures’ (Cowan and Marsh, 2019, p319).  
Studies of housing that use policy paradigms in in a more systematic way are rare, with two 
recent exceptions. Friedman and Rosen (2020) examine the policy response to a wave of 
protests in 2011 in Israel and conclude that a neoliberal paradigm of affordable housing was 
able to adapt in ways that did not fundamentally threaten its underlying foundations. They 
argue that this was achieved by drawing on a policy instrument for discounted purchase 
drawn from a ‘shadow paradigm’ or ‘remnant’ of the welfare state that is subordinate to the 
dominant neoliberal paradigm yet remains sociologically embedded in Israel’s society and 
polity.  
In a study of post-financial crisis developments in housing in Ireland, Denmark and Hungary, 
Bohle and Seabrooke (2020) draw on Hall (1993) and Campbell (2004) to conceptualise 
three paradigms with roots in social democracy, neoliberalism and conservativism - housing 
as a social right; housing as an asset; and housing as patrimony – and connect them to a 
varieties of residential capitalism (Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2008) approach. Based on the 
literature and secondary sources, they argue that all three demonstrate a shift to housing as 
asset but that this is increasingly tied to patrimony.  
These studies show the potential for paradigms-based approaches in assessing the dynamics 
of policy change that offer new ways of interpreting trends in the developments of housing 
systems since the financial crisis. However, they do not attempt to apply the means and 
ends-based frameworks proposed in the literature that followed Hall and they do not cover 
housing in England or the UK. The next chapter sets out my research methods for a study 
that attempts to bridge these gaps. 
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CHAPTER 4  
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
This chapter outlines the methods used in the study and the links between them and the 
analytical framework. It sets out the research design, reprises the research questions and 
explains the methodology and approach to data selection and analysis. 
A research project that seeks to investigate the role of ideas in the policy process confronts 
issues of epistemology, ontology and methodology from the outset. The study adopts a 
pragmatist philosophical stance in which all truths are contingent, truth is what works and 
‘the “validity” of a belief or concept is defined in terms of its practical consequences’ 
(Sanderson, 2009, p708). Pragmatism endorses fallibilism in which ‘current beliefs and 
research conclusions are rarely, if ever, viewed as perfect, certain or absolute’ (Robson, 
2011, p28) and knowledge is open to further interpretation, revision and criticism 
(Bernstein, 1991; Sanderson, 2009).  
It starts from a social constructionist position on epistemology in which meaning is 
‘constructed by human beings as they interact and engage in interpretation’ (Robson, 2011, 
p24) and ‘knowledge is actively “constructed” by human beings, rather than being passively 
received by them’ (Ormston et al, 2014, p13). It follows that: ‘Subjective meanings are 
negotiated socially and historically. In other words, they are not simply imprinted on 
individuals but are formed through interaction with others…and formed through historical 
and cultural norms that operate in individuals’ lives.’ (Creswell, 2007, p21). Within the policy 
process, meaning is constructed and framed by policy actors (Fischer, 2003). Even official 
documents ‘which are intended to read as objective statements of fact are also socially 
produced’ (Macdonald, 2008, p287).  
In terms of ontology, the study adopts a moderate, ‘weak’ or ‘thin’ form of social 
constructionism (Robson, 2011) that emphasises the constraints that the ‘real’ world places 
on discursive constructions (Hay, 2009a). In housing studies, this acceptance that there is an 
underlying reality that is being mediated through social and cultural processes has been 
seen as offering a fruitful approach to conceptualising homelessness (Fitzpatrick, 2005) and 
the pathways of housing systems (Lawson, 2010).  
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This epistemological and ontological positioning has implications for an understanding of 
the role played by ideas, interests and institutions in policy change and of the nature and 
role of crises. The research starts from the position that it is the interplay between ideas, 
interests and institutions that leads to policy change. Discourses may be shaped by existing 
institutions but they can also help to shape the evolution of institutions (Fischer 2003: 
Schmidt 2008). The crises that may play an important role in policy change are not self-
apparent phenomena but events that need to be narrated and explained as problems that 
need the attention of policy makers (Blyth, 2002).  
These philosophical underpinnings also have implications for the understanding of policy 
paradigms and for the methodology and methods proposed here. In particular, they support 
a softer version of paradigms in which incommensurability is not seen as an essential 
feature of paradigm shift and policy makers may behave more like bricioleurs than 
‘paradigm men’ (Carstensen, 2011). Consistent with this philosophical approach, a 
pragmatic choice of methods seems appropriate. 
 
4.2 RESEARCH DESIGN 
My project seeks to answer the following research questions: 
1) What have been the factors influencing policy change in housing in England since the 
Global Financial Crisis?  
2) Does this change amount to a change in policy paradigm? 
Plus these sub-questions:  
i) Was there an identifiable policy paradigm for housing in 2007? 
ii) What policy ideas have emerged in housing over the period? 
iii) What have been the key factors and/or actors influencing policy change? 
iv) How has housing policy changed since 2007? 
The scope is restricted to England because an increasing number of policy levers have been 
devolved to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and housing policy has diverged in the 
other UK nations as a result (McKee, Muir and Moore, 2017). While the role of ideas and 
paradigms in this divergence would make an interesting subject for investigation in its own 
right, it would also mean a proliferation of data to investigate that would be beyond the 
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resources than are available in a DSocSci research project. The time period chosen runs 
from the start of the Global Financial Crisis in 2007 to the present, although an appreciation 
of how policy developed before that will also be required to determine whether a policy 
paradigm was in operation at the start of the period.   
 
4.3 METHODOLOGY 
Qualitative methods are a pragmatic choice for interrogating ideas and their influence. The 
research design is based on a case study approach suited to a focus on contemporary 
phenomena within their real-life context and ‘when’, ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being 
posed (Yin, 2003). Consistent with a social constructionist approach, the study relies on 
interpretive analysis to study the cognitive and normative frames that policy actors use to 
make sense of policy problems and the different ways that they understand them. Case 
studies are seen as offering advantages including ‘their potential for achieving high 
conceptual validity; their strong procedures for fostering new hypotheses; their value as a 
useful means to closely examine the hypothesized role of causal mechanisms in the context 
of individual cases; and their capacity for addressing causal complexity’ (George & Bennett, 
2005, p26). 
The case study is one of the oldest and most frequently used approaches to qualitative 
research although opinions vary in the literature about whether it is a methodology or 
merely a choice of what is to be studied. Following Creswell (2007,p73), the case study is 
seen  ‘as a methodology, a type of design in qualitative research, or an object of study, as 
well as a product of the inquiry’ and as ‘a qualitative approach exploring a bounded system 
over time through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of 
information and reports a case description and case-based themes’. A case study design is 
also consistent with a social constructionist approach that acknowledges the researcher’s 
interaction with the research. This is a single, rather than comparative, case study design 
and it is exploratory (Yin, 2003) with the aim of developing a richer understanding of the 
policy paradigm(s) operating in the particular context of housing policy.  
Case study approaches were taken in all of the early accounts of policy paradigms: 
researchers used a combination of existing literature, media reports, official documents and 
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interviews looked at arguments and counter-arguments put forward in oral and written 
statements followed by changes in actual policy and especially in goals and strategy (Carson, 
Burns and Calvo, 2009, p156).  
 
4.3.1 RIGOUR 
When compared with other research methods, the weaknesses of case studies are 
perceived to lie in their lack of generalisability, a tendency to be descriptive and absence of 
internal validity. A project based on qualitative methodology within an interpretative 
approach to research cannot hope to meet the standards of falsifiability, generalisability and 
validity claimed in a positivist approach to research.  
However, the literature suggests that qualitative research can demonstrate academic rigour 
by other means. Reflexivity on the part of the researcher is essential in demonstrating 
transparency and consistency in their interpretation of the data. Triangulation between 
different sources of date, such as documents and interviews, is recommended in the 
literature on methods (Yin, 2003) and on policy paradigms (Carson, Burns and Calvo, 2009; 
Daigneault, 2014; Kern, Kuzemko and Mitchell, 2015) as a way to increase the 
trustworthiness of the findings.  
 
4.4 DATA SELECTION 
Data for this research come from two sources: a selection of key policy documents; and 
semi-structured interviews with key policy actors. 
 
4.4.1 OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 
The sample of policy documents7 is designed to offer as comprehensive a picture of the 
stated policies of the government of the day as is possible within the resource constraints of 
a DSocSci. Based on the literature and my own experience as a specialist journalist, the 
sample is intended to comprise the most important policy documents published over the 
 
7 A full list of documents and debates analysed is presented in Appendix D. 
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case study period. This is focused sampling based on ‘the selective study of particular 
persons, groups or institutions, or of particular relationships, processes or interactions that 
are expected to offer especially illuminating examples’ (Hakim, 2000, p170).  
Green and white papers set out official policy as understood by civil servants and ministers. 
A limitation is that is that they only set out stated policy rather than policy as enacted and 
implemented. The sample is therefore supplemented by two additional sources. First, 
election manifestos and mini-manifestos and opposition party ‘green papers’ offer political 
perspectives unmediated by the civil service. These are also stated policy but may offer 
more clues about the ideas behind it. Second, parliamentary debates on major legislation 
affecting housing illustrate the terms of the political debate between different parties at the 
time and indicate where there is consensus and significant disagreement. The process of 
debate, and questioning of ministers by MPs from different parties, offers a different 
perspective on stated policies and the political discourse employed to support them. Second 
Reading8 debates were chosen as the stage of the legislative process at which the key 
principles behind the legislation are debated and voted upon.  
 
4.4.2 POLICY ACTOR INTERVIEWS 
The analysis of policy documents was supplemented by, and triangulated against, interviews 
with key policy actors. Elite interviews offer a way of looking directly at the ideas that policy 
makers hold (Daigneault, 2014) and are aimed at exploring how interviewees think the 
housing system works and what is driving change within it. Open-ended questions were 
intended to allow them to feel free to develop their own arguments and allow me to test 
my research assumptions. The overall aim was to generate unprompted answers to 
questions relevant to my conceptual framework from a range of different actors familiar 
with the development of housing and housing policy over the period and seek their opinions 
on what and how much had changed and why. 
 
8 Legislation in the Westminster Parliament must pass through different stages in both the House of Commons 
and the House of Lords. At First Reading, Bills are introduced without debate. Second Reading is the first 
opportunity for MPs or peers to debate the main principles of the proposed legislation. After that, Bills go 
through a line by line examination at Committee Stage, followed by a Report Stage where amendments are 
considered and a Third Reading on the content. The final stage before a Bill becomes an Act of Parliament is 
the formality of Royal Assent.  
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Initial recruitment was via email with initial sampling based on my own experience and 
contacts as a specialist journalist. Within the constraints of a sample size dictated by 
resources and time available, I attempted to balance different political and sectoral 
interests and insiders and outsiders in the policy process to ensure a range of views. This 
was supplemented by asking the initial round of interviewees who else they thought would 
be worth talking to in an attempt to minimise issues of researcher bias and to identify gaps 
in the sampling scheme.  
Interviews were semi-structured, on the grounds that structured interviews would be too 
restrictive while unstructured ones risk losing research focus. A topic guide (see Appendix G) 
was used to help focus the interviews (Bryman, 2004; Arthur et al, 2014). Close attention 
was given to ordering of questions, with more straightforward questions asked at the 
beginning to help establish rapport but ensuring that sufficient time is left to address the 
main research questions (Arthur et al, 2014, p151). Some flexibility was required, for 
example by varying the order of questions according to the interviewee, allowing for follow-
up questions to initial answers or additional questions where appropriate (Bryman, 2004). 
The aim was to allow the interviewer to guide the discussion while allowing the interviewee 
enough freedom to address issues that they consider to be important (Hakim, 2000, p35).  
The initial plan was that interviews would be done face to face to establish a rapport with 
interviewees and to observe visual as well as verbal evidence of how they understand the 
world (Yeo et al, 2014, p182). However, the Covid-19 pandemic meant interviews were 
instead conducted by video call (using Teams or Zoom). When compared to phone 
interviews, these offered at least some visual evidence, and, several months into the 
pandemic, interviewees were comfortable with this method of communication. Subject to 
interviewee consent, all interviews were recorded and transcribed to allow for thematic 
analysis during the data analysis stage of the project. Transcription was labour intensive but 
allowed me to listen again to the interviews and immerse myself in the data.  
The aim was to achieve a set of data as rich as possible within the resources available. A 
total of 35 policy actors were approached either via email or via direct message on Twitter 
(see Appendix F). Of these, 27 agreed and interviews were arranged between October 2020 
and January 2021. Interviews lasted between 30 minutes and 75 minutes, with the duration 
of the call the choice of the interviewee. While the eight people who declined or failed to 
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respond would have offered valuable additional insights, the completed interviews gave the 
balance of different interests and perspectives that was sought. A high level of access to 
policy makers at a senior level was achieved in a sample9 that included former ministers 
from different political parties, special advisers, senior civil servants and public agency 
officials from all the main government departments covering housing, as well as MPs, 
campaigners and policy specialists from the housing, housebuilding and mortgage finance 
sectors.   
Potential limitations of interviews including poor or selective recall and possible bias on the 
part of interviewees (Lewis and McNaughton Nicholls, 2014) were recognised as well as the 
risk of poor structuring of questions on the part of the interviewer. For example, a question 
about ‘changes in housing policy’ was rephrased to ask about ‘changes in housing and 
housing policy’ when one of the first interviewees pointed out that this made a difference to 
their answer. This reinforced the importance of triangulation across the interviews and with 
data from the documentary analysis stage of the project as a means of corroborating 
evidence from different sources (Creswell, 2007, p208).  
Interviews were conducted on an anonymised basis with attribution to a generic job 
function description agreed with the interviewee. While some were happy to quoted by 
name, others felt freer to talk on this basis and it seemed logical to treat attribution in the 
same way for all interviewees; they are identified by interview number in Chapter 6. Some 
interviewees had changed their role several times since 2007, giving them a varied 
perspective on policy which was particularly valuable. Where their role is specified in this 
chapter, this refers to what they were doing at the time of the events described.  
 
4.5 PERSONAL POSITIONING  
It is important to acknowledge from the outset that ‘scholars have beliefs about what the 
social world is made of and how it operates, and these beliefs influence their choices about 
how to construct and verify knowledge statements about that world’ (Bennett and Elman, 
2006, p456-457). The same is true of journalists, no matter how hard they strive to maintain 
 
9 For a full list of interviewees, see Appendix E 
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balance, and my long experience as a journalist covering housing and social affairs inevitably 
affected my positioning in the research project.  
In advance of conducting the research, I believed that my familiarity with the issues, people 
and institutions involved in housing policy and how it has developed over time, plus a well-
practiced interview technique, would be advantages. Some potential interviewees were 
already journalistic contacts while others were familiar with my work and this may have 
made it easier to get them to agree to be interviewed for the project. Against that, my 
experience as a journalist may also have brought with it ingrained ways of making sense of 
housing policy and cognitive biases that a researcher fresh to the subject would not have. In 
some cases, my identity as a journalist may have dissuaded some potential interviewees 
from participating, despite my different role in this process and my offers of anonymity and 
unattributability. I sought to mitigate these problems with clarity in my intentions, 
reflexivity as a researcher and close attention to the data.  
 
4.6 DATA ANALYSIS 
Two frameworks (Kern, Kuzemko and Mitchell, 2014, 2015; Daigneault, 2014, 2015) drawing 
on the ‘softer’ version of policy paradigms (Section 2.3.1) were selected for a pilot analysis 
of policy documents to test their efficacy in the context of this project. Each proposes four 
dimensions of a paradigm. Kern, Kuzemko and Mitchell (2014) put forward ideas about the 
subject and how it should be governed, goals, instruments and governance institutions. 
Daigneault (2014, p461) proposed: ‘i) values, assumptions and principles about the nature 
of reality, social justice and the appropriate role of  the state; ii) a conception of the 
problem that requires public intervention; iii) ideas about which policy ends and objectives 
should be pursued; and iv) ideas about appropriate policy ‘means’ to achieve those ends 
(i.e. implementation principles, type of instruments and their settings)’.  
The second was chosen for three main reasons. Daigneault’s framework emerged as a 
better fit with the way that ideas are set out in domestic policy documents. Although 
governance is an important issue in housing, it is arguably a more important dimension in 
Kern, Kuzemko and Mitchell’s case of international energy policy and therefore justifies a 
separate category for analysis. Daigneault’s framework was also used in Nicholls and 
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Teasdale’s (2017) work on ‘nested paradigms’ and therefore offers an established route to 
my intended analysis of the relationship between paradigms in housing policy and 
paradigms in other areas such as economic policy and welfare policy. 
Moving to the main study, the sample of official documents and parliamentary debates 
identified above was analysed in three stages. The focus in the first was the elements of 
policy paradigms identified in Daigneault’s framework and on the relationship between 
housing and other policy paradigms. The second paid close attention to discourse and to the 
use of policy metaphors and narratives that Hall (1993, p291-292) argued ‘can structure 
many aspects of what is to be done’ even in policy fields where paradigms are not ‘fully 
elaborated’. The third involved thematic analysis of the documents using NVIVO. As 
recommended in the methods literature, the analysis was in two stages, with data 
management followed by abstraction and interpretation to create more analytic concepts 
and themes and look for patterns of meaning (Spencer et al, 2014). Codes were developed 
from my theoretical approach while also leaving space for themes to emerge from the data, 
allowing a dialogue between the two.  
The methods literature argues that thematic analysis can be used as a constructionist 
method that examines the way in which realities, meanings and experiences are the effects 
of discourses operating within society (Robson, 2011). This aligns with my ontological and 
epistemological positioning and approaches taken within the policy literature. For example, 
Daigneault (2015, p459) criticises a ‘revealed ideas’ approach to policy paradigms that 
neglects ‘the actual normative and cognitive ideas of policy actors in favour of those 
revealed by the adopted policies’ [original emphasis].  
The same three-stage approach was used in analysis of the interviews, building on the 
themes identified in the document analysis. The aim here was to establish how interviewees 
understand the world and the meaning of particular events. This recognises that ‘as 
meanings are not directly observable, the realm of meaning has to be approached through 
reflection and interpretive analysis’ (Fischer 2003, p139). In part, this was through the 
narratives and metaphors interviewees use to make sense of housing policy, in part the 
causal chains they used to understand policy problems. The researcher has to try ‘as it were, 
to get inside the heads of the particular players in an effort to figure out the thinking behind 
the actions at issue’ (ibid, p141).  
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4.7 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS  
Ethical approval was granted for this study by the University of Bristol’s School for Policy 
Studies research ethics committee in August 2020.  
The main ethical consideration concerned procedures for conducting the policy actor 
interviews and management of interview data. All interviews were subject to the informed 
consent of interviewees, either in writing in advance or agreed at the start of the interviews. 
All of them occupied senior political and policy roles and were used to being interviewed. 
They knew that they would not be named in the study, partly to encourage them to feel 
able to be open in what they say but partly to ensure a consistent approach to their data. 
However, they were also advised that complete anonymity could not be guaranteed as the 
specialist nature of some of their roles meant that they could be identifiable from the 
details of what they said even if quotations were only generically attributed. Interviews 
were recorded subject to their agreement and transcribed and stored securely. In line with 
university policy, at the end of the project, data will be stored and made available to other 
researchers via the Research Data Repository or UK Data Archive. Data will be anonymised 
and any references that could identify the interviewee removed.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FINDINGS PART ONE: POLICY DOCUMENT ANALYSIS  
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter draws on the policy paradigms literature for an analysis of official documents 
published before and after the start of the Global Financial Crisis in 2007. It proposes a 
provisional categorisation that will be triangulated against findings from interviews with 
policy actors in Chapter 6.   
The analysis looks further back than 2007 to establish the nature of the policy paradigm in 
operation at the time as a baseline for assessing any subsequent changes. The starting point 
is a matter of judgement. It could have been taken as 1979, with the election of Margaret 
Thatcher’s Conservative government and the introduction of the Right to Buy. However, the 
mid-1980s was selected as the period that saw extensive liberalisation of mortgage finance 
under the Big Bang and the 1988 Housing Act, which is identified in the literature as a key 
turning point in policy on the private and social rented sectors.  
The analysis draws on three principal sources of data: the general election manifestos of the 
main political parties; green and white papers on housing; and parliamentary debates on 
major legislation affecting housing. Key events and policy developments affecting housing 
that took place beyond the confines of formal ‘housing policy’ are often referred to in these 
debates and, where appropriate, are also referenced in the analysis10.  
The documents were first coded on the basis of Daigneault’s four dimensions of a policy 
paradigm. It soon became apparent that these are not necessarily discrete categories: policy 
ends and instruments often have ideas about the policy problem and values embedded 
within them; ideas about the roles of different tenures may express values; and ideas about 
the problem that requires intervention often imply ends and sometimes means. Some 
interpretation was therefore required to determine how to apply some of the categories 
but the intention was to apply the same criteria across the different documents before 
moving to thematic analysis. 
 
10 Details of the documents and debates analysed are presented in Appendix D. 
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The analysis found clear evidence of a housing policy paradigm in operation in 2007 and 
tentative evidence of a shift to a ‘proto-paradigm’ based on affordable housing in the period 
since. 
 
5.2 FROM COUNCIL HOUSING TO SOCIAL HOUSING  
The policy documents and debates analysed suggest evidence of a significant shift in the 
housing policy paradigm from the 1980s that was evident across all four of the dimensions 
of a policy paradigm in the framework derived from Daigneault (Section 2.6.3). 11 
Support for the view that the policy changes in the 1980s represented a break with a 
‘council housing’ paradigm comes from the way that it was framed by Nicholas Ridley, the 
environment secretary12, and by the opposition during the second reading debate on what 
became the Housing Act 1988. Ridley presented it in paradigmatic terms as a reversal of the 
policy regime that had begun with the introduction of rent control during the First World 
War and as the end of ‘the stalemate of doctrinaire disagreement’  (HC Deb, 30 November 
1987, Vol 123). The shift was also evident in an important change in tenure terminology 
during the same period. The term ‘social housing’ was not once used in the 1987 housing 
white paper (DoE, 1987) but gained in currency after the 1988 Act because ‘council housing’ 
was no longer accurate in a world in which local authorities had lost their dominant role in 
new provision13. This was a change in ‘the very terminology through which policymakers 
communicate about their work’ (Hall, 1993, p279).  
What I am calling the 1988 framework refers to a series of changes that happened during 
the 1980s. This is not to argue that the 1988 Act was the start of the paradigm shift, or that 
it alone changed everything, or that it would not be further refined. The introduction of the 
Right to Buy in 1980 was a huge change for council housing and home ownership alike but, 
from the point of view of the housing system as a whole, the 1988 framework can be seen 
in Carson Burns and Calvo’s (2009) terms as the tipping point in a gradual shift to a new 
 
11 Since this dissertation focuses on the period since 2007, space does not allow for the inclusion of the full 
analysis on the dimensions of the earlier paradigm but the results are presented in Table 2 and key points are 
referenced in Table 3 later in this chapter. 
12 See Appendix B for a guide to the main government departments and principal political actors over the 
period. 
13 See Appendix C for a table setting out changes in the balance of the main housing tenures since 1980.   
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paradigm that had begun earlier and continued afterwards. It also represented a shift in the 
‘locus of authority’ (Hall, 1993, p286) within social housing from local authorities to housing 
associations and within mortgage lending from building societies to banks. Consistent with 
my earlier point about terminology, Section 21 of the 1988 Act and Section 106 of the Town 
and Country Planning Act 1990 are still routinely used more than 30 years later as generally 
understood shorthand terms for important legal principles affecting private renters and 
landlords and housebuilders and planning authorities.  
None of these changes meant that council housing ceased to exist in 1988, or that it would 
not continue to exist in a more limited form up to the present day, or that a small housing 
association sector did not already exist, but it was intended to mean the end of the 
‘municipal monopoly’ (Conservative Party, 1987). As argued in Chapter 2, changes in the 
pattern of new construction or policy changes that affect tenure distribution take time to 
have an effect. Empirically, the impact of some changes can be seen relatively quickly: the 
Right to Buy contributed to a seven percentage point rise in the proportion of homes that 
were owner-occupied between 1981 and 1991 that was matched by a seven percentage 
point decline in the proportion rented from a local authority; and a doubling in the 
proportion of homes rented from a housing association in the ten years after 1988 was 
matched by further decline in council housing (see Appendix C). However, other changes 
happened more gradually: even though the 1988 framework established the conditions for 
the revival of the private rented sector, it only applied to new tenancies and growth did not 
happen on any significant scale until after the creation of Buy to Let in 1996. Equally, the 
survival of substantial amounts of local authority housing and even some pre-1989 
regulated private tenancies indicates that the council housing and social housing paradigms 
overlapped each other and supports the view that there can be some commensurability 
between paradigms.  
 
5.2.1 PARADIGM SHIFT 
The analysis shows that, at the most abstract level of ‘values, assumptions and principles 
about the nature of reality, social justice and the appropriate role of the state’ (Daigneault, 
2014, p461), the shift between paradigms was marked by a change in the dimensions of 
home prioritised in public policy. Where quantity, security and affordability were dominant 
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concerns under the council housing paradigm, opportunity and choice were the 
predominant values under social housing. Home ownership was to be the aspiration for all 
as ‘the foundation stone of a capital-owning democracy’ (Conservative Party, 1987). The 
two paradigms involved two different conceptions of the role of the state and of how to 
deliver social justice in housing, with local authorities having a direct and central role in 
provision under ‘council housing’ and a strategic role as enabler of private and third sector 
solutions under ‘social housing’.  
In the dimension of ideas about the problem that requires public intervention, thinking on 
housing in this period drew on discourses of New Public Management and welfare 
dependency. Under council housing ‘whole communities’ were held to have ‘slipped into a 
permanent dependence on the welfare state from which it is extremely difficult for people 
to escape’ and ‘indiscriminate’ bricks and mortar subsidies were seen as wasteful and public 
spending could be targeted more effectively through personal and potentially temporary 
subsidies for people who needed them (DoE, 1987, p2). On the one hand, this allowed rents 
to be increased to a level high enough for private landlords to be able to make a return on 
their investments and for housing associations to be able to raise private finance; on the 
other, it depended on the creation of a national and integrated system of housing benefit to 
cover the rents of tenants who could not afford them. Compared to the previous system of 
rent rebates and rent allowances, this meant that housing policy became ever more tied up 
with welfare policy, even though the two were administered by different government 
departments.  
This is an illustration of the fact that the paradigms that I am calling ‘council housing’ and 
‘social housing’ are not just about homes for subsidised rent but about the housing system 
as a whole. The era of council housing was also the era of the municipalisation and slum 
clearance of private rented housing and of rent regulation and security of tenure for the 
private tenants that remained. Mass council housing developed at the same time as mass 
home ownership, with bricks and mortar subsidies for local authorities matched by 
mortgage interest tax relief for home owners (Malpass, 2004). The Right to Buy was a huge 
change for council housing but could still be seen as part of this ‘mass’ model of housing. 
Equally, the ‘social housing’ paradigm was about much more than just social rented housing 
provided by different types of landlord or even the use of private as well as public finance to 
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support provision. The 1988 framework marked just as big a turning point for the private 
rented sector, with a regime based on the assured shorthold tenancy to guarantee 
possession and market rents to (as the government argued) usher in an era of new 
investment. This enabled the later creation of Buy to Let. The social housing era also saw 
the phasing out of mortgage interest tax relief for home owners, a policy instrument once 
seen as so politically untouchable that it could survive the tax it was relieving by several 
decades but which by the 1990s seemed an anachronistic government subsidy.  
The stability of the paradigm was demonstrated when a Labour government took power in 
1997 committed to the retention of most of its key objectives and instruments and settings. 
Intuitively, this seems an important indicator of ideational consolidation and their survival 
for more than one government’s term of office is one test of radical policy change posited in 
the critical junctures theory proposed by Hogan and O’Rourke (2015). Labour had initially 
opposed the Right to Buy and the deregulation of the private rented sector but by 1997 it 
accepted both. Instruments introduced under the 1988 framework such as the assured 
shorthold tenancy and private finance for housing associations were more than just tools for 
achieving policy objectives: they were institutions that structured public policy and the 
behaviour of policy actors (Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2007) and became part of a ‘taken for 
granted’ policy framework under both parties.   
Crucially, the shift in housing policy was influenced by, and in turn influenced, changes in 
other policy paradigms. The intimate connection between housing and social security policy, 
and the crucial importance of the creation of housing benefit, has already been noted. The 
liberalised mortgage market became an important part of the ‘social housing’ paradigm. The 
first wave of loans to tenants to exercise the Right to Buy was initially financed by local 
authority mortgages, which added to the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement. Prior to the 
1986 Big Bang, mortgage lending was dominated by building societies whose conservative 
lending model restricted their lending and banks were reluctant to enter the market. The 
government encouraged both to extend their sources of financing and their lending until 
the Big Bang made the mortgage market part of the on-going expansion of credit (Oren and 
Blyth, 2019). This underpinned the government’s ambitions for a wider ‘property-owning 
democracy’ through the 1980s and beyond but also created some of the conditions that 
would help send it into reverse (Arundel and Ronald, 2020).  
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5.2.2 ANOMALIES AND POLICY FAILURES 
Just as the shift from a council housing to a social housing paradigm took place over time so 
the social housing paradigm gradually developed, influenced by changes within the housing 
field and in related policy areas. However, the paradigm also contained contradictory 
elements that emerged as anomalies and as instances of policy experimentation and failure 
that Hall (1993, p280) identified as ‘likely to play a key role in the movement from one 
paradigm to another’. Attempts to push the marketisation of social housing beyond the 
transfer from local authorities to housing associations largely failed. Social housing proved 
to be something of a compromise as significant amounts of council housing remained in 
urban centres and housing associations looked to retain a social ethos in a more commercial 
world (Murie, 2018). The system was dependent on housing benefit ‘taking the strain’ of 
higher rents but, for all the promises made by Nicholas Ridley in 1987, it could not do so 
indefinitely.  
In the four years after the Housing Act 1988 became law, the housing market went through 
a boom and then a bust as interest rates peaked at 15 per cent on Black Wednesday in 
September 199214. The falling house prices, negative equity and repossessions that followed 
underlined the close relationship between stability in the housing market and the wider 
economy. The focus of macro-economic policy switched to inflation targeting and then an 
independent Bank of England with control over interest rates. Base rates fell to between 3.5 
per cent and 7 per cent between 1993 and 2007, fuelling a recovery and then a fresh boom 
in house prices.  
At the same time, the liberalisation of financial markets continued to be seen as a desirable 
method of increasing the supply of credit and opportunities for home ownership right up to 
the start of the Global Financial Crisis. ‘House price Keynesianism’ (Crouch, 2009) linked 
household debt, house prices and economic growth. Further support for housing market 
growth came via instruments in housing policy such as help for first-time buyers and key 
workers to buy and official encouragement for more innovative forms of lending. In July 
2007 the Treasury commissioned a review of barriers to the supply of funds to mortgage 
 
14 House prices fell by 35 per cent between 1989 and 1993 largely as a result of spiralling interest rates. In part 
this was due to maintaining a minimum exchange rate to stay in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. In a 
single day on 16 September, 1992, interest rates rose from 10 to 15 per cent, before the chancellor withdrew 
from the ERM.   
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lenders, noting that: ‘In the UK, the mortgage-backed securities market is growing but still 
relatively under-developed, compared with the US for example.’ (DCLG, 2007, p92). This 
was two months before the collapse of Northern Rock but after the first warning signs of 
widespread problems in the US mortgage-backed securities market. The UK may not have 
seen the same scale of expansion of sub-prime lending as in the US but it had its own 
problems with self-certified and 100 per cent-plus mortgages (Whitehead and Williams, 
2020).  
The overall rate of owner-occupation in England began to fall in 2004 but the decline in 
mortgaged ownership began nine years earlier in 1994, reflecting a decrease in the 
proportion of households under 35 who were succeeding in buying their first home (DCLG, 
2010; MHCLG, 2020a)15. In response to increasingly unaffordable house prices, the Labour 
government increased the scope and scale of its affordable housing programme for key 
workers and first-time buyers as well as social tenants (Provan et al, 2017). However, the 
mismatch between rising demand for homes and inadequate supply was seen as a failure 
that risked ‘widening wealth inequality, frustrated aspirations and damage to our economy’ 
(DCLG, 2007, p5). 
A review of housing supply (Barker, 2004) for the Treasury concluded that housebuilding 
numbers needed to be substantially increased to bring down the long-term upward trend in 
real house prices, improve macroeconomic stability and deliver greater affordability. This 
underpinned the target set in the 2007 housing green paper of 240,000 additional homes a 
year to meet growing demand and address affordability issues (DCLG, 2007, p7). 
 
5.3 FROM SOCIAL HOUSING TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING? 
By contrast with the paradigm shift from council housing to social housing, the transition to 
what is tentatively proposed as an ‘affordable housing’ proto-paradigm was a messier and 
more drawn-out process that was as much a product of circumstances as political choices. 
The term ‘proto-paradigm’ is used because it is more wide-ranging than a ‘policy theory’ 
specific to a particular policy but also because it is not clear that it possesses the internal 
coherence that is  ‘a necessary condition for the existence of a policy paradigm’ (Daigneault, 
 
15 See Appendix C for a breakdown of tenure change.  
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2014, p458). Leaving this issue to one side, change is still detectable in all four of 
Daigneault’s dimensions of change, although not on the same scale as the earlier shift 
between the council housing and social housing paradigms.  
Table 2 below attempts to quantify the extent of the change on each dimension on an 
ordinal scale to nuance the analysis, following Daigneault’s advice (2015, p55). This is 
necessarily a subjective judgment on the part of the researcher but comparing the extent of 
change since the mid-2000s with the paradigm shift that that is already established to have 
happened during the 1980s provides a baseline for the more recent case.  
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TABLE 2: DIMENSIONS OF CHANGE IN THE HOUSING POLICY PARADIGM 
 







and principles about 
the nature of reality, 
social justice and the 




Housing as social right 
State as direct provider 
Opportunity, choice,  
From 1979: independence, 
responsibility 
From 1997: quality, community 
Housing as asset 
State as enabler 
Opportunity, affordability, quantity 
From 2010: Independence, community 
From 2015: Security  
Intergenerational equity 
Housing as asset  
Some state role in provision 
 
Change (out of 10)  8 4 









Too much regulation means too 
little choice 
Councils inefficient, council 
housing causes dependency 
Bricks and mortar subsidies 
wasteful  
From 1997: Excluded 
communities 
Unaffordability caused by failure to 
build enough homes  
Planning system a barrier to supply 
From 2010: Top-down targets, social 
housing part of culture of dependency 
From 2017: social housing stigma 
Change (out of 10)  9 4 
Ideas about policy 
ends and objectives 
 
 
Build more homes to meet 
housing shortage  
Subsidise local authorities 
to build council housing 
Support home ownership 
 
Increase choice and competition 
Reduce municipal monopoly 
Increase asset ownership  
From 1992: ‘sustainable home 
ownership’ 




Revive home ownership 
Work should always pay 
 
From 2010: Localism, marketise social 
housing 
From 2017: Social housing as safety 
net and springboard 
 








Private rented sector (PRS) 
rent control, security of 
tenure best for tenants 
Mortgage interest tax 
relief (MITR) for all 
Bricks and mortar 
subsidies for councils 
 
Right to Buy (RTB) builds 
property-owning democracy 
Assured Shorthold Tenancy + 
market rents increase choice 
Housing associations to take over 
as main social housing providers 
Private finance cuts public 
borrowing 
Housing benefit (HB) will take 
strain of higher rents 
From 1992: MITR raises house 
prices – phase it out 
Local Housing Allowance to allow PRS 
tenants to shop around (from 2010: 
caps to cut bill) 
HA cross subsidy from sales and 
market rent 
Self-financing for councils 
From 2010: Benefit cuts and freeze as 
HB ‘out of control’ 
Help to Buy to support market 
From 2019: Abolish Section 21 to 
improve rental market 
Change (out of 10)  9 7 
Anomalies and 
policy failures 
Council housing quality 
PRS disinvestment  
Lack of choice 
Mortgage cartel 
1976 IMF crisis – cuts in 
public spending  
Homelessness – 1977 Act 
Escalating housing benefit bill 
Limits of RTB? 
Residualisation 
Housing market boom & bust 
Instrument fails 
First signs of fall in first-time 
buyers v rise in Buy to Let 
Rising homelessness  
 
GFC and response 
Grenfell Tower fire 2017 
Leasehold, cladding scandals 
PRS an unfair market? 
Unaffordable ‘affordable’ homes 
Rising homelessness 
Instrument u-turns and fails 
Fall in ownership + Generation Rent 
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5.3.1 PARADIGM SHIFT? 
As with the earlier period, policy change after 2007 consolidated gradually over time. It was 
also marked by another of the changes in terminology that Hall (1993, p279) highlighted as 
significant in the process. On one level, ‘affordable housing’ was, and continues to be, a 
collective term for all forms of housing built with bricks and mortar subsidies, whether for 
rental or home ownership. On another, increasing use of ‘affordable housing’ during the 
2000s and 2010s reflected unaffordable prices and rents. The transition from ‘social’ to 
‘affordable’ can be seen as a semantic shift and a rationalisation of the failure to address the 
underlying issue of affordability. This reflected an underlying debate about the cognitive 
and normative ideas embedded in housing policy. The meaning of ‘affordable’ – whether it 
should mean in relation to market prices and rents or in relation to incomes – was at the 
heart of this. 
The change in terminology also signalled changes in the sort of homes being delivered: 
affordable and low-cost home ownership schemes became an increasingly important part of 
the grant-funded programme at the expense of rented homes; and an increasing proportion 
of households who would once have qualified for social housing were housed in private 
rented sector homes with rents that were only affordable because of housing benefit. After 
2010, Conservative ministers were accused by Labour of blurring the distinction to conceal 
deep cuts to the Affordable Homes Programme and a switch of development funding from 
social rent to higher Affordable Rent. The definition of ‘affordable housing’ within the 
National Planning Policy Framework was broadened to include discounted market sales and 
other affordable routes to home ownership and an initial draft lacked any explicit reference 
to social rented housing (MHCLG, 2019). Though not formally defined as ‘affordable 
housing’, Help to Buy expanded state support via mortgage guarantees to boost low-deposit 
loans and equity loans for new-build homes.  
Housing benefit was the key policy instrument that ‘took the strain’ of private market rents 
and higher social rents and made them relatively affordable for low income households 
under the social housing policy paradigm. However, the housing benefit bill trebled 
between 1986/87 and 1995/96 (Stephens et al, 2020, Table 109) and governments began to 
impose restrictions on entitlements from the mid-1990s. In 2008, the Labour government 
introduced Local Housing Allowance for private tenants. This paid a flat rate by property size 
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in each local area rather than the actual rent on the basis that allowing tenants to keep 
some of the difference would give them an incentive to ‘shop around’ for a cheaper rent. 
After 2010, by which time the bill had doubled again, the Conservative-led coalition 
government argued that housing benefit was ‘out of control’ and introduced a succession of 
restrictions and freezes in LHA levels for private tenants and cuts in entitlements for social 
tenants. Under the affordable housing proto-paradigm, therefore, growing numbers of 
tenants had to make up a shortfall between their housing benefit and their rent out of their 
other benefits, which were also cut and frozen and capped. Changes at the level of 
instrument settings had a profound effect on entitlements, on ideas behind the instrument 
itself and on the role that housing benefit had been advertised as playing in the 1988 
settlement.  
 
5.3.2 ANOMALIES AND POLICY FAILURES 
As earlier, I am using the term ‘affordable housing’ as a term for a regime that stretched 
across the housing system and different tenures. As before, council housing and social 
housing continue to exist. Unlike earlier, the switch was not a (relatively) coherent process 
but a contradictory one that welded together very different ideas. As it developed under 
Conservative-led governments from 2010, it combined an attempt to reduce the role of the 
state and increase the role of markets in social housing at the same time as it did the 
opposite for the private housing and housebuilding markets. A country that had aspired to 
be a property-owning democracy saw home ownership fall from a peak of 71 per cent in 
2003 to 63 per cent in 2013-14 (see Appendix C). Amidst rising concern about inter-
generational equity, governments clung to faith in housebuilding targets as a means of 
reversing this trend.  
Failures at the level of policy instruments indicate a system under pressure. Manifesto 
commitments to fund the extension of the Right to Buy to housing association tenants and 
build 200,000 discounted Starter Homes (Conservative Party, 2015) were legislated for and 
then dropped. In another sign of stress on the existing policy system, reforms have been 
introduced or are promised to key elements of the 1988 framework, such as tight controls 
on local authorities’ ability to build new homes and the Section 21 procedure granting 
landlords no-fault possession of their property. The Grenfell Tower fire exposed inadequate 
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regulation and inequality in social housing (MHCLG, 2018) while the cladding scandal that 
followed has exacerbated existing problems with leasehold that have exposed the precarity 
of this form of home ownership.   
 
5.3.3 NESTED PARADIGMS 
As seen in Chapters 2 and 3, the financial crisis and the policy response to had profound 
impacts on the housing policy paradigm. Table 3 (below) breaks down key changes within 
different housing micro paradigms and nested meso and macro policy paradigms in related 
policy areas between the council housing, social housing and affordable housing period. 
From outside ‘housing policy’, it takes Forrest and Hirayama’s (2018) periodisation of 
developments in home ownership, and adds deregulated private renting to run alongside 
mature home ownership and Buy to Let-fuelled investment to become part of late home 
ownership. At the macro level, a financial crisis that had its origins in housing might have 
been expected to lead to profound change in a political economy based on House Price 
Keynesianism but policy changes after 2007 reinforced it. At the meso level, monetary 
policy innovations including near zero interest rates and quantitative easing reduced the 
cost of mortgage borrowing and supported asset prices for existing homeowners and 
landlords at the same time as austerity in fiscal policy squeezed public investment in social 




TABLE 3: MICRO, MESO AND MACRO PARADIGMS 
 
 ‘Council housing’  












Local authorities (LAs) in 
leading role 
Paternalistic 
Cuts (from 1976)  
 
Housing associations (HAs) 
Private finance 
LA strategic role 
Stock transfer 
Right to Buy 
 
Commercialisation of large HAs  
Cuts and end of social rent funding 2010 
Self-financing and limited LA build role 





Security of tenure 
Municipalisation 
 
Market rents and Assured 
Shorthold Tenancy  
Revival and investment 
Buy to Let (BTL) 
Overtakes social renting 
Buy to Let – Generation Rent 
Build to Rent 
Re-regulation? 
 
Home ownership Mortgage tax relief 
Rise of two-earner 
families 
Inflation erodes debt 
Boom and bust 1989-92  
Repossessions 
Recovery and price boom 
Mortgage tax relief phased 
out 
 
Price boom before GFC 
Low rates/QE: asset values 
Decline in ownership rate  
Help to Buy 
Leasehold and cladding scandals 
Affordable 
housing 
Shared ownership + Low-
cost home ownership 
(LCHO) 
Growth of SO + LCHO 
Shared equity models 
Section 106 (1990) 
Affordable rent 
Funding switch to LCHO 
Help to Buy 
Homelessness Gaps in safety net 
1977 Act 
Duty scrapped, restored 
Social exclusion 
Rough sleeping 




Mass housebuilding for 
sale 
Timber frame scandal 
Crash and recovery 1992 
Consolidation 
Mixed communities 
240,000 pa target 
‘Top-down targets’ to local incentives 
National Planning Policy Framework  
300,000 pa target 
Reform planning = fix housing? 
Building Beautiful 
 
Social security Rent rebates/allowances Housing benefit (HB) 
Shift to personal subsidies: 
HB ‘to take strain’ 
  
Welfare reform: Universal Credit, 
conditionality, LHA, caps and freezes 
HB ‘out of control’ 
Cuts break link with rents 
Mortgage and 
financial markets 
Building society cartel Big Bang 
Demutualisation 
Banks + credit boom 
Buy to Let 
Global Financial Crisis and credit crunch 
Help to Buy 
Funding for Lending 
BTL boom 
Labour market Full employment  
Unionisation 
Recessions 1981, 1991 
Unemployment 
Low pay – insecure jobs 
Welfare to work 
Economic policy Keynesian demand 
management  
IMF crisis 1976 
Monetarism  
Monetarism  
ERM withdrawal  
New Consensus Macro 
House Price Keynesianism 
BoE independence 1997 
GFC – brief Keynesian response then 
austerity 
Macroprudential regulation 
Ultra-low rates and QE  
Use of contingent liabilities 
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Given the importance of home ownership to the wider economy, governments adopted 
policy instruments designed to boost housebuilding and transactions and make it easier for 
first-time buyers to enter the market. Help to Buy evolved out of support measures for 
housebuilding first introduced by Labour after 2008 into a major expansion of the role of 
the state in the housing market via the use of financial transactions and contingent liabilities 
rather than conventional fiscal policy. The loans gave the government a direct stake in the 
housing market to go with the implicit stake it already had under House Price Keynesianism. 
By the first quarter of 2020, over 270,000 properties had been bought for a total of £73 
billion with equity loans worth £16 billion (MHCLG, 2020c).  
Cuts in housing benefit were accompanied by caps, freezes and cuts in entitlement to other 
benefits. At the same time, conditionality, sanctions and welfare to work schemes increased 
pressure to take low-paid and insecure employment. The same rhetoric about ‘welfare 
dependency’ that had marked the political critique of council housing in the 1980s was used 
about social housing in the 2010s.  
The net effect of all this at the micro level of tenure was to support house prices while 
reducing the cost of credit for home owners and landlords and to reduce the supply of social 
housing at the same time as demand for it was rising. What I am calling the affordable 
housing proto-paradigm was an attempt to reconcile these two poles of policy with a series 
of policy instruments designed to produce more ‘affordable’ homes at higher rents and 
improve access to home ownership at the same time as a more general drive to ‘fix the 
broken housing market’ (DCLG, 2017) by increasing the supply of new homes. This emerges 
from the policy documents as the central objective of housing policy and targets are 
currently 300,000 new homes a year by the mid-2020s and at least a million over the 
current parliament (Conservative Party, 2019, p31).  
 
5.4 ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENTS 
It is important to consider potential counter-arguments to this position. The developments 
considered to be a proto-paradigm may simply be the results of reductions in public 
spending. This is certainly true of cuts in the Affordable Homes Programme and housing 
benefit. However, set against this are ideational changes such as those signalled by the shift 
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in terminology from ‘social housing’ to ‘affordable housing’ and by changing ideas about the 
role of social housing embedded in policy instruments such as fixed-term tenancies.  
Policy failures and u-turns that I am interpreting as flux within the new paradigm could be 
seen instead as anomalies undermining the social housing paradigm but without anything 
coherent to take its place. It is certainly true that much of the policy agenda laid out in the 
2015 Conservative manifesto and Housing and Planning Act 2016 was not delivered: no 
Starter Homes were ever built; plans for higher rents for higher earners, mandatory fixed-
term tenancies for new council tenants and forced sales of vacant council houses were all 
dropped; and the Right to Buy has not been extended to housing association tenants. 
However, the ideas embedded within these instruments had appeared to signal a new 
conception of the relationship between social housing and the market so they should be 
seen as more than just anomalies.  
A conceptual framework derived from comparative political economy might offer another 
perspective. Under varieties of residential capitalism (Schwartz and Seabrooke, 2009), the 
UK is categorised as a liberal or liberal-market regime that features ‘high personal debt on 
mortgages and high rates of home ownership, a combination permitted by financialisation’ 
(Seabrooke, 2012). However, with the UK classified as a liberal regime throughout the 
period since 1988, this seems to lack nuance at the level of a single country. In a 
development of that, Bohle and Seabrooke (2020) propose three housing paradigms – 
housing as social right, housing as asset and housing as patrimony – to correspond with 
social democratic, neoliberal and conservative politics in Denmark, Hungary and Ireland. 
They highlight a paradox since the GFC whereby all three countries have moved from 
housing as asset to housing as patrimony, with market-driven programmes embedding 
increased dependence on family wealth irrespective of varieties of residential capitalism 
(ibid, p428). This has also happened to some extent in England, with increasing reliance on 
‘the Bank of Mum and Dad’ to finance house purchases, but Help to Buy can arguably be 
seen as a corporatist element running alongside this. Since an international comparison is 
not part of my study, it seems more logical to use a framework designed to capture nuances 
within domestic policy. In the first row of Table 5, a shift was noted from housing as social 
right under the council housing paradigm to housing as asset under social housing and 
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affordable housing, but it is quite possible to argue that elements all three of Bohle and 
Seabrooke’s paradigms were present at all three time periods.  
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
My conclusions on a second shift of policy paradigm from social housing to affordable 
housing are necessarily more tentative than on this earlier shift. In part this is because of 
the problem inherent in relying on policy document analysis: should the claims made in 
them be taken at face value or not? This is exacerbated by a problem of timing. The shift to 
social housing happened long enough ago to be corroborated from the outcomes of policy 
and the wider policy literature. Dispassionate analysis of trends in contemporary policy is 
more difficult.  
The shift to affordable housing that I am positing happened much more recently and in 
some cases involves policies that have been proposed but not yet implemented. In addition, 
although some of the initial policy changes relevant to the shift were introduced by Labour 
before 2010, most of them were made by Conservative-led governments after 2010. This 
means that one test of radical ideational policy change – the survival of changes beyond one 
government’s term in office (Hogan and O’Rourke, 2015) – can be conducted between the 
administrations of different prime ministers but not between those run by different political 
parties. The next stage of my analysis – interviews with key policy actors – is designed in 
part to address these issues, as well as offering triangulation between different sources of 
data as recommended in the literature.   
In conclusion, it is clear from the policy documents that there have been significant policy 
change in housing since the Global Financial Crisis. However, it is not yet clear whether this 
represents a substantial enough departure from the policy equilibrium to amount to a shift 
in policy paradigm as defined in the literature. In particular, the proto-paradigm appears to 
lack the same internal coherence across the housing system as a whole as the earlier shift to 
a social housing paradigm, therefore failing to meet one of the conditions for the existence 
of a paradigm proposed by Daigneault (2014). There is considerable evidence of policy 
layering (Mahoney and Thelen, 2010), for example in the development of different 
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affordable housing schemes, that could point instead to the sort of  ‘tense layering’ that Kay 
(2007) argued can lead to ‘synthetic’ paradigms.   
Finally, a new process of paradigm flux and paradigm stretching may already be underway. 
In the wake of the Global Financial Crisis, crisis has seemed to follow crisis in politics, 
housing and fire safety and public health. Severe stretching of my affordable housing proto-
paradigm was signalled by the failure of policy instruments proposed in 2015 and 2016. 
Tentative moves towards the re-regulation of the private rented sector and a new role for 
local authorities in housing provision directly contradict key elements of the social housing 
paradigm and could perhaps be seen as evidence of a council housing ‘shadow paradigm’ 
(Friedman and Rosen, 2020) reasserting itself and as an illustration of Schmidt’s (2011, p42) 
argument that ideational paradigms never completely expire but wait to be resuscitated 
when new events call for new explanations.  
Such processes are also evident in the evolving position of the two major parties and the 
way that they have tended to reach back to earlier achievements. In the social housing 
green paper in 2018, the Conservatives referenced their 1951 manifesto’s description of 
housing as ‘the first social service’ (MHCLG, 2018, p7) in what seemed to be a conscious 
signal that they had moved beyond their post-1979 stance. In its manifesto in 2019, Labour 
reached back to 1945 and the party’s promise to ‘proceed with a housing programme at 
maximum practical speed’ (Labour Party, 2019, p77) and was moving steadily towards the 
re-adoption of policies such as rent control that it had abandoned after 1979. The Johnson 
Conservative government elected in December 2019, has shown signs of returning to the 
free market-oriented policies put forward by the party before 2016 and opened up a new 
area of debate with proposals for radical reform of a planning system that  means there are 
‘nowhere near enough homes in the right places’ (MHCLG, 2020, p6). However, it has also 
shown a willingness to accept an increased role for the state. Even though one political 




FINDINGS PART TWO – POLICY ACTOR INTERVIEWS 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The analysis of policy documents tentatively concluded that the period since the Global 
Financial Crisis has seen a shift to an ‘affordable housing’ proto-paradigm. This chapter 
triangulates these findings with data from 27 interviews with key policy actors and puts 
them in the context of the literature on housing and policy paradigms. In general, a more 
nuanced and detailed picture emerged of the conflicts, compromises and institutional filters 
through which policy has to pass before it emerges into the more ordered and rationalised 
world presented in policy documents and parliamentary debates.  
The 27 interviewees including ministers, MPs, special advisers, civil servants and public 
agency officials as well as policy specialists from housing sector organisations, think tanks 
and the housebuilding and mortgage lending industry. In combination, they had experience 
of all of the main government departments and agencies and key external organisations 
with an interest in housing policy. All interviews were unattributable except to a generic job 
function (see Appendix E) as set out in my research methods and interviewees are identified 
by interview number in the text that follows. Some of them had policy experience in several 
different roles since 2007 and any reference to them in the text refers to what they were 
doing at the time of the events described rather than their current role.  
The chapter interweaves accounts of the ideas influencing policy development at particular 
moments in the period with consideration of overarching themes that emerged from the 
analysis. Section 6.2 considers the immediate impact of the financial crisis on housing and 
the differing responses of the Labour government and the Conservative-led coalition 
between 2008 and 2015. Section 6.3 explores one of the most influential ideas about the 
problem that requires policy intervention (inadequate housing supply) and its significance 
within the paradigms framework. Section 6.4 looks in detail at policy experimentation, 
anomalies and failures between 2010 and 2016 via analysis of two key policy instruments 
and a major piece of legislation and considers what these can tell us about the dynamics of 
the underlying ideas and values behind policy. Section 6.5 explores important themes that 
emerged from the interviews about the importance of the machinery of government, 
ministerial agency and hidden constraints on policy. The focus in Section 6.6 is on 2017 to 
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2019, a period that might have led to a change in the housing policy paradigm, the reasons 
why it did not and the possibilities of a new policy consensus. Finally Section 6.7 positions 
these themes and the question of paradigm change in relation to interpretations of the 
‘housing crisis’ and Global Financial Crisis.  
 
6.2 PARADIGMS AND POLITICS 2008-2015 
The immediate aftermath of the events of 2007 and 2008 played out in different narrations 
of the Global Financial Crisis drawing on different macro-economic paradigms. These 
strongly influenced housing and welfare policy and the interaction between them and 
involved contrasting conceptions of the appropriate role of the state and market.  
 
6.2.1 A BRIEF KEYNESIAN REVIVAL  
Housing shot up the political agenda after 2008 as the Labour government saw not just the 
general importance of the housing market to consumer confidence and housebuilding to 
economic activity but also the specific role that social housing could play in counter-cyclical 
growth (Interviews 5 and 21). In some ways this conforms with expectations in much of the 
literature about the effect of an exogenous shock but it could also be seen as Labour 
reaching back to an earlier shadow paradigm (Friedman and Rosen, 2020) for policy 
responses.  
A Labour housing minister recalls coming into the job says that ‘the business as usual 
sensitivities or constraints about what government could or should do fell away’ (Interview 
16). Unusually for a middle ranking minister, he reported directly to the prime minister 
rather than his secretary of state and was able to work with the cabinet secretary to get 
capital investment switched from other programmes to housing:  
‘What it allowed us also to do was to do things that in the normal course of 
government either wouldn't have happened or would only have happened over an 
extended period and probably in a watered down way.’ (Interview 16).  
The crisis circumstances, plus previous experience in government that had given him an 
‘understanding about how to set things up and get things done in a way that I hadn’t had 
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before’, meant that he had the agency to achieve what would not have been possible 
otherwise. In a sense, housing policy had moved out of a period of ‘normal policy making’ 
(Hall, 1993, p279) into one where more radical change was possible outside of those 
‘business as usual’ constraints. The brief period of Labour government immediately after the 
crisis therefore did see a significant change in the position of housing within the policy 
hierarchy in the wake of a switch to a more counter-cyclical macro-economic policy. The 
crisis had raised fundamental issues about the relationship between the market and the 
state. These were most obvious in relation to the financial sector and the banks but the 
impacts extended down through the financial system to mortgage lending, housebuilding 
and the wider housing system.  
In terms of housing policy, the Homes and Communities Agency16 was brought into being 
early (Interview 9). New policy instruments like Kickstart and HomeBuy Direct were created 
to intervene in the housebuilding market with funding to free up sites where work had 
stalled and equity loans to help buyers of new homes secure a mortgage (Interviews 7, 21). 
Civil servants at DCLG worked in close cooperation not just with housebuilders on these 
schemes but with mortgage lenders to prevent repossessions (Interview 5). Some of this 
work reached back to the housing market crash of the early 1990s but much of it involved 
policy that had to be improvised and developed at speed. Other changes went beyond the 
short term and included, for example, proposals worked up by officials at DCLG for a ‘self-
financing’ settlement for local authority housing departments that would potentially allow 
them a direct role in the provision of new homes (Interviews 2, 16). This was a change to a 
key element of the 1988 framework confining them to a strategic role in housing. 
However, the opposition Conservatives had drawn very different conclusions about the 
Global Financial Crisis and its consequences for economic policy and these reshaped the 
context for housing policy and, in some cases, the ends to which these instruments were put 
when Labour lost power to a Conservative-led coalition at the 2010 election. 
 
 
16  A new unified public agency responsible for investment and regeneration formed by a merger of the 
Housing Corporation and English Partnerships. This had already been planned as part of the government’s 
drive to increase housebuilding (DCLG, 2007). The HCA has since been replaced by Homes England and the 
Regulator of Social Housing. 
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6.2.2 AUSTERITY AND WELFARE REFORM 
The Conservatives had originally pledged to match Labour’s public spending plans but the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 prompted a rethink. A future minister says 
there was now a recognition that it ‘was not going to be about saying “well, how much can 
we spend?”, it was going to be about how are we going to look realistic to an audience in 
2010?’ (Interview 10). There was an acute awareness among Conservatives that measures 
to promote financial stability and restrict access to mortgage credit in the wake of the 
financial crisis would cut across their aspirations to promote home ownership and their core 
belief in giving people a stake in society (Interview 10).  
Driven by a commitment to fiscal austerity, the coalition’s first emergency budget cut public 
spending in general and capital investment and benefits in particular. That meant a 65 per 
cent cut in the affordable housing programme at the same time as a big change in its main 
output. In future, rented homes delivered would be for Affordable Rent (see Section 6.4.1) 
rather than traditional social rent. From the perspective of policy outsiders and opposition 
MPs, this looked like an ideologically-driven change to marketise social housing (Interviews, 
2, 3, 16, 19) that was consistent with policies advocated by Conservative-aligned think tanks 
(Greenhalgh and Moss, 2009; Morton, 2010) before an election the party expected to win.  
Cuts in benefits came at the same time as a major programme of welfare reform intended 
to ‘make work pay’. The close connection between cuts in housing and welfare was 
highlighted in most of the interviews with actors in the housing sector and opposition 
politicians. A Labour MP and shadow minister argued that much of the impetus for housing 
policy changes after 2010 came from within the social security paradigm, in a context set by 
media coverage of high housing benefit payments in central London and a political discourse 
that reached back to the ‘dependency culture’ rhetoric of the 1980s: 
‘There was absolutely clear framing of this argument that both social housing and 
social security held people back and increased dependency and that [with] the pre 
2010 social security system tax credits there was almost failed morality to them.’ 
(Interview 19) 
In the private rented sector, Local Housing Allowance was converted (Mahoney and Thelen, 
2010) into a mechanism for cost control that meant growing numbers of tenants had 
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shortfalls against their rent. In the social sector, cuts that had been proposed by DWP 
before 2010 and rejected after pressure from Labour MPs (Interview 19), such as the under-
occupation penalty or ‘bedroom tax’17, were dusted off again by the new government.  
Policy on setting rents in social housing illustrates competing agendas between the housing 
and welfare policy paradigms. The amount by which local authorities and housing 
associations are allowed to increase their rents fundamentally affects their incomes and 
borrowing capacity and therefore their ability to fund repairs and investment in new homes, 
all of which are issues for MHCLG, but also has a big impact on the housing benefit budget 
for DWP, and therefore creates competing institutional interests within spending limits set 
by the Treasury. In the 2013 spending review, it was agreed that rents would rise by CPI 
inflation plus 1 per cent for the next ten years in negotiations between the departments 
refereed by the Cabinet Office in which DCLG and HCA arguments about capacity to build 
new homes won out (Interview 10). However, just two years into the ten-year formula, 
counter-arguments about cutting the housing benefit bill proved influential enough for the 
chancellor to announce a 1 per cent per year rent cut for the four years from 2016. The CPI 
plus 1 per cent formula was restored from 2020.  
These lurches in policy on rents are seen by a special advisor as evidence that housing policy 
was ‘open’ under the coalition, with no fixed views (Interview 11), but also speak to a 
tension between departmental interests that is never completely resolved, perhaps 
suggesting instability in the underlying policy paradigm. Seemingly technical decisions about 
the formula for rent increases had other ideas about housing policy embedded within them 
(Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2007). One official says that the first hint of a move away from 
rent increases to fund investment came earlier: 
‘There was a strong pushback and Treasury accepted the argument that the longer 
term rent settlement gave people certainty and encouraged people to invest and all 
of those things…. When the rent settlement was abandoned and then the minus one 
introduced in 2015, I think that was quite a big difference in that that was the first 
 
17 A percentage deduction made from the housing benefit of tenants who were deemed to have too many 
bedrooms.  
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time, in all the years that I've been involved, when government hadn't accepted that 
the rent settlement had an impact on investment.’ (Interview 21) 
By the mid 2010s, housing sector organisations and left-leaning think tanks were putting 
forward ‘bricks v benefits’ proposals to change the balance of subsidy with the idea that 
increased social housing investment would pay off over time in a reduced benefits bill. This 
would have reversed a key idea in the 1988 framework that personal subsidies are a more 
efficient way of meeting housing costs than bricks and mortar subsidies but the proposal 
made little headway: 
‘There's a reason people have been consistently making the pitch for 10 years and 
the Treasury keep turning around and saying, “but the numbers don't stack up like 
that”. The numbers actually don't stack up. And I say that with a huge amount of 
personal frustration. It's not a spend to save argument in the way that people would 
like it to be.’ (Interview 13) 
The housing and social security paradigms continued to co-exist in an uneasy tension but 
the picture that emerged from the interviews looks less like a proto-version of a new 
paradigm than an imperfect compromise generated by the existing one. This leaves 
unresolved the fundamental question at the heart of the relationship between housing, 
social security and the labour market, says a former government adviser: 
‘In a sense, I think this is all about the housing benefit bill. It's all about a refusal to 
acknowledge that if you've got a lot of people with relatively low wages and quite an 
expensive housing market, there will be a lot of people who can't afford their rent.’ 
(Interview 12) 
 
6.3 FIXING THE BROKEN HOUSNG MARKET 
The idea that the way to fix problems in the housing market is to increase the supply of new 
homes has arguably been the dominant theme running through housing policy ever since 
the publication of the Barker Review (Barker, 2004). In Hall’s terms (1993, p292) this was 
expressed in an ‘overarching metaphor’ that ‘can structure many aspects of what is to be 
done’. 
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‘Fixing The Broken Housing Market’ (DCLG, 2017) is the title of a white paper but also a 
metaphor that reaches back to the earlier one of the ‘housing ladder’18. However, If there is 
a consensus about increasing the supply of new homes, that starts to break down when it 
comes to the means of delivering them. From my analysis of policy documents and 
parliamentary debates in the previous chapter it was clear that increasing supply was an 
important idea about the problem that required policy intervention and that policy 
instruments designed to achieve this were controversial. However, a more complex picture 
emerged from the interviews, in which policy outcomes are the result of ideational battles 
and compromises rather than a more linear progression from policy problem to solution.  
 
6.3.1 ECONOMIC LIBERALS v SOCIAL CONSERVATIVES 
Tensions around planning and housebuilding have a long history but re-emerged in the 
2000s when the Conservatives opposed the regional spatial strategies that Labour had 
introduced to deliver its housebuilding targets. These would be replaced by ‘localism’, a 
philosophy that went beyond planning to embrace decentralisation of government in 
general and was seen as central to Conservative values. As one former Conservative 
minister puts it:  
‘I suppose it was really a difference of approach, which, in a way, was a political 
difference. I think the more authentic, Conservative approach is to think that if you 
allow people a say, and allow some discretion and local variation, then people will be 
creative in solutions.’ (Interview 20).   
Localism in planning would embrace incentives to local communities to agree to new homes 
backed up by simplified planning guidance in a National Planning Policy Framework (NPPF, 
MHCLG, 2019) and the minister argues that this was successful in driving up planning 
permissions.  
However, tensions were evident from the start. Multiple interviewees perceived this as 
between two rival camps within the Conservative Party, economic liberals and traditional 
conservatives. As a former Liberal Democrat special adviser put it: 
 
18  The idea of a natural progression, now interrupted, from the first rung of home ownership 
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’The Conservative Party has two sides, the one side that wants to do everything it 
can to protect asset prices, and is interested in anything that props up asset prices, 
and crowbars new people into homeownership and frankly hates poor people. And 
then there's a group of people who see the activity of house building as 
economically beneficial and believe that a market correction would probably be 
helpful to all of us.’ (Interview 11).  
The influence of the economic liberals was detected in policies like extending the system of 
permitted development to cover the conversion of vacant offices into homes outside of the 
normal planning system. Alongside other policies like Help to Buy (see Section 6.4.2), the 
compromise of localism plus NPPF is credited with increasing housebuilding numbers 
(Interview 24). This battle has never been completely resolved and it has re-emerged 
several times since, most notably in the Conservative backbench rebellion (Interviews 15, 
18) against a new method of calculating local housebuilding requirements that emerged 
alongside the planning white paper in 2020 (MHCLG, 2020b). 
 
6.3.2 A MISLEADING MAP?  
If the cognitive and normative ideas that make up paradigms set ‘mental maps’ (Surel, 2000; 
Carson, Burns and Calvo, 2009) for actors, then the quality of the information that helps to 
form them is crucially important. The picture that emerged from the interviews was one in 
which policy makers were often basing their decisions on inaccurate data and sometimes 
working with models that did not give them a good picture of how the world works.  
Several interviewees from outside government strongly challenged the empirical basis of 
the idea that increasing supply alone would be enough to solve the problem of housing 
affordability. They included a former government adviser whose work had underpinned 
much of the supply agenda of several governments:  
‘I think new supply as a solution has generally been…I know I'm responsible for it so I 
feel bad about that, it's been an over-dominant strand.’ (Interview 12)   
Interviewees identified issues with the data that informed the debate on several different 
levels. On the supply side, it is difficult to say with certainty how many new homes are being 
built (Interview 4). On the demand side, household projections are subject to frequent 
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revision and rely on assumptions about future household formation (Interview 14) and net 
migration that may change after Covid and Brexit (Interview 18).  
While nobody disputed that increased supply must be part of the answer to housing 
affordability problems, some interviewees believed that the idea had been over-sold by the 
government in 2007 (Interview 12) and used by subsequent administrations in a way that 
missed important parts of the original analysis and diverted attention from other causes of 
housing unaffordability such as interest rates and the supply of credit (Interviews 4, 17, 19). 
The crude case for building more has been challenged empirically on the basis of data 
showing that market rents had not risen as they should have done if arguments about 
severely constrained supply were correct (Interview 19).  
A growing case has also been made across the political spectrum that the market will not 
deliver the numbers required without radical action to address the structural constraints of 
the business model of major housebuilders and the operation of the land market. In 2017, 
the Treasury commissioned a review of build-out rates on large sites. For a time it seemed 
that these structural factors behind the broken housing market would get as much attention 
as the question of supply. The Letwin Review (Letwin, 2018) recommended greater diversity 
of tenure on large sites where build-out rates were linked to the pace at which 
housebuilders could make market sales at a price that gave them the margin they required. 
From the perspective of a former Labour special adviser, the recommendations pulled the 
punches implied in the analysis (Interview 26). From inside the government, a special 
adviser who worked with Letwin says that:  
‘In a more stable political time, Oliver Letwin's review might have been a critical 
moment in taking that from an external perspective into the heart of government, 
but it just wasn't able to really get the cut-through it needed internally.’ (Interview 
27) 
 
6.3.3 MEANS AND ENDS 
For all these doubts, the idea that the way to fix housing is to increase supply is still widely 
held. It is a simple idea to grasp and for politicians it may have the virtue that it involves 
targets that are only ever being achievable beyond the next election. However, the 
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interviews also offered some deeper explanations for its prominence. First, it chimes with 
an institutional view within the Treasury of the planning system as a fundamental obstacle 
to making the market more responsive in terms of supply (Interview 13) Second, it enjoys 
support across a spectrum of different interest groups from advocates for more social 
housing to trade federations representing housing associations, residential property 
investors and housebuilders (Interviews 3, 8, 24).  
In this latter sense, it may be acting as a ‘coalition magnet’ (Béland and Cox, 2016) with an 
instrumental political appeal:  
‘There's a particular contradiction within the Conservative side of the political 
debate between liberalisers and asset wealth shy tory types, which goes right to the 
heart of the Conservative coalition. But there are similar contradictions in other 
points on the political spectrum. The one thing they could all agree on is that 
building more is the most politically easy solution to all of the major housing 
problems. And that goes whether with your concern is about affordability for young 
people in the private sector, affordable housing, but also from a green perspective…. 
Everyone coalesces on building more as the easier policy solution.’ (Interview 27) 
At the level of housebuilding and planning, ‘building more’ can also be seen as an example 
of a ‘synthetic paradigm’ in which these different agendas combine in a form of ‘tense 
layering’ (Kay, 2007). It might meet one of Daigneault’s (2015) criteria for the existence of a 
policy paradigm, prevalence within a policy community, but at the meso level of housing 
policy as a whole it falls some way short of the coherence he also stipulates.  
Amid tentative signs that the Boris Johnson government has returned to a more ‘home 
ownership first’ approach (Interviews 7, 9, 13), the ‘broken housing market’ metaphor 
remains a powerful one within government but it is still strongly challenged within the wider 
policy community on the basis that it is the distribution of supply rather than the aggregate 
amount that matters to housing affordability (Interview 19). Within my policy paradigms 
framework, ‘broken housing market’ appears to convey certainty about the problem that 
requires intervention but a vaguer notion of  the policy objective. Is building more homes an 
end in itself, or a means to the end of making homes more affordable? As one interviewee 
put it:  
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‘If something is broken, then it means there's a big gap between the outcomes you 
want and the outcomes you're getting. Well, what are the outcomes they want? 
They talk about outputs like 300,000 homes a year, but that's not an outcome, an 
outcome is everyone having sufficient income, or a housing position where they 
don't have to call on the state when they’re retired or not spending more than x of 
their income on housing…They keep talking about affordability, but they don't really 
want a house price correction or even a reduction.’ (Interview 7) 
This confusion between means and ends was evident at the heart of government. ‘We want 
houses to be more affordable, but we don't want house prices to fall, and that is a 
fundamental contradiction that we tie ourselves in knots over,’ says a former special adviser 
at No 10: 
‘I used to have this problem in government with very senior civil servants, who 
would say things like they were terrified that there were signs that house prices 
might be about to fall, and they were worried about this because that would mean 
therefore the private sector would stop building as much, therefore the  300,000 
homes a year target would not be met. And I said, “Well, why do you want to meet 
the 300,000 homes target?” and they said, “because houses are much too expensive 
- we need to make them more affordable”. “So if house prices fall, that's okay then 
right?”. “No, it would be a disaster because then we won't meet the target”. And 
round and round you go.’ (Interview 27) 
If the central objective of housing policy is not really an objective at all but means 
masquerading as ends, what does that say about the underlying paradigm of which it is a 
key part?  
 
6.4 INSTRUMENTS AND ANOMALIES 2010-2016 
Hall treated first and second order changes in policy instruments and settings as ‘normal 
policy making’ whereas more radical ‘third order’ change concerned the hierarchy of goals 
behind policy. However, much of the literature suggests that this direction of change can be 
reversed (Greener, 2001; Kay 2011, Zittoun, 2015) and that instruments play a more 
influential role that plays out in the policy experimentation, anomalies and failures that Hall 
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argued can precipitate a paradigm shift. This section discusses these points in relation to 
three key episodes between 2010 and 2016.  
 
6.4.1 AFFORDABLE RENT 
As seen above, interviewees from the housing sector saw the decision to cut the affordable 
homes programme and base it on a new scheme called Affordable Rent at significantly 
higher rents as ideologically driven. The account given by policy insiders, civil servants and 
government agency officials of what happened is very different. In the run-up to the 
decision, the Treasury rated different capital investment programmes using cost-benefit 
analysis. Housing emerged ‘below the line’ and ‘there was a point where all affordable 
housing spend would have stopped basically.’ (Interview 9)  
For DCLG, this was a disaster, since once budget lines disappear it is perceived to be very 
hard to get them back in future spending reviews (Interviews 7, 21). A rearguard action 
began to develop a policy that would maintain output without generating big increases in 
housing benefit costs while still being compliant with state aid rules. The department had 
carried out some internal policy work before the election on a potential new intermediate 
rent product aimed at people on higher incomes than would qualify for social housing. 
Within a few days, this became Affordable Rent, with the difference that it would replace 
social rent rather than run alongside it (Interviews 5, 7, 21). The proposal won the support 
of secretary of state Eric Pickles, the Lib Dem side of the coalition and eventually the 
Treasury, and an aircraft carrier was removed from the capital programme to make way for 
it (Interviews 7, 9). A civil servant involved with the policy says that it was ‘completely 
driven by ”we need to cut expenditure”…it was not part of a coherent housing strategy and 
it's never been part of a coherent housing strategy’. (Interview 7) 
This appears to contradict the interpretation that emerged in the first stage of my research 
that saw Affordable Rent plus moves to introduce fixed-term tenancies as an important part 
of the affordable housing proto-paradigm that has emerged since 2007. By this account, it 
lacks the internal coherence that is one of Daigneault’s criteria for the existence of a policy 
paradigm and was instead the result of policy bricolage by DCLG officials to maintain an 
affordable homes programme at the same time as it maintained output. As the civil servant 
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put it: ‘It was never the strategy I would have adopted if someone had asked me what the 
strategy should be, but it stopped there being a position where there was no affordable 
housing grant.’ (Interview 7) 
That view is supported by a Conservative housing minister under the coalition, who argues 
that the shift to affordable housing more generally was the product of financial 
circumstances rather than ideology:  
‘I think the way affordable housing, as opposed to social housing, emerged was 
really a product of the squeeze on public finances, and a desire to try to get as many 
homes as we could for every million pounds that we had... I can honestly say, even 
from the more financially idealistic souls around the table, Alex Morton19, for 
example, at Number 10, that it wasn't “oh, we don't like social housing”, or “we 
don't like affordable housing”. It was “we've only got this budget guys, how the hell 
do we deliver enough roofs over people's heads with this budget?”.’ (Interview 10) 
However, this raises a question that emerged several times in the interviews. Should 
accounts of policy development by insiders be privileged over the interpretations put on 
those policies by outsiders if is it the interpretations that actors give of events that shape 
understandings (Skogstad, 2011)? The conditions in which these decisions were made were 
determined by the prevailing economic policy of austerity and by value assumptions that 
are implicit in cost-benefit analysis. Although policy insiders argue that the policy was not 
ideological, many of those attempting to influence policy from outside government 
effectively concluded that it was.  
A Conservative MP also suggests a more political motivation for the decision in the next 
spending review to switch funding from rented homes to affordable home ownership: 
‘There was a deliberate decision by George Osborne20… of swapping the money out 
from the affordable housing programme and that was a political decision on the 
basis that people in social housing don't vote Conservative. Complete and utter 
 
19 Alex Morton, head of housing at the Policy Exchange think tank from 2010 to 2013 and David Cameron’s 
special adviser on housing and planning from 2013 to 2016 
20 Chancellor of the Exchequer 2010 to 2016 
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myth. It's not true. There are large numbers of MPs who are totally dependent on 
people that live in social housing voting for them.’ (Interview 18) 
Although it is disputed by a former Conservative cabinet minister (Interview 20), this view of 
Osborne’s motivations was widely shared in the housing sector to the extent that many 
concluded there was no longer any point talking about social housing (Interviews 5, 13). 
Arguably, therefore, the effect was the same.  
 
6.4.2 HELP TO BUY 
Declining levels of home ownership and low levels of housebuilding were quickly identified 
as major problems that required policy intervention by the coalition government. For 
Conservatives who saw the idea of a property-owning democracy as fundamental to their 
values (Interview 20), these were big problems. 
In his Budget in 2013, chancellor George Osborne dramatically extended existing affordable 
home ownership initiatives by introducing Help to Buy. This came in two forms. A mortgage 
guarantee scheme for all transactions developed by DCLG was resisted by some major 
lenders (Interview 23) but is credited with restoring market confidence in higher loan-to-
value mortgages (Interview 17). An equity loan scheme was a development of earlier Labour 
schemes like HomeBuy Direct, to the surprise of officials who had improvised them in haste 
in the wake of the financial crisis (Interview 21), with the key difference that all of the equity 
would come from the government rather than being put up jointly with housebuilders.  
The story of the creation of the equity loan Help to Buy illustrates several important points 
about the housing policy paradigm, the machinery of government and political agency. 
Multiple interviewees confirmed the policy was very much led by the Treasury (Interviews 2, 
10, 21, 23) rather than the department that was theoretically in charge of housing policy. 
DCLG had been working separately on a more modest equity loan scheme of its own that 
was overtaken by Help to Buy (Interview 21). An interviewee who was in a senior position at 
a major mortgage lender remembers finding out about it the day before the announcement 
(Interview 23) while a senior official at a government agency recalls discussing with the 
Home Builders Federation what it was looking for ahead of the Budget and that an equity 
loan scheme on this scale was not on its list of ‘asks’ (Interview 21).  
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Help to Buy had a big impact on housebuilders and their finances and on housebuilding but 
had extra significance in policy terms because of the way it was financed through financial 
instruments rather than conventional public spending. The official says this was what 
counted for the Treasury: ‘George Osborne discovered at some point that it wouldn't score, 
and therefore you could a) scale the programme up and b) could let the developers off from 
putting in their equity.’ (Interview 21).  On this important level, Help to Buy was an example 
of experimentation in policy instruments that pointed the way towards much greater use of 
financial instruments as a means of financing housing investment (Interview 2).  
That meant that it escaped the intense scrutiny of value for money (VFM) faced by all 
conventional investment programmes:  
‘It was all about the way it scored because if you ignored that, there's no way it 
would have done. At the time, we were struggling to ask for more affordable housing 
money and being challenged on VFM grounds and all of those things, but Help to Buy 
stood outside of that conversation because it wasn't on balance sheet.’ (Interview 
21) 
Billions of pounds worth of loans and guarantees were subsequently extended for 
affordable and private rented housing. From the perspective of a Conservative minister, this 
was ‘using the government’s balance sheet in an intelligent way’ even though it represented 
a departure from Conservative fiscal orthodoxy (Interview 10).  
However, a civil servant puts this form of intervention in a different context: 
‘I think with Cameron, you saw a willingness for the state to be extremely 
interventionist on the demand side but not necessarily to do the kind of 
transformative stuff on the supply side. So willing to make quite large handouts in 
the form of Starter Homes and Help to Buy and all of that on the demand side, but 
not really wanting to rock the boat in the Tory shires.’ (Interview 13) 
From the perspective of the housing sector, it also represented a reversal of Conservative 
policy that had applied to social housing: ‘Ostensibly the Tories want to back away from 
state involvement but in actual fact, they've ramped it up substantially but in support of the 
private market.’ (Interview 3)  
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Help to Buy’s contribution towards housing policy objectives was questioned by other 
interviewees and the way that the housebuilding sector became dependent upon it begins 
to look more like a policy anomaly. Evidence suggests that a significant proportion of people 
who used it could have bought anyway:  
‘Okay, it also boosted the demand for new build property, which I think is a good 
thing. If you look at it in a narrow sense of how many people did it help into 
homeownership, clearly its impact was much lower.’ (Interview 17)  
A former official puts it in context of policy on affordable housing more generally: 
‘You ended up that in that really odd situation where the government contribution 
to Help to Buy could be more than the grant you were putting into affordable 
housing, and much more than the amount of public subsidy that was going into 
shared ownership. Which in its own terms, if money's money, is just absurd, but 
obviously some was on balance sheet and some was off. But policy wise, it's bizarre, 
isn't it? Your biggest area of subsidy is to people who objectively need that subsidy 
least because their incomes are higher.’ (Interview 21) 
 
6.4.3 HOUSING AND PLANNING ACT 2016 
The majority Conservative government elected in 2015 came to power pledged to extend 
the Right to Buy to housing association tenants and to build 200,000 starter homes to be 
sold at a 20 per cent discount to first-time buyers. The funding mechanisms for these 
policies -  the sale of council houses and flats in high-value areas as they fell vacant and 
planning contributions from developers – compromised the financing of existing affordable 
housing. These were changes in policy instruments and their settings with a clear ideological 
intent (Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2007). 
The new Conservative government then doubled down on them by planning an Affordable 
Homes Programme for 2016-2021 that included no funding for affordable rented housing. 
As a former senior civil servant puts it: 
‘Basically at that point, the view was that the affordable housing programme should 
only be for shared ownership and market sales. Essentially, they didn't want any of 
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that budget going towards affordable housing for rent. So it was a very radical 
departure from the consensus policy that had been there in previous Labour and 
Conservative governments that had just about held together through the coalition. It 
was a big shift, and it was a very contested set of policies.’ (Interview 9) 
The key ideas in the manifesto emanated first from think tanks and were then driven by 
Downing Street and the prime minister’s special advisor, Alex Morton (Interviews 3, 7, 10). 
The extension of the Right to Buy to housing association tenants had periodically featured in 
Conservative manifestos ever since the introduction of the policy by Mrs Thatcher in 1980. 
Abandoned then because most associations were charities, the policy had been discussed, 
and quickly dismissed, within the coalition, according to a Liberal Democrat special advisor:  
‘Extending the right to buy to housing associations was a bloody stupid way of 
expropriating charitable assets at vast expense…We said to them, when they were 
writing the manifesto, that's a stupid idea. We blocked it in government, because 
this is stupid, it doesn't work, it's incredibly expensive.’ (Interview 11) 
The ideas were not supported across the whole of the Conservative party or at the DCLG.  
The secretary of state appointed after the election says that ‘I very clearly understood that 
my job was  to implement it’. However, the charitable status of associations created room 
for manoeuvre in implementation and he worked for a voluntary agreement with the 
National Housing Federation so that ‘we would avoid having to legislate and to breach a 
covenant that I think successive governments have had with housing associations that they 
were independent and voluntary’. (Interview 20) 
Seen from the perspective of the housing sector, it was a matter of playing for time until the 
contradictions inherent in the policy became clear:  
‘My calculation at the time was that the deal that we had done would prove to be 
very unattractive for the Tories and it was. That's exactly what happened. It's not 
worked a) because actually the stomach for it in the population has diminished and 
b) because it is very expensive. They've properly had to face up to the fact that the 
discount in Right to Buy costs a lot of money.’ (Interview 3)  
Because it was a voluntary agreement, the extension of the Right to Buy itself did not form 
part of the Housing and Planning Bill tabled in 2015 but the Bill did include starter homes, a 
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levy on the sale of vacant council homes and mandatory fixed-term tenancies for new 
council tenants. Behind the scenes, though, problems with the rest of this agenda were 
already clear to some Conservatives and to the DCLG. As a Conservative minister sums up 
starter homes:  
‘I had major rows with Alex Morton, because he was very idealistic and he came up 
with [starter homes], which were just a non runner… It was never going to fly. It was 
a thing that Number 10 latched on to because they wanted better numbers than 
they were getting and he went in and persuaded them. And poor old Brandon21 had 
to put it in legislation. And of course, nothing ever got built, surprise, surprise… One 
shouldn't underestimate the ability of the policy unit in Number 10 to suddenly skew 
what you thought you were doing in the ministry off in some other avenue.’ 
(Interview 10)  
The problems soon became clear to incoming ministers after the election too, according to 
the Conservative secretary of state:  
‘It didn't make sense. Take the Right to Buy, the manifesto policy was a kind of 
bonkers hybrid, which said that the discount… would be generated from the sale of 
high value council properties. Now, these are two completely different policies with 
their own dynamics, and it would be an astonishing coincidence if the  revenues 
from the sale of high value council properties happened to coincide with the cost of 
the discounts, for example. There was no connection,  they were driven by different 
forces and that's not to get into the injustice in many ways, if it had proceeded, of 
moving funds from a very small number of boroughs… to other parts of the country. 
So it was it was not in my view a sensible policy.’ (Interview 20)  
As the Bill made its way through the Commons and the Lords, the Labour opposition found 
that it was gaining support in unexpected places and the plans started to unravel. A Labour 
shadow minister says he felt isolated in the arguments he was making at the beginning, with 
the housing sector reluctant to speak out against a new government. By the end:   
‘The Bill was such a bad piece of legislation and it just captured everything that was 
so flawed about the philosophy and policy approach to the previous five years, that 
 
21 Brandon Lewis, housing minister from 2014 to 2016 
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actually we were able to make a lot of headway. By the time  that bill came back to 
the Commons, we had Tory MPs, Tory councillors, making the same arguments as us. 
You would be hard pressed by the end to find a Tory MP, a Tory council leader or 
Tory peer who felt that some of the extreme elements of that legislation were the 
answer to the housing crisis.’ (Interview 16) 
Although the Act became law, measures including higher-value sales and mandatory fixed-
term tenancies for new council tenants were not implemented and were eventually 
repudiated in the social housing green paper three years later (MHCLG, 2018). Preparatory 
work continued on Starter Homes but none were ever built. The Right to Buy for housing 
association tenants remains unimplemented beyond a small regional pilot.  
This episode illustrates both the influence and the limits of marketising ideas on 
Conservative housing policy in the 2010s. Had they been implemented, the affordable 
housing proto-paradigm would have become more firmly established at all four levels of 
Daigneault’s framework. The fact that they were not represents an accumulation of 
anomalies and policy failures but is also an example of a failure to institutionalise a new 
policy framework (Oliver and Pemberton, 2004).  
The period between 2010 and 2016, and especially the period when the Conservatives had 
an overall majority, was certainly marked by a high degree of policy experimentation and 
policy failure. This might be seen as the social housing paradigm being stretched to breaking 
point but perhaps also as a failure to consolidate a new ‘affordable housing’ paradigm on 
market liberal lines. Equally, as multiple interviewees pointed out, the legacy of the failed 
policies of 2015-2016 can still be seen in the Conservative agenda of 2020 and 2021: for 
Starter Homes, read First Homes; and for housing association Right to Buy read Right to 
Shared Ownership (Interviews 3, 6, 7). This suggests that ideas within the party about 
promoting home ownership above all else retain their strength regardless of past policy 
failures.  
 
6.5 CONSTRAINTS AND AGENCY 
The importance of the machinery of government emerged very strongly in this second 
phase of my research. Interviews revealed where policy makers perceived housing’s place 
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within a more complex institutional system and how the interplay between different 
institutions affects the policy process. Radical policy change requires buy-in from a minister 
with sufficient power to move policy beyond these institutional constraints. However, the 
agency of ministers is contingent and can be limited by the short duration of their 
appointments.  
 
6.5.1 MACHINERY OF GOVERNMENT 
The interviews highlighted issues with institutional interests (Interviews 7, 16) that go 
beyond conventional thinking about policy silos since different departments will see policies 
from the point of view of their own priorities. As a former minister puts it:  
‘I would say that depending on the different silos within government, the housing 
ministry, Treasury, Number 10, that shapes the perception of what the priority is. So 
mortgage policy, which actually is very important in terms of homeownership, is 
really driven by Treasury and so therefore they're coming at it from looking at it from 
that point of view. Number 10 is concerned with policy in its in its own right, so are 
there more homeowners, are we making sure that we're helping different groups in 
our society? And then the ministry tends to be very much focused on the meat and 
drink and is broadly pretty practical.’ (Interview 10)   
However, these different interests also frame ideas about the policy problems they are 
trying to solve. Several interviewees argued that policy does not emerge from the silos that 
contain it unless it is championed by a minister with enough clout to do so.  
When it comes to homelessness, as seen by a civil servant: 
‘It is in MHCLG's interest to say that the problem with statutory homelessness lies 
with housing benefit, and therefore it's a DWP problem to fix. It's in the interest of 
the Treasury to say there's no problem with raising benefits, it's about social change 
and shifting expectations. It's the interest of DWP to say it's all about Section 21 and 
that needs to shift. So, driven by civil servants, you definitely have an institutional 
bias to make sure it's someone else's problem.’ (Interview 13) 
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Across different levels and roles within government, interviewees saw coherence in policy 
as an unrealistic expectation because of these different interests. A former Conservative 
minister says that:  
‘Government is always a group of opinions and views, depending on where someone 
sits in government. The notion that government is some sort of holistic whole is I 
always think a mistake. It's never that coherent - and that's not a comment on this 
government or any government.’(Interview 10)  
A former Lib Dem special advisor puts it even more strongly:  
‘it's almost impossible to say that one idea, that there's one kind of ideologically 
pure thing that led to x policy. In the end, often it's three or four different priorities 
or ideologies that smash together and create something that probably to the outside 
looks utterly incoherent.’ (Interview 11).  
As perceived by a former civil servant: 
‘It's just such a misnomer to think of the government view. It is a seething nest of 
factions, which occasionally through collective responsibility is forced to take an 
outward facing position. But all those positions reflect is who won a particular fight 
on a particular day, they don't attempt to come together in anything coherent. So 
you'll end up with this patchwork of one person getting their pet policy on social 
housing, someone else getting their pet policy on home ownership, the Treasury 
forcing compromise. And even if you had individual figures who had the bandwidth 
and the heft to within themselves have a coherent view of housing, that machinery 
of government and the petty squabbles between departments means that you end 
up with a collection of incoherent compromises.’ (Interview 13) 
This is compounded by a rapid turnover of ministers that is seen to encourage short-term 
decision making and reduce the chances of anything resembling a coherent, long-term plan 
(Interviews 6, 9, 16). The 13-year period since 2007 had seen 14 different housing ministers 
by early 2021 of whom only three served for more than two years and nine spent less than 
12 months in the job. Many different interviewees perceived that ministerial priorities were 
driven by short-termism and chasing headlines (Interviews 3, 5). As one senior civil servant 
puts it:  
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‘What I felt quite frustrated by really…was sometimes the ability to recognise the 
underlying market fundamentals… and what was going to make a difference. So to 
have long term plans that deliver a change was always the difficulty on housing. We 
had a rapid - we had an extraordinary turnover of housing ministers and the natural 
instinct of any new housing minister is to come up with a new scheme, to “solve the 
housing crisis”. Well, they don't, these schemes, they usually just distort the market 
a little bit.’ (Interview 9) 
Inside government, the Cabinet Office, headed by the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 
emerges as an important player in the interviews in attempting to forge coherence from 
these disparate strands. Its role covers not just the adjudication of spending disputes 
between departments, as on rents in Section 6.2.2 above, but also the delivery of cross-
departmental programmes and manifesto commitments. Current examples include the 
targets to deliver 300,000 new homes a year by the mid-2020s and eliminate rough sleeping 
by the end of the parliament as well as a long-term programme to release public land. 
Targets like this are seen to be far more important inside government than it might appear 
from outside (Interview 13). All three could be classified as ideas about policy ends under 
my conceptual framework but can also be seen as means to the policy ends of making 
housing more affordable and reducing homelessness. As seen in Section 6.3.3, means can 
become institutionalised as ends.  
 
6.5.2 MINISTERIAL AGENCY 
Within a context of institutional constraints and rapid ministerial turnover, individual 
ministers are still key to getting things done. Based on the interviews, the agency felt by 
ministers was contingent on the circumstances of their appointment and what they wanted 
to change. A Labour housing minister appointed in the wake of the Global Financial Crisis 
asked for, and received, cross-departmental authority  from a prime minister who 
recognised housing’s importance to the economy (Interview 16). Even though all of the 
secretaries of state and housing ministers after 2010 were Conservatives, interviewees 
perceived far more differences between them than one might expect from their common 
party affiliation.  
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Ministerial agency is also important in deciding what happens outside of formal ‘housing 
policy’ and DCLG/MHCLG, adding nuance to the institutional interests highlighted above. As 
one interviewee put it, radical change requires the prime minister or the chancellor or the 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster to expend political capital winning the argument 
(Interview 13). Among prime ministers, David Cameron (2010-2016) was perceived by 
multiple interviewees to lack much interest in housing beyond associating social housing 
with sink estates (Interviews 9, 13, 19). Theresa May (2016-2019) ushered in a time when 
progress seemed more possible to those outside government and where it became possible 
to talk about social housing once again (Interviews 5, 7). Boris Johnson (2019-present) is 
seen as lacking strong views on housing but as steering policy back towards the ownership-
first agenda of Cameron (Interviews 3, 13).  
Among chancellors, multiple interviewees perceived George Osborne (2010-2016) as hostile 
to social housing on the grounds that it breeds Labour voters (Interviews 6, 13) although this 
was denied by a former Conservative minister (Interview 20). Phillip Hammond (2016-19) 
took a strong interest in housing as a former housebuilder but was seen as an obstacle to 
progress and as unwilling to compromise on spending decisions (Interview 27) or the 
market-driven solutions to housing problems favoured inside the Treasury (Interview 3). 
Sajid Javid (2019-20) was perceived inside and outside government as a chancellor who 
genuinely wanted to achieve things in housing policy, influenced by his time at MHCLG 
when he was instrumental in making housing part of its title, but lacked the time to achieve 
anything (Interview 3, 13).  
Ministerial agency perhaps matters most in the consideration of ideas that are outside the 
policy mainstream. Policy silos are also seen to exist even within departments and 
heterodox ideas that cut across them will tend to filtered out by civil servants unless a 
minister takes an interest and has the power to implement change: 
‘Unless you have a minister who a) has permission to have that breadth, and b) is 
pushing it, all of the institutions on the officials side are not set up to draw those 
connections. There's no natural gravity that would make the person looking at 
housing supply talk to the person responsible for capital gains tax and see what they 
could do. If that happens, that is only going to come from a ministerial steer.’ 
(Interview 13) 
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The point here is that, however much policy change may be driven by ideas and constrained 
by institutional interests, it also depends on circumstances and who has the power, 
influence and agency at a particular time (Carstensen and Matthijs, 2017). Accounts of 
policy paradigms must, in other words, not just look at the ideas underpinning them but the 
willingness and capacity of those in government to act on them.  
 
6.5.3 HIDDEN CONSTRAINTS 
Alongside the visible impacts of institutional interests and ministerial agency, a more 
concealed set of constraints on the transmission of ideas into policy emerged in the 
interviews.  
Section 6.4.2 showed how the creation of the Help to Buy equity loan scheme depended on 
a funding mechanism that did not score against public borrowing. A similar logic had applied 
to the funding switch to housing associations in 1988 and the subsequent promotion of 
stock transfer from local authorities. In addition to what was seen as breaking the 
‘municipal monopoly’ (Conservative Party, 1987), any private finance raised by associations 
in addition to government grant does not count against public borrowing totals. At the level 
of ideas about what should be provided by the market and what by the state, this created a 
distinction between what counts as ‘public’ and ‘private’ that has carried through into 
spending decisions decades later22.  
Local authority borrowing counts as public borrowing in England. Housing sector 
organisations have long argued that this disadvantages council housing and that in other 
countries the debt of public corporations, including municipal housing companies, is not 
classified in this way (Interview 2). A former Downing Street special adviser recalls 
attempting to find out why but: 
‘It took me a long time to even find the people to have the argument with. The 
Treasury is such an opaque institution, with so many layers of gatekeepers and 
 
22 This was thrown into confusion when changes in regulations resulted in housing associations being 
reclassified as part of the public sector by the Office for National Statistics in 2015, putting all of their debt 
onto the public balance sheet. The decision was reversed in 2017 but civil servants recall having to brief 
ministers about the potential impact of regulations that could be seen as compromising associations’ private 
status (Interview 7).  
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secrecy, that to even find who guards that particular policy is quite difficult, even 
from inside Number 10.’ (Interview 27)  
This is a description that recalls Hall’s description of a framework that is ‘unamenable to 
scrutiny’ (Hall, 1993, p279). The Treasury pointed to New Zealand and Canada as examples 
of countries that treat public corporations in the same way but it also admitted that both 
operate whole asset accounting, which counts the value of assets as well as liabilities, 
whereas the UK does not. This seemingly technical issue has helped to structure housing 
policy since the 1980s. The result is that: 
‘[Council housing] always looks like a bad investment. In accounting terms it's just 
money down the toilet. It's madness, no business, no household would run like that, 
but that's how the British national accounts run. We are the only country that does 
both these things, ie classifies public corporation debts as on balance sheet and 
doesn't count the assets that they acquire. But they basically said, “yeah, we are a 
bit anomalous, but our system is better and it will not change”.’ (Interview 27)  
These rules are just part of a larger framework of classifications and conventions that 
constrain decisions about housing. We have already seen the impact of cost-benefit analysis 
with in-built assumptions about value for money on the affordable housing programme in 
2010 (Section 6.4.1). Beyond that, civil service norms and procedures that may seem value-
neutral but may also have an almost ‘taken for granted’ bias against heterodox policy ideas 
embedded within them. For example, the process of preparing brief summaries of policy 
options for ministers finds flaws in arguments very quickly but may also contain an in-built 
bias in favour of existing policy: 
‘To call it neutrality would be misleading but it's a kind of deference to the status 
quo. But the challenge is, that is the way it is done. When [housing] sector 
arguments rely heavily on emotive appeals, that's not going to translate. So it's then 
that question of what's left, what's the substance? Unless you've got a really credible 
model that tells me doing this will reduce rough sleeping by x, then what have I got 




6.6 CHAOS AND CONSENSUS 2017-2019 
The period between the Housing and Planning Act receiving Royal Assent and the u-turns on 
several of its key elements was marked by Brexit, a new prime minister in Theresa May, an 
election in which she lost her majority and the Grenfell Tower fire. Although Brexit in 
particular took up  the majority of the government’s time, these fresh crises also appeared 
to create limited possibilities for political agency (Hay, 2001; Kern et al, 2015). Although this 
had mixed results, beneath the surface of the tumultuous events over the period, at the 
level of ideas about housing, interviewees detected movement towards, if not a new 
paradigm, then potential for a new consensus in the right political circumstances.  
 
6.6.1 A SIGH OF RELIEF 
Before the 2017 election, when the government was in theory still committed to the 
pledges in the 2015 manifesto, a new housing minister, Gavin Barwell, struck a different and 
more tenure-neutral tone. Recalling Hall’s point about ‘the very terminology’ used by policy 
makers there was a significant change, says a senior civil servant:  
‘Obviously Theresa May came in with Gavin Barwell and everybody breathed a sigh 
of relief because you could start using the word social housing again. No one talked 
about social housing in the previous government, it was all affordable housing, and 
then nobody knew what was meant. Was it affordable housing at social rent or 
affordable housing at affordable rent so was it a shared ownership or whatever 
else?’ (Interview 5).  
May retained power at the 2017 election but as head of a minority government. Barwell lost 
his seat and became her chief of staff. While delivering Brexit was the overwhelming 
political priority, there was a shift to the left in social policy. Several non-Conservative 
special advisers were hired in Downing Street and it seemed that Brexit had opened political 
space for action on housing (Interview 27).  
There was also a sense that the Conservatives had woken up to the issues facing private 
renters and to the fact that they needed to find policies to appeal to a large bloc of young 
voters (Interview 13). The private rented sector had been seen through the prism of the 
market and deregulation ever since the 1988 Act, but a reframing of the arguments that 
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portrayed renters as consumers in an unfair market chimed with Downing Street’s thinking 
about the wider economy (Interview 22).  
 
6.6.2 SYMBOLIC CHANGES 
This change of mood was reflected in two policy announcements that from outside 
government looked like symbolic changes to the existing policy framework. At the 
Conservative Party conference in October 2018, Theresa May surprised the housing sector 
by announcing that borrowing caps on council housing would be scrapped. This removed 
one of the limitations on self-financing imposed by the Treasury when it was first introduced 
(Interview 16) and it amended a key part of the social housing paradigm that had rigidly 
controlled borrowing through local authority Housing Revenue Accounts (Interview 2). Then 
a consultation on introducing longer three-year tenancies in the private rented sector in 
2018 hardened into a proposal to abolish Section 21 no-fault evictions in 2019 (Interview 
22). Section 21 of the Housing Act 1988 is a key element of the social housing paradigm that 
institutionalised the deregulation of private tenancies and became a shorthand term used 
across the housing sector.  
The view from inside Downing Street was very different, however. From this perspective, 
there was no big ideological shift and both policies were the result of ‘occasional, fairly 
chaotic and sporadic bits of political space’ that happened to open up (Interview 27).  On 
this account, the borrowing cap decision was ‘a classic example of just internal political 
gameplaying. It had nothing to do with the policy or the ideology at all. It's through the 
insane process by which conference announcements are planned and created and then 
made’. The leader’s speech at the party conference is the one political event of the year that 
is controlled by Number 10: 
‘So policy announcements are very carefully, jealously guarded by the centre. 
There's a long process that goes on where people argue over what they're going to 
have, but they want to keep it secret from each other, and from the civil servants, 
because it's a clearly political process because it's party conference. So [laughs] 
nothing gets scrutinised, nothing gets any detail, nothing gets checked, and at the 
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last minute there's a frantic round of horse trading over what can and can't be 
announced.’ (Interview 27) 
Shortly before the conference, the Treasury and Number 10 met to discuss ideas for 
announcements and the Treasury rejected all of those proposed. Knowing this would 
happen, the special adviser (spad) and his opposite number at MHCLG had already 
discussed HRA cap reform, anticipating a last-minute rush for something to say about 
housing: 
‘So at that point, we produced our kind of trump card and said, “well, there is this, 
Prime Minister, you can just announce this, the Treasury can't stop it, all it takes is 
the secretary of state, who's onside, to write to the chief executive of each local 
authority, and the cap is lifted. It's something that the sector has been crying out for 
years, it'll make you look good, we'll get a big announcement and the Treasury can't 
really block it”. So it was just for that, it was just because they needed something to 
say.’ (Interview 27) 
The Section 21 announcement went through a similar process. Seen from the inside: ‘It was 
a desire to do something. It was obviously a long held policy goal of mine. And so once I had 
my equivalent spad in MHCLG onside, it was just a matter of finding the right political 
moment.’ The policy was supported by polling among frustrated young private renters and 
did not cost anything: 
‘There was obviously huge internal resistance but the government was fairly 
desperate and in those circumstances, we were able to get something through. Or at 
least get it announced. It still hasn't been introduced.’ (Interview 27) 
The abolition of Section 21 remains a manifesto commitment but the details are yet to be 
seen. As with macro-prudential regulation (Baker, 2013), the politics could play out at the 
level of instruments and settings rather than policy objectives.  
Policy bricolage and entrepreneurship therefore played a major role in decisions that looked 
like significant changes to the housing policy paradigm from the outside. It also seems that 
the closer we get to the centre of power, the more chaotic decision-making appears to be. 
This raises conceptual issues about how to treat the different views of policy insiders and 
outsiders. These two examples could be exceptional and reflect the impact of the chaos 
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created by the exogenous shock of Brexit on domestic politics. However, the earlier case of 
the creation of Affordable Rent generated a similar gap in perceptions. While the views of 
policy insiders may seem self-evidently more valid, a more distant perspective focussing on 
the wider impacts of a decision, rather than the way in which was made, also has value. 
 
6.6.3 GRENFELL AND THE GREEN PAPER 
Only five weeks after the 2017 election, 72 residents died in a horrific fire at Grenfell Tower, 
a local authority tower block in West London. After the immediate horror, the fire raised 
fundamental issues about fire safety and social housing. A series of tenant consultation 
events held ahead of a green paper (MHCLG, 2018) made a strong impression on ministers 
and civil servants (Interview 25). This might be seen as a tentative example of a change in 
the locus of authority cited by Hall as a sign of third order change and it was certainly 
detectable in the tone of the green paper, in its promises to scrap parts of the housing 
policy agenda from 2015 and 2016 and its references back to more consensual, pre-
Thatcher Conservatism. However, interviewees in the housing sector were more sceptical 
that the green paper and subsequent white paper (MHCLG, 2020d) mark ‘a shift in their 
fundamental world view of the role of social housing’ (Interview 7). 
Seen from inside government, the green paper was ‘a bit of a dog’s breakfast’ that reflected 
ministerial turnover – there were three different housing ministers while it was being 
written – and competing agendas. The net results were contradictions and incoherence, 
according to a special adviser with a hand in writing it: 
‘This goes right to the heart of a Conservative government that was, on the one 
hand, trying to kind of reimagine its position on social housing….partly driven by a 
genuine sense of responsibility and horror over what had happened at Grenfell and a 
recognition that not just building safety aspects, but the cultural exclusion and 
stigmatisation of social housing tenants had really gone too far and too long. That 
was genuine. And also an acceptance of the political reality of it - you just can't get 
away with it anymore. But at the same time, they still have all the same prejudices 
and assumptions and financial pressures not to spend too much on social housing 
and desire for home ownership. So all of those contradictions are  bundled up into 
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one. And trying to come up with a set of policies that were both addressing those 
things, but were actually vaguely meaningful, was a tangled process, and the result 
was not particularly coherent.’ (Interview 27) 
That was the context in which the green paper hedged its bets about social housing being a 
‘safety net’ offering secure homes or a ‘springboard’ to home ownership (MHCLG, 2018). 
The episode illustrates contradictory ideas at the level of values and principles within the 
ruling party but also the continuing influence of a paradigm that a former senior civil servant 
argues is still based on the view implicit in the Right to Buy that ‘social housing was for the 
residual poor and ideally wasn't the destination… I don’t think they’ve changed their mind 
since really.’ (Interview 7) 
Grenfell also led to an escalating and so far unresolved crisis in building safety. Fuelled by 
revelations from the public inquiry about dangerous cladding and shoddy construction 
work, this has affected most high-rise and even mid-rise residential buildings in England and 
left residents facing huge bills for repairs and flats that are unsaleable. Almost four years on, 
the crisis is unresolved despite several announcements of government funding. Inside 
government, the delays are blamed on Treasury resistance to spending money (Interview 
27). Outside government, interviewees expressed amazement that it had been so slow to 
recognise that this, rather than Covid-19, was the real threat to the housing market 
(Interview 13) and to the Conservatives’ reputation for supporting first-time buyers 
(Interview 19). There is a feeling that only the government has the capacity to resolve the 
wider cladding crisis but that it had still not woken up to this (Interview 23).  
 
6.6.3 A SHIFTING CONSENSUS? 
The period also brought tentative evidence of a change in the spectrum of ideas about 
housing that perhaps suggests a ‘moving paradigmatic core’ (Princen and Van Esch, 2016) 
beneath the surface of policy.  
After losing the 2015 election, the opposition Labour Party steadily adopted a more radical 
approach based on the theme of ‘housing for the many’ (Labour Party, 2017). The platform 
included not just substantially increased investment in social and affordable housing but 
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moves towards rent regulation and action across the housing system. A former shadow 
housing minister says that: 
‘Part of my starting point…was that it's not just how much you build but it's what 
you build and who it's for. So yes, we need to increase supply. But simply increasing 
supply of open market homes is not going to help with meeting housing need. 
You've got to build a mix. And to build a mix, you've got to use a mix of measures 
from the market to regulation to government policy, including priming investment, 
as part of it.’ (Interview 16) 
Labour advocated institutional changes within government including a full-fledged 
Department of Housing, which influenced the Conservatives’ conversion of DCLG into 
MHCLG in 2018. At a more macro level, before the 2019 election the shadow chancellor 
proposed a new fiscal rule based on Public Sector Net Worth, which includes assets as well 
as liabilities, and showed interest in a think tank proposal to include house price inflation in 
inflation targets given to the Bank of England (Interview 26). Both of these might have 
changed ‘taken for granted’ conventions (Section 6.5.3) that constrain housing policy if 
Labour had won and adopted them. However, the housing policy paradigm has not been 
tested by a change of political party within government since 2010.  
Changes of tone within the Conservative government are discernible and the substance has 
also varied between administrations, although the pandemic makes it hard to say with any 
certainty where the Johnson government’s priorities will lie. In the wider party, however, 
there is evidence that pro-housing arguments can have some impact if they are framed in a 
way that appeals to underlying values. A former housing sector policy specialist recalls ‘a 
personal epiphany moment’ at an event organised by Prince Charles when he realised that 
groups like the National Trust and CPRE were making the same criticisms of the housing 
market as he was. At the next Conservative conference, he put this thinking to work in a 
presentation at a fringe meeting: 
‘I gave exactly the same critique of exactly what was wrong with the housing system 
and just accompanied it with pictures of Poundbury23. That was all it took and they 
 
23 Urban extension under construction on land owned by Prince Charles in Dorset to a masterplan based on 
traditional design 
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agreed with me 100 per cent. In fact at the end of it, I had Conservative councillors 
came up to me saying, “if it looked like this, we'd be asking how can I get more social 
housing built in Buckinghamshire?” And I realised that a lot of the divisions on this 
were unnecessary and actually driven by cultural prejudice on both sides more than 
a real fundamental ideological divide.’ (Interview 27) 
Some empirical support for this view comes from the backbenches in the House of 
Commons, where private members’ bills on homelessness prevention and making homes fit 
for human habitation were approved in 2017 and 2018 (Interviews 18 and 19). The Housing 
Communities and Local Government select committee24, which has a Labour chair but a 
Conservative majority, has published a series of unanimous reports including a call for 
90,000 social rented homes a year (Interview 18) that contrast sharply with official party 
policy. At the level of values, one former minister said that in his experience what unites 
Conservatives is ‘recognition of the importance of home, for people to have a place that 
they feel they can belong, to be part of a community, to have stability’ (Interview 20). 
Another took the same view as Oliver Letwin that ‘if you're going to build the number of 
homes you need, you have to do it in a range of different tenures and they need to be in the 
same locations or neighbouring to one another’ (Interview 10).  
These are hints that potential political space exists for a shift in ideas about housing across 
all four dimensions of the policy paradigm. Whether political circumstances will ever create 
the opportunity to act upon it remains to be seen.   
 
6.7 CRISIS AND THE INTERPRETATION OF CRISIS 
This final section steps back from policy debates to look at the way that perceptions of two 
different crises have influenced the housing paradigm since 2007. In the context of the 
literature, in which crises can play an important role as exogenous shocks that delegitimate 
an existing policy paradigm, this should be fertile territory for policy change. If crises can be 
conceived as events that need to be narrated and explained as problems that need the 
attention of policy makers (Blyth, 2002; Kern et al, 2014), then this is a crucial point. 
However, this in turn needs to be considered in the context of arguments that crises have 
 
24 The work of each government department is scrutinised by an all-party committee of backbench MPs 
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become a ubiquitous feature of contemporary societies and need to be understood as 
narrative constructions that raise certain questions while foreclosing others (Roitman, 
2014). Crises can be both ‘real’ events and constructed narratives deployed to make sense 
of the world in a particular way (Blyth, 2002).  
 
6.7.1 HOUSING CRISIS 
Interviewees were asked whether they considered the notion of a ‘housing crisis’ to be a 
useful way to describe what is happening in the housing system and how they saw this in 
relation to other crises. Some interviewees agreed in straightforward terms, for example 
pointing to evidence of unaffordable house prices and their impact on younger generations 
(Interview 15). Most of those outside government said they had used the term to lobby for 
policy change themselves.  
However, many others thought that the idea of a housing crisis had outlived its usefulness 
and had even begun to be counter-productive because it added to pressure for short-term 
policy fixes: 
‘The notion of crisis implies that stuff can be fixed quickly, whereas actually I think 
probably that's just not true. To be honest, I think the sector plays into this as well, 
don't we? We use crisis all the time, because it's a good way to get to get money… 
but I think over the long term it doesn't help particularly.’ (Interview 21) 
Another said that:  
‘However much you recognise that there is a crisis in housing, you also have to 
recognise that it's not one you can fix quickly… So I think it's a bit of a double edged 
sword in a way to talk about a housing crisis from that point of view because you 
also have to communicate the fact that it's going to take time to solve it… I think it's 
perhaps more important to see this as a long term, profound challenge for the 
society.’ (Interview 7) 
One of the characteristics of policy fields with looser paradigms that Hall noted in his 
original paper was the role that metaphors and leitmotifs play in constraining and enabling 
options (Hall, 1993, p291). This certainly seems to be true of the ‘crisis’ narrative. Two 
 104 
interviewees independently reached for the same alternative metaphor to make sense of 
what was happening. One said that  
‘When it was first acknowledged by government, as in we have a housing crisis 
under a Conservative government, that was a real shock and awe moment. But I 
associate a crisis with being something that is a particular driver and, relatively 
speaking, short lived and you come out of a crisis….I don't know how you would best 
describe it, but it is chronic rather than acute. Well, it's both acute and chronic.’ 
(Interview 1).  
A second argued that:  
‘A crisis is sudden, and this is chronic, it's a set of chronic worsening problems that 
are interlinked and they're lifestyle diseases.’ (Interview 11) 
What is interesting about these accounts is that they are almost describing the opposite of 
crisis as exogenous shock and seeing the world in terms of a developing, structural and 
systemic problem, hence something endogenous. Turning the crisis argument around, one 
interviewee argued that:  
‘Politics is not hugely irrational. Politics does respond to crises... And I almost feel 
like, by definition, the fact that we've done naff all proves it's not a crisis. It proves 
it's contained enough and the impacts are specific enough and the beneficiaries are 
powerful... I think there comes a point where you have to accept you can't keep 
telling people there's a crisis if they just don't act like that's true.’ (Interview 3)  
 
6.7.2 FINANCIAL CRISIS 
For context, interviewees were also asked what they thought had been the impact on 
housing of other crises since 2007. Despite Brexit, Grenfell and Covid-19, the Global 
Financial Crisis and its aftermath was the one that continued to be in the forefront of the 
minds of most.  
Interviewees from the mortgage finance sector said it was important to set this in the 
context of structural changes in the lending industry before the crisis. Financial liberalisation 
led to most building societies converting into banks and reduced margins and increased 
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risks but also meant an increased supply of credit at more competitive rates. Dual-earner 
households could borrow up to five times their joint income rather than the traditional two 
and a half times and rising access to credit fuelled rising house prices (Interview 23). The 
creation and rapid expansion of Buy to Let took lenders as well as the government by 
surprise (Interview 17) and this ‘fundamentally shifted the relationship that there's a finite 
number of buyers and a finite number of homes because suddenly any individual could own 
as many homes as they were able to get finance for’ (Interview 23). 
In the wake of the crisis, the effects of these changes in the mortgage market have 
continued to play out in combination with measures to rescue the economy and the 
financial system. A former Conservative housing minister makes direct connections with the 
problems in the housing system that emerged after 2007: 
‘The global financial crisis meant that interest rates plummeted. And that meant that 
a lot of people who had savings… [suddenly saw that] disappear. So there was a 
huge amount of money looking to buy something, or invest in something, that would 
generate a better rate of return… And of course, because they were coming into that 
and they were looking to make both capital return and rental income, they were 
able to outbid first time buyers. So you had the worst of all worlds…you had a new 
group of people coming in who could probably pay more, you had the lack of access 
to finance for first time buyers and for some self-employed.’ (Interview 10) 
This perception that Buy to Let was squeezing out first-time buyers rather than providing a 
cost-free way to increase the supply of rented homes (Interview 18) cut across Conservative 
values of property-owning democracy . This informed chancellor George Osborne’s decision 
to phase out tax reliefs for landlords and increase stamp duty on second properties from 
2015 even though in Tory terms this was a controversial move and he knew he would ‘get 
some flak from the usual suspects’ (Interview 10). 
However, this was in the context of changes to financial regulation in the wake of the 
financial crisis (see Chapter 2) that had a profound effect on mortgage lenders and 
borrowers. Affordability stress testing and restrictions on lending at higher loan to value and 
income multiples (Interview 17) reduced risks but the net effect was to exclude outsiders, 
new entrants to the housing market, even as insiders, existing owners and landlords, 
benefitted from the impact of low interest rates on mortgage payments and quantitative 
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easing on asset values (Interview 23). Interviewees thought these after-effects of the crisis 
were still structuring the market. As one puts it:  
‘We've still got all the hangovers... We've obviously got a hangover in terms of 
quantitative easing. We've got a hangover in terms of base rates, they've been kept 
so low. Personally I still think we haven't exited the support that was given to us to 
get us out of the crisis. And so what we've done is layer new crises on top of the 
financial crisis.’ (Interview 17) 
A former policy specialist with a major mortgage lender argues that:  
‘Without doubt the most significant policy intervention since [2007] has been the 
dramatic fall in interest rates. Obviously, that has been linked to an assessment out 
of the Global Financial Crisis that the mortgage lending sector and the banking sector 
was too big to fail... I think It also resulted in an inherent statement that the 
government would intervene to protect not just the banking system, but the wealth 
that is accumulated within people's homes and within home ownership. Together 
with the collective policy in 2007-8, and to some extent repeated in the Covid crisis, 
the effect has been that those who have property have been able to keep hold of it 
and those who haven't property have seen the chances of them getting it without 
help and support become more difficult.’ (Interview 23) 
If the aim was to promote stability in the financial system after the crisis, this directly 
contradicted the aim of expanding home ownership. The ‘policy spillovers’ that Kay (2011) 
identified between monetary policy and financial regulation were felt just as powerfully 
within the housing system. From this perspective, the story of repeated policy interventions 
to promote affordable housing looks like a repeated cycle of policy experimentation and 
policy failure in which agency is severely constrained by structural factors that are the 
legacy not just of the events of 2007 and 2008 but of the responses to it within other policy 
paradigms.  
Table 4 sums up changes in the key policy fields influencing housing. 
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TABLE 4: NESTED PARADIGMS AND HOUSING 
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Chapter 5 tentatively suggested that there had been a shift from a social housing paradigm 
to an affordable housing proto-paradigm since 2007. This was on the basis of changes that 
were significant but lacked the internal coherence that would qualify as a full paradigm.  
The findings from interviews with key policy actors give a different impression in which the 
ideas behind policies to promote ‘affordable housing’ look more like a rationalisation of the 
unaffordability generated by changes in related policy fields and markets that make up the 
housing system. The interviews also highlighted constraints on the operation of policy 
paradigms in government as opposed to as stated in policy documents. The findings point to 
the importance of institutional interests embedded in the machinery of government and of 
ministerial agency in navigating the conflicts and compromises that translate ideas into 
action. Government emerges as being about ‘a seething nest of factions’ as much as it does 
about tactical bricoleurs or strategic ‘paradigm men’. In the background, policy options for 
housing are still constrained by rules and conventions about borrowing and accounting that 
are largely ‘unamenable to scrutiny’ (Hall, 1993, p279).  
Some significant changes are detectable at the level of the micro-paradigms of housing 
tenure: increased state intervention is now deemed not just appropriate but necessary to 
sustain home ownership; deregulation of the private rented sector is seen to have gone too 
far, with rebalancing required to protect renters and consumers and prevent landlords 
pricing out first-time buyers; and, while the stock continues to decline, the value of social 
housing has been rehabilitated to some extent and attempts to tilt it further towards the 
market have receded for now. For all this, at the macro and meso levels political economy 
and fiscal and monetary policy continue to restrict investment, support asset prices and 
restrict access to mortgages to new entrants to the market. Table 5 summarises changes in 
ideas about housing over the five governments since 2007 on the four dimensions proposed 
by Daigneault (2015).  
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TABLE 5: THE HOUSING POLICY PARADIGM SINCE 2007 
 Values - assumptions 
about nature of reality, 
social justice, role of state 
Conception of the 
problem that requires 
policy intervention 
Ideas about policy 
ends 
Ideas about policy 
means/instruments 
2008-10 
Labour   
(Gordon 
Brown) 
Govt intervention needed 
-‘business as usual falls 
away’ 
 
Emergency action after 
GFC 
Inadequate supply 




Kickstart housing market 
LA self-financing plan 
Local Housing Allowance as 
shopping incentive 








Economic liberals v social 
conservatives 
Localism - ‘authentic 
Conservative approach’ 
Demand side intervention 
Lenders not lending, 
builders not building 
Inadequate supply 
Housing crisis – falling 
ownership and 
affordability – ‘Tory 







Make work pay 
 
Affordable Rent – bricolage 
or ideology? 
Help to Buy – ‘all about the 
way it scored’ 
Self-financing with caps 
Rent increase = investment 
LHA as cost control, 
bedroom tax, benefit cap 
 
Changes Hostility to social housing 
Contradictions on role of 
market and state 
Market failure requires 
intervention 
Primacy of reducing 
deficit 
Austerity drives change 
Use of off-balance sheet 






Intergenerational equity  
Fix supply, fix housing ‘ 
Inadequate supply 








HA RTB + forced council 
sales ‘bonkers hybrid’ 
Starter Homes –‘it was 
never going to fly’ 
Cut social rents, freeze LHA 




Greater role for markets Acceptance of ‘housing 
crisis’ (in home 
ownership) 
More pro-market with 
coalition brakes off  
Home ownership first 
Influence of think tank 





State should intervene in 
unfair markets 
Intergenerational equity 
Renters as consumers 
Broken housing market 
– supply, accessibility 
Housing crisis – 
affordability  
Renter insecurity 
Grenfell: social housing 
‘new deal’? 
Build more homes of 
all tenures – ‘talking 
about social housing 
suddenly felt possible’ 
Borrowing cap removed on 
LA housing – ‘a complete 
ambush’  
Pledge to scrap Section 21 
U-turns on 2015/16 plans  
Significant 
changes 
Role for state if markets 
not working 
Social housing valued 
Need for action across 
tenures 
‘Moral duty’ to build  
Cross-tenure solutions Symbolic changes proposed 




End of austerity? 
Covid and role of state 
Levelling up? 
 
Broken housing market 
- accessibility 
Raise home ownership 
300k homes pa 
‘Building Beautiful’ 
End rough sleeping 
Social rents CPI+1% 






Emergency expansion of 
state post-Covid 
 
Problem again = access 
to home ownership  
Empty targets? 
 
Revival of failed 2015/16 
policies in new form 
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Changes in housing policy after 2010 were driven by ideas about austerity and welfare 
reform within these nested paradigms. Seen from inside government, specific policy 
instruments such as Affordable Rent emerge as the results of policy bricolage by officials 
acting in their department’s institutional interests rather than the ideology perceived by 
outsiders, although both perspectives may be valid given the social construction of 
institutions. In 2015 and 2016 it seemed that marketising reforms might firm up an 
‘affordable’ paradigm but these ‘bonkers hybrids’ remain unimplemented. In 2017 and 
2018, the Theresa May government rehabilitated some pre-2010 thinking, including use of 
the term ‘social housing’, and announced changes to two key elements of the post-1988 
framework at the level of policy instruments. Seen from inside government, however, these 
were more the result of bricolage, opportunism and the need for announcements on a 
politically salient issue than of an ideological or paradigmatic switch. More fundamental 
reforms to the land and housebuilding market and conventions on public spending on 
housing – new ideas at the level of ideas about the problem that requires policy 
intervention and policy instruments – made brief headway but ultimately failed to progress.  
All this suggests that ideational changes since the financial crisis look less like a new 
paradigm, or even proto-paradigm, than the exhaustion of a post-1980s ‘social housing’ 
framework and the laying bare of its contradictions. Housing policy appears to meet most of 
Hogan and O’Rourke’s (2015) criteria for extant ideational collapse and but few of those for 
new ideational consolidation. Alternative ideas are available but there are few signs of a 
political entrepreneur capable of injecting them into the political arena or producing a 
consensus around a new paradigm. However, change remains a possibility. There is 
tentative evidence of a ‘moving paradigmatic core’ (Princen and Van Esch, 2016) in ideas 
within the Labour Party, even if it remains in opposition, and in the way that some of these 
have been taken up by the Conservatives in government. Differences in framing between 
right and left may obscure common ground on the importance of ‘housing as home’ rather 
than ‘as asset’ and of seeing housing as a system whose component parts must work 
together. Against this, the Global Financial Crisis and the policy responses to it have ‘layered 







Chapter 5 suggested a gradual and tentative shift to an affordable housing ‘proto-paradigm’. 
Drawing on the housing and political economy literature, this was positioned within a 
transition generated outside formal ‘housing policy’ from mature home ownership and 
deregulated private renting to late home ownership (Forrest and Hirayama, 2018). Chapter 
6 revealed a more nuanced story that highlighted the importance of institutional and hidden 
constraints on change, ministerial agency and structural factors arising in political economy 
and finance. The picture that emerged was less of an ‘affordable housing’ proto-paradigm 
than of an attempt to rationalise policy amid the slow collapse of the previous ‘social 
housing’ paradigm.  
This penultimate chapter draws these threads together and considers what the case of 
housing in England since 2007 can contribute to the literature on policy paradigms and what 
the paradigms framework can tell us about policy change in housing.  
 
7.2 POLICY PARADIGMS AND HOUSING 
At first glance, Hall’s case of macro-economic policy making in Britain between 1970 and 
1989 seems to have little in common with my case of policy change in housing in England 
since 2007 apart from historical context and geography. However, both periods illustrate 
the close connections between the economic and housing policy fields and the connections 
between the two in a system of nested paradigms (Nicholls and Teasdale, 2017) that is 
characterised by policy spillovers (Kay, 2011).  
Although the inflation crisis of the 1970s was preceded by the oil price shock, it was 
perceived as a failure of the state and of Keynesian ideas about managing the economy. 
With an alternative set of ideas available and adopted by an opposition that was about to 
win power at the general election, the conditions were in place for third order change in 
Hall’s terms. Whether this change was abrupt or more gradual and involved Monetarism 
alone or a neoliberal synthesis of ideas (Oliver and Pemberton, 2004), it created the 
conditions for the paradigm shift in housing policy in the 1980s, including reductions in 
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public spending and borrowing, the overthrow of local authorities as the principal providers 
of rented homes and a general emphasis on deregulation, privatisation and marketisation.  
The consequences of economic policy for housing did not follow so logically from the events 
of 2007 and 2008, and there were rival constructions of the Global Financial Crisis. What 
looked initially like a failure of the market and neoliberalism gave way after the 2010 
election to a narrative that public borrowing was out of control and that a revival of neo-
classical austerity (Blyth, 2013) was required. Monetary policy was loosened even further 
with ultra-low interest rates and QE, reducing the cost of credit for existing home owners, 
and financial regulation was tightened, restricting access for anyone not already in the 
market. At the same time austerity meant cuts in housing investment and housing benefit. 
Fiscal and monetary policy and financial regulation have therefore worked in concert to 
make housing less accessible and less affordable for housing ‘outsiders’.   
Chapter 5 confirmed the value of Daigneault’s (2014, 2015) paradigms framework as a 
systematic way of analysing ideas behind policy and changes between two time periods and 
of Nicholls and Teasdale’s (2017) ‘nested paradigms’ framework as a way of examining the 
relationships between housing and other policy fields.  However, Chapter 6 raises questions 
about whether any conceptual framework can adequately reflect a process that actors 
themselves believe is marked by conflicts and uneasy compromises between very different 
sets of ideas. Perhaps the most important of these questions concerns the internal 
coherence that Daigneault makes one of his conditions for the existence of a paradigm. 
 
7.2.1 COHERENCE AND BRICOLAGE 
The interviews raise some fundamental questions about the extent and nature of policy 
change since the Global Financial Crisis and some conceptual questions about the way that 
policy paradigms operate in a field like housing. Ministers from the same party emerge with 
very different views about housing policy. Officials seem more like bricoleurs than ‘paradigm 
men’ (Carstensen, 2011). Detailed accounts of individual policies like rent setting have 
shown examples where policy has lurched in one direction and then back again.  
As argued in previous chapters, this supports a softer version of paradigms in which 
commensurability is blurred and coherence is qualified. Support for this view comes from 
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the way that policy instruments that were improvised in the wake of the Global Financial 
Crisis survived in modified form after it. Affordable Rent, for example, became the principal 
component of the Affordable Homes Programme after 2010 but it developed out of earlier 
thinking within DCLG about what an intermediate market rental product might look like for 
people on higher incomes. Similarly, the Help to Buy equity loan scheme became the 
centrepiece of government policy on affordable home ownership from 2013 onwards, but 
the principle of equity loans had already been developed in pre-2010 schemes.  
These may be cases of bricolage but they also look like examples of policy instruments and 
their settings that can have far more significance in the policy process than conventional 
accounts might allow (Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2007). Help to Buy grew to encompass 40 
per cent of the sales of major housebuilders and became so integral to the new build 
market that it has had to be extended several times. Affordable Rent has been 
institutionalised not just as a means of delivering homes with less grant but also as a way for 
housing associations to increase their financial capacity by increasing rents on existing 
homes. At the level of instruments, these resemble ‘layering’ and ‘conversion’ (Mahoney 
and Thelen, 2010) but at the level of ideas about the problem that requires intervention 
(unaffordable housing) they could indicate ideational ‘exhaustion’ (Hogan and O’Rourke, 
2015). In other words, ‘affordable housing’ becomes a way to rationalise the absence of a 
policy paradigm where one is actually needed. As Blyth (2013, p209) argued: ‘It is entirely 
possible that the dominant paradigm is seen to fail and that nothing in particular comes 
along to replace it.’  
All of these factors suggest a need for caution when assessing policy change against criteria 
stipulated in the policy paradigms literature. Internal coherence may be too much to expect 
in a policy field where responsibility is split between different departments with sometimes 
very different interests. Put like this, it seems logical to ask whether it is  possible to speak in 
terms of policy paradigms at all, especially when it comes to a second or third order policy 
field like housing. However, Schmidt (2011, p42) argues that paradigms need not be as 
coherent as a Kuhnian approach might lead one to suspect on precisely the grounds that 
that they are the results of conflicts as well as compromises between actors with different 
ideas. The findings support this interpretation.  
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‘Affordable housing’ still looks like more than a ‘policy theory’ that is specific to a policy 
(Daigneault, 2014) and more than just bricolage even if it amounts to less than a coherent 
policy paradigm. Perhaps, as in the not ‘fully elaborated’ paradigm posited by Hall, it 
consists of the net results of the compromises made between different institutional 
interests. In this interpretation, the policy paradigm in housing is not to be found just in 
formal ‘housing policy’ but precisely in the ways it collides with other nested paradigms and 
finds its place in the policy hierarchy. ‘Affordable housing’ becomes an expression and a 
rationalisation of those dynamics. 
 
7.3 NESTED PARADIGMS 
My framework also drew on the idea of ‘nested paradigms’ proposed by Nicholls and 
Teasdale (2017) as a way of understanding how paradigms operate below the level of 
‘macro’ policy. This offered a useful way to think about how housing relates to policy in 
other fields such as welfare and macro-economic policy making as well as to policy on 
individual tenures and particular aspects of housing policy such as homelessness and 
housebuilding and planning. The concept also illustrates the difference between ‘narrow’ 
housing policy as administered by DCLG/MHCLG  and ‘broad’ housing policy administered 
across multiple government departments and agencies. 
Nicholls and Teasdale conceptualise a three-stage hierarchy, with the over-arching political-
economic paradigm at the macro level, welfare, economic and defence etc policy at the 
meso level and their case of social enterprise sitting below welfare at the micro level. They 
argue that ‘these relationships are not purely hierarchical, and policy paradigms can be 
linked both vertically and horizontally’ (ibid, p327). My policy document analysis highlighted 
important policy relationships and how they might work and my interviews brought a 
wealth of extra data about the way that relations between departments and the interaction 
between different institutional interests shape the conflicts and compromises that form 
policy. Figure 1 below maps out a hierarchy of nested policy paradigms and the government 






















This is a simplified model seen from the top down and omits, for example, local government 
and local authorities, housing associations and private landlords as housing providers. The 
relationships are not purely hierarchical, as all of the micro and meso policy fields listed 
have a strong influence on the housing meso paradigm. While all of them are influenced by 
the macro level of political economy, the influence may run in the other direction, for 
example from home ownership to housing to House Price Keynesianism via housing finance. 
In addition, housing seems to fit more neatly below fiscal and monetary policy in the 
hierarchy than on the same level. The model above therefore envisages ‘upper’ and ‘lower’ 









































Figure 1: Nested paradigms and the housing system 
Key: MPC = Monetary Policy Committee of Bank of England; FPC = Financial Policy Committee of Bank 
of England; No 10 = Downing Street/prime minister; CO = Cabinet Office; MHCLG = Ministry for 
Housing Communities and Local Government; DWP = Department for Work and Pensions.  
Arrows = direction of influence. Italics = outside formal ‘policy’ 
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meso levels, in which economic policy sits above housing, welfare and other policy fields. In 
addition, the research has highlighted the impact of influences from outside formal ‘policy’ 
(marked in italics) and inputs of land and finance that are related at multiple levels  The 
micro paradigms of housing tenure may be easier to specify but are also inter-related. By 
the time these other factors are considered, the framework begins to look less like a 
hierarchical model than a map of a complex ‘housing system’. 
This requires a broader view of the endogenous and exogenous factors that create the 
environment for the ideas that drive ‘housing policy’ and an appreciation of the institutional 
barriers, conflicts and compromises that constrain their potential for action. Perhaps we 
should think of paradigmatic change less in terms of an abrupt shift between 
incommensurable ideational frameworks than as a re-ordering of ‘previous cognitive and 
normative structures’ that ‘give rise to complex and at times contradictory mechanisms of 
adaptation’ (Surel, 2000, p508).  
The model begs several questions about how paradigms might work at different levels. 
Consistent with the literature, the existence of a policy field at a particular level does not 
necessarily mean that it has an active policy paradigm of its own. This also raises the issue of 
whether a paradigm shift can take place at the meso or micro level of policy without one 
also happening at the macro level. This is implicit in Hall’s distinction between policy fields 
with ‘forceful’ and ‘looser’ paradigms but it perhaps also relates back to the levels of 
analysis problem that Kay (2011) detects in Hall’s framework and the literature that it 
inspired. This is that the crisis of Keynesianism applied both at a broad political economy 
(macro) level and at the meso level of macro-economic policy. Within my framework of 
nested paradigms, it is possible for a shift in the housing policy paradigm to happen without 
a shift at the macro level of political economy. However, this is less likely when there is no 
firmly established housing paradigm and when it is so closely tied to political economy. 
Conversely, at the meso level, the post-GFC macro-economic policy paradigm was preserved 
by extraordinary innovations in policy instruments but spillover effects could have led to a 
paradigm shift in housing as well as in financial regulation (Kay, 2011; Baker, 2013). 
However, ideas about macro-prudential regulation were available for rapid adoption in the 
latter case whereas alternative ideas about housing have not yet reached the same point.  
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Finally, there is the possibility that paradigms can exist at the micro level that are internally 
coherent but are not complementary with each other. Arguably, for example, a consistent 
home ownership paradigm has existed since well before the changes of the 1980s based on 
ideas about the values embedded in the tenure and the objective of giving more people a 
stake in society. The differences can be seen through policy instruments, such as the means 
of state support for the tenure, and in ideas about whether the problem that requires 
intervention is a level of ownership that is too low or imbalances within the housing system 
as a whole. This tension has expressed itself in policies designed to promote transfers from 
other tenures that do not take this balance into account and in the durability of an overall 
housing policy paradigm.     
 
7.4 INSTITUTIONS AND AGENCY 
The interviews highlighted institutional constraints on policy change that included not just 
policy silos within departments but different ways of thinking about policy problems and the 
solutions to them. Interviewees from inside government argued that policy outcomes were 
often the product of conflict between competing factions that resulted in incoherent 
compromises. At the same time, rapid ministerial turnover all too often resulted in short-
termism and headline-chasing rather than anything resembling a strategic plan.   
This view challenges the notion of an internally coherent housing policy paradigm, certainly 
in the period since 2007 and possibly more generally as well. However, this may also go 
some way to addressing the more general criticism of policy paradigms, certainly in Hall’s 
original conception of them, that their ‘structuralism’ denies agency to policy actors 
(Carstensen, 2011). The view from inside government of a ‘seething nest of factions’ that is  
occasionally forced to adopt outward-facing positions lends support to a policy process 
based on bricolage. However, interviewees also highlighted the importance of ministerial 
agency in overcoming institutional constraints on heterodox policy ideas. Structure and 
agency exist in a dynamic relationship in which chaos and crises may open up space for 
action but also close it down.  
These points apply especially to the relationships between housing and other paradigms 
that are further up the policy hierarchy. Most obviously, political economy and fiscal and 
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monetary policy set the parameters within which housing policy functions, operating as 
structural constraints that are nevertheless the result of policy choices, and have helped to 
create the affordability question in the period since 2007. However, the interviews also 
revealed the impact of more hidden and ‘taken for granted’ constraints on action in rules 
and conventions operating within government.  
 
7.5 METAPHORS AND NARRATIVES 
In his seminal paper on policy paradigms, Hall argued that in policy fields that do not have a 
‘fully elaborated’ paradigm policymakers’ actions are still ‘invariably based on a particular 
understanding of that sphere of the world which policy addresses’ (1993, p291). He 
highlighted the importance of ‘the terms of discourse’ used in that field and the way that 
even ‘an overarching metaphor…and its attendant elaborations can structure many aspects 
of what is to be done’ (ibid, p292). This offers a useful way of understanding housing policy 
in the 21st century. Unlike Hall’s examples of  ‘the war on drugs’ and ‘the problem of welfare 
mothers’, metaphors such as ‘broken housing market’ and ‘housing crisis’ do not contain 
such obvious prescriptions of policy problems, but they still inform our understanding of 
them.  
Implicit in the notion of a ‘broken market’ is the older metaphor of the ‘housing ladder’, the 
idea that most young people can access the first rung of home ownership and climb towards 
a stable and secure home in middle age and retirement. The way that it has been ‘broken’ in 
the 21st century is connected to wider notions of social mobility and labour market flexibility 
and to the maturing of the housing market (Forrest and Hirayama, 2018) and raises 
fundamental issues about inter- and intra-generational equity that have become more 
pressing over time. Why it is broken, and how it should be fixed, are more contested 
questions that link to wider questions of political economy. Perhaps the dominant theme of 
policy since 2007 has been that the problem is an inadequate supply of new homes over 
many years and that the solution lies in building more of them. This in turn begs further 
questions of ‘how’ that, at least within the Conservative Party, have pitted economic liberals 
who see regulation in general and the planning system in particular as the obstacle to 
progress against social conservatives who resist the threat to existing communities and 
(implicitly) property values. In the shadows of that struggle, never completely resolved, 
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pragmatists focus on delivering as many homes as possible within constraints on 
development.  
The idea of a broken market also implies that the solutions can and should  be found 
through home ownership, or at least through the private market. Yet this is at odds with the 
realities of a labour market in which (depending on definition) around half of the workforce 
cannot afford to house themselves without assistance from the state (Affordable Housing 
Commission, 2020). Mass home ownership was aided by full employment, secure jobs and 
unionised workforces but does not so easily translate into the era of welfare to work and 
zero hours contracts. In the absence of a market that works, if it ever could in a purist 
economic liberal sense, the state must therefore intervene, through different forms of 
subsidy for households to buy or rent.  
The creation of housing benefit was a key part of a ‘social housing’ paradigm that shifted the 
balance of state support from bricks and mortar to personal subsidies but costs rose until it 
could no longer ‘take the strain’ of higher rents and more people needing assistance. In this 
context, governments have turned to a growing array of ‘affordable housing’ schemes 
(Whitehead and Williams, 2020), ironically delivering rents that are less affordable and 
prices that require greater state intervention. ‘Affordable housing’ is in some senses 
another metaphor, with cognitive and normative meanings that contradict each other.  
At various times since 2007, governments have seen the need to fix ‘broken’ markets more 
generally. This was most obvious in the wake of a financial crisis that exposed the 
spectacular failings of financial markets and systemic risks to the wider economy. More 
generally, both main parties have advocated intervention to protect consumers in markets 
where the odds are stacked in favour of producers with measures such as greater regulation 
and price capping. In housing, the deregulated and insecure private rental market created 
by the 1988 Housing Act came to be regarded less as a means of increasing choice and 
competition for tenants and more as an unfair market for renters as consumers. However, 
seeing the extraordinary growth of the private rented sector solely from a consumer 
perspective misses the point that most of it was based on individuals becoming landlords 
using buy to let mortgages. If Conservative political philosophy was, and still is, based on 
giving people a stake in society, here were a new class of landlords who believed they were 
doing exactly that. Except that in the process they were confounding the belief that home 
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ownership is ‘the foundation stone of a capital-owning democracy’ (Conservative Party, 
1987).  
Seen from this perspective, the decline in home ownership that has so exercised 
governments over the last decade is a misnomer; it was owner-occupation that fell at the 
same time as multiple home ownership rose. This is just one illustration of the long-term 
structural effects of the financial crisis and the policy response to it. Just as rising credit and 
lower interest rates fuelled house price growth before the crash, so even lower interest 
rates and quantitative easing have inflated asset prices after it. At the same time, the 
conduct regime and macro-prudential regulation introduced in the name of financial 
stability after the crash have had the spillover effect (Kay, 2011) of reducing access to 
mortgages for anyone not already on the housing ladder who does not have access to help 
from their family. In a market divided between insiders and outsiders, wealth and access to 
credit as much as income have become the price of entry and accessibility has become as 
important as affordability. For those excluded, austerity since the financial crisis has led to 
cuts in investment in new social housing and cuts in entitlement to and levels of housing 
benefit.  
This in turn begs questions about the other metaphor most widely used about housing in 
the 21st century. As seen in Chapter 6, ‘housing crisis’ seems a strange way to describe 
chronic problems that have now lasted for years. If the continuing effects of the financial 
crisis look like the strongest influences on this, it also seems legitimate to ask how many 
years they have to last before they are seen as systemic problems rather than a crisis.   
 
7.6 THREE PARADIGMS OR TWO? 
As seen in Chapter 5, the housing policy paradigm established in the 1980s involved the 
intensification of home ownership, the deregulation of the private rented sector and the 
demuncipalisation of council housing. In the debates that led to the 1988 Housing Act, this 
was explicitly conceived as a more market-based model for renting as a whole. At the same 
time, reforms of mortgage lending, necessitated in part by the Right to Buy (Oren and Blyth, 
2019), would introduce competition and choice for an expanding group of home owners 
and mortgage tax relief could eventually be phased out.  
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In its own terms, this amounted to an internally coherent paradigm but it relied on the 
creation of housing benefit with escalating costs over time. Reflecting Conservative belief in 
choice and a desire to roll back the state, local authorities were replaced by housing 
associations as the principal providers of what was now called social housing. However, 
though they became more commercial and were classified as in the private sector for public 
spending purposes, associations were never quite as private (Murie, 2018) as the 1987 
white paper’s conception of one ‘independent rented sector’ (DoE, 1987) had implied. Since 
they mostly relied on the same model for allocations as local authorities, for many 
Conservatives, over time, ‘social housing’ came to have the same welfare dependency 
connotations as ‘council housing’. 
‘Affordable housing’ was originally a neutral term for subsidised homes to rent or buy or 
part rent, part buy. As conceived, for example, in the 2007 housing green paper (DCLG, 
2007), it meant a set of housing options for the growing number of people who could not 
afford home ownership and did not qualify for social housing. In the wake of the financial 
crisis and austerity, the meaning of ‘affordable housing’ expanded to include social housing 
at higher rents, increasingly elaborate and expensive home ownership schemes and a 
system of housing support that did not cover the full cost of most claimants’ rents. The net 
results have been a significant increase in public intervention in the private ownership 
market at the same time as a significant decrease in public investment in the social rental 
sector. Discursively, ‘affordable housing’ almost came to mean its opposite. As social 
housing became ‘affordable’ and scarcer, so much of its role in housing those most in 
housing need fell by default to the bottom end of the private rented sector.  
Chapters 5 and 6 presented two slightly different stories of the development of affordable 
housing. As seen via an analysis of policy documents it seems to be both the product of 
circumstances and of a strategy to move social housing closer to the market within an 
overall objective of maximising home ownership. Interviewees from outside government 
largely agreed with this interpretation. However, as seen from inside government, this was 
a far more contingent process characterised by improvisation and bricolage rather than 
ideology or strategy. On these accounts, Affordable Rent was created in a few days by a 
DCLG fighting to maintain any kind of affordable housing programme and Help to Buy was 
created by a Treasury that seized on a way to pursue political and economic objectives 
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through financial instruments that did not score as public spending. These two key 
instruments of affordable housing were not the result of conscious choices in housing policy 
but of circumstances created by decisions to pursue tight fiscal and loose monetary policy. 
From this perspective, the anomalies and policy failures that have accumulated over the last 
decade begin to look less like problems with an ‘affordable housing’ proto paradigm than 
evidence of continuing ideational collapse and unresolved contradictions in the ‘social 
housing’ paradigm established in the 1980s.  
This housing policy framework is marked by a series of tensions with other departments and 
agencies and other policy paradigms. This is most evident, as shown in the interviews, 
between DCLG/MHCLG and DWP on rents, investment  and the costs of housing benefit. 
However, it also plays out in the conflict between a liberalised labour market and 
commitment to work as the route out of poverty and a deregulated and high-rent housing 
market. The government’s hopes of increasing home ownership, and associated gains in 
asset-based welfare, are in tension with Bank of England policies to control financial risks 
that make it more difficult to get a mortgage and access the housing market. Hence the 
government must step in with off-balance sheet guarantees and loans, sending a message 
to market participants that it will not allow house prices to fall. A policy paradigm that was 
based on the idea of giving the market a greater role can only be maintained with greater 
intervention from the state.  
 
7.6 HOUSING AND POLITICAL ECONOMY 
This in turn raises questions about the relationship between housing and wider political 
economy. Whether we call it ‘House Price Keynesianism’ (Crouch, 2009) or ‘late 
neoliberalism’ (Rolnik, 2013) or ‘financialisation’ (Aalbers, 2016), at a macro level we are 
talking about processes that connect financial markets to household debt via housing and 
residential property and of housing not just as asset but as investment portfolio. While 
unregulated derivatives markets were at the heart of the financial crisis, the relationship 
between debt, housing and the wider economy has continued in its aftermath, underpinned 
by the search for returns in the wake of low interest rates and quantitative easing. Housing 
is related to all of these frameworks and it also connects to processes of agglomeration in 
major urban centres (Maclennan and Miao, 2017). Hundreds of apartment blocks built in 
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dense developments in cities since the millennium were the most visible sign of supply 
apparently fixing the ‘broken market’. But these routes on to the housing ladder were also 
major sites of Buy to Let and ‘buy to leave empty’ investment as well as the focus of 
affordable housing schemes and they are now caught up the post-Grenfell cladding scandal 
as well as ongoing discontent with leasehold and shared ownership. They are the physical 
expression of political economy in the built environment. 
Given all this, is it credible to talk about a housing ‘policy paradigm’ at all? That seems to be 
the question implicit in an ‘affordable’ regime under late home ownership struggling under 
the weight of its own contradictions and now facing more uncertainty than ever in the wake 
of Covid-19. Rather than a paradigm shift in response to the exogenous shock of the events 
of 2007 and 2008, my analysis of policy in housing has instead shown evidence of ideational 
collapse (Hogan and O’Rourke, 2015) and a system that exists in a seemingly permanent 
state of ‘crisis’. Daigneault’s policy paradigms framework encourages the researcher to 
think systematically about the ideas behind policy at the four different levels of values and 
principles, ideas about the problem that requires policy intervention, ends and means and 
to think about the coherence of policy as a whole. In housing policy, this helps to reveal 
confusion between ideas about ends (increasing supply) that are really about means to the 
end of making housing more affordable. However, this objective conflicts with a macro 
paradigm of House Price Keynesianism that is based on delivering growth via the housing 
market. The best place to begin the search for solutions may be to think in terms of a 
‘housing system’ and adopting ideas that consider that system as a whole. Paradigmatic 









Chapter 7 considered my findings in the context of the policy paradigms and housing 
literatures. This final chapter starts by returning to my research questions and summarises 
my answers to them. It then considers the strengths and weaknesses and the study and 
concludes with some final remarks and suggestions for further research.  
 
8.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
The study set out to answer two principal research questions: 
1) What have been the factors influencing policy change in housing in England since the 
Global Financial Crisis?  
2) Does this change amount to a change in policy paradigm? 
Plus four sub-questions: 
i) Was there an identifiable policy paradigm for housing in 2007? 
ii) What policy ideas have emerged in housing over the period? 
iii) What have been the key factors and/or actors influencing policy change? 
iv) How has housing policy changed since 2007? 
 
1) What have been the factors influencing policy change in housing in England since 
the Global Financial Crisis?  
The study found that the main factors influencing policy change in housing since 2007 were 
fiscal and monetary policy rooted in political economy. In fiscal policy, the initial response to 
the GFC under the Labour government was based on Keynesian ideas about counter-cyclical 
fiscal stimulus but that was succeeded by austerity under a Conservative-led coalition. In 
monetary policy, under both governments the economy was supported by cuts in interest 
rates and quantitative easing (QE). At the same time, financial regulation was tightened 
under both governments to ensure financial stability. The spillover effects from these 
changes worsened the affordability of housing in general and the accessibility of home 
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ownership and availability of social housing in particular. These developments represented 
significant challenges to a ‘social housing’ paradigm established in the 1980s that was based 
on support for home ownership, deregulation of the private rented sector and a switch 
away from councils to housing associations, with higher rents supported by housing benefit.  
At a deeper level, the housing system was influenced  by long-term trends in housing in 
which mature home ownership has given way to late home ownership (Forrest and 
Hirayama, 2018) and ‘home as asset’ has become ‘home as investment’. The 
‘unacknowledged policy regime’ of House Price Keynesianism (Crouch, 2009) continued in a 
new form, supported by monetary policy and state intervention.  
 
2) Does this change amount to a change in policy paradigm? 
Evidence from policy documents suggests a shift to an ‘affordable housing’ proto-paradigm 
after 2007. However, the picture that emerges from the policy actor interviews looks more 
like ideational collapse of the existing paradigm. Assessed against Daigneault’s (2015) 
criteria for the existence of a paradigm, the shift may be said to represent significant 
departure from the policy equilibrium but the framework lacks internal coherence. The 
spectrum of possibilities has moved but the ‘thermostat’ (Howlett and Cashore, 2007) of 
paradigm shift has not been tripped. ‘Affordable housing’ looks more like an attempt to 
rationalise the failures of the existing regime than a new paradigm and, by contrast with the 
Housing Act 1988, the Housing and Planning Act 2016 failed to institutionalise a new 
framework. However, if we accept the concept of partial as well as wholesale paradigm 
change (Oliver and Pemberton, 2004), this could also be part of an incremental process of 
change in which a ‘tipping point’ has not yet been reached (Carson, Burns and Calvo, 2009).   
 
i) Was there an identifiable policy paradigm for housing in 2007? 
The policy document analysis suggested clear evidence of a shift in the housing policy 
paradigm that took place under Conservative governments in the 1980s, survived the 
election of a Labour government in 1997 and remained largely intact until the cusp of the 
financial crisis in 2007. This was categorised as a ‘social housing’ paradigm to reflect the 
shift in provision from local authorities to housing associations and associated change in 
terminology after 1988 but the paradigm applied across tenures and also included 
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deregulation of the private rented sector and the liberalisation of finance for home 
ownership. Higher social and private rents were enabled by the creation of housing benefit 
in a shift from bricks and mortar to personal subsidies.  
ii) What policy ideas have emerged in housing over the period? 
The fiscal austerity of the first half of the 2010s was accompanied by a revival of ideas about 
a ‘culture of dependency’ encouraged by the welfare system and by social housing. These 
led to cuts in investment and benefits but also encouraged ideas designed to introduce 
market incentives into the social housing system and direct resources into schemes to 
support home ownership. By the second half of the 2010s, after a series of other exogenous 
shocks, there were signs of ideational change in a different direction. Within the 
Conservative government, attitudes towards social housing became more favourable, 
rhetorically at least, as a result of the Grenfell Tower fire and marketising elements of the 
Housing and Planning Act 2016 were not implemented. Within the opposition Labour Party, 
significant new policy thinking has emerged about the need for structural reform but this 
has not yet been tested in government.  A more consensus view about the role of social 
housing emerged among some Conservatives and there was a general willingness to 
consider a greater role for the state in the housebuilding market and improved consumer 
protection for private renters.  
iii) What have been the key factors and/or actors influencing policy change? 
Tight fiscal policy and loose monetary policy led to cuts in social housing investment and 
housing benefit for households requiring assistance with their housing and supported asset 
prices and reduced mortgage costs for those already in the housing market. At the same 
time, macro-prudential regulation and a financial conduct regime for mortgage lenders 
made it harder for housing ‘outsiders’ to access a mortgage.  
The context for these changes was a generally accepted ‘housing crisis’ for which the 
principal cause was seen to be an inadequate supply of new homes. Ambitious targets have 
not yet been achieved and structural constraints on output, including land ownership and 
the business model of major housebuilders, have been identified but not addressed (Letwin, 
2018). At the same time, new actors have emerged, including significant campaigns by 
private renters, leaseholders and victims of the cladding scandal that followed Grenfell, and 
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created an influential new consumer voice that politicians are finding it increasingly difficult 
to ignore.   
iv) How has housing policy changed since 2007? 
An initial counter-cyclical investment in social housing after 2007 gave way to austerity after 
2010. Output of rented homes was maintained by ended funding for homes for social rent 
in favour of a new programme of homes for higher ‘affordable’ rents. Cuts in welfare broke 
the previous link between housing benefit and rents, leaving tenants with rising shortfalls 
that had to be paid from their other benefits. At the same time, political concern about 
declining levels of home ownership led to a series of government initiatives under the 
banner of Help to Buy that significantly increased state intervention in the private market. 
Policy has varied between different Conservative-led administrations and there are signs 
that Boris Johnson’s government has returned to a more ‘ownership first’ agenda after a 
more tenure-neutral approach under Theresa May. There is a continuity across the field in a 
policy focus on the importance of increasing the supply of new homes to address a generally 
perceived ‘housing crisis’. However, it remains unclear whether this is an objective in itself 
or a means to the end of addressing housing unaffordability. 
 
8.3 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE 
This is the first time that a policy paradigms approach has been applied systematically to the 
study of housing in England or the UK. While some of the housing literature does use 
‘paradigms’ as a metaphor or heuristic device for understanding policy change, it has not 
gone beyond that to engage with the literature inspired by Hall. Looking at the literature 
internationally, my search revealed only two very recent examples of policy paradigms 
being applied to housing (Bohle and Seabrooke, 2020; Friedman and Rosen, 2020) in this 
way. The project has demonstrated the value of this conceptual framework in 
understanding the dynamics of policy change within housing.  
The majority of the literature that followed Hall has looked either at his case of economic 
policy making or at fields such as trade, agriculture and energy where paradigms are more 
likely to be ‘elaborate or forceful’ (Hall, 1993, p291) because they involve technical issues 
and specialised knowledge and/or international agreements. This study outlines the 
dynamics of policy in a field with a paradigm that is not in Hall’s terms ‘fully elaborated’ and 
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maps out how it interacts within a system of nested paradigms (Nicholls and Teasdale, 
2017). It shows how ‘looser’ paradigms can still structure the mental maps that guide policy 
makers and also demonstrates how paradigms further up the policy hierarchy can structure 
the possibilities for action. 
The two-stage research design has allowed me to speak to issues such as the level of 
coherence in the housing policy paradigm that would not have been possible in a project 
based on official documents alone. The richer data provided by the interviews has enabled a 
more nuanced interpretation of policy change and revealed dynamics that were not visible 
in policy papers and parliamentary debates. This revealed the institutional and hidden 
constraints on policy and the conflicts and compromises involved in policy making and 
enabled broader reflections on the policy process based on multiple points of view. This 
strongly supports the case for studying the ideas of policy actors directly and relying on 
primary sources rather than official documents and policy outcomes. 
My research has also shown the value of engaging with so many different interviewees in 
the context of a policy field with multiple dimensions. A high level of access was achieved 
and interviewees included senior politicians and civil servants who had been directly 
involved in policy making as well as those seeking to influence policy. From a housing 
perspective, it adds rich and detailed perspectives to existing accounts of policy change 
since 2007.  
 
8.4 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND FURTHER REFLECTIONS 
During my research I encountered many of the issues raised by Daigneault (2015) in the 
lessons learned from his own work on ideas and welfare reform. The process is certainly 
labour-intensive, even when relying on a retrospective design that involves asking one set of 
interviewees about changes between two time periods.  
Conducting enough interviews to assess the prevalence of ideas within a policy community 
is also a problem, especially within the time and resource constraints of a DSocSci research 
project. I ended up carrying out significantly more interviews (27) than I had originally 
envisaged (15-20) precisely because I wanted to ensure rich data across different parts of 
the housing system. In addition, to answer my main research question about whether there 
had been a paradigm shift since 2007, I first had to establish what the paradigm was in 2007 
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and how it had developed, rather than take that as a given, which involved reaching further 
back in time. Although the pandemic prevented me from interviewing people face to face, 
raising issues of interpretation in itself, it is possible that the convenience of video call 
interviewing helped to generate a higher response rate to my interview requests.  
Another issue that emerged from the interviews was the question of how far to privilege the 
interpretations of policy insiders, ministers and civil servants, over those of actors 
attempting to influence or to implement policy from the outside. My solution was to give 
due weight to the former while allowing that policies, like crises, are narrated, explained 
and socially constructed and that, in the context of paradigms, those most closely involved 
may also be most likely to be operating within a ‘taken for granted’ interpretative 
framework.     
As demonstrated by that point, applying the paradigms framework systematically also raises 
issues of judgement on the part of the researcher. Measuring the extent and nature of 
changes in ideas and their level of coherence is inevitably a matter of interpretation and this 
applies especially to the ultimate question of whether there has been a ‘paradigm shift’ or 
not. Triangulation between policy documents and key actor interviews proved valuable in 
helping to make these judgements, and I hope I have been transparent about the steps 
taken in making them. Triangulation also strongly supports Daigneault’s argument against 
adopting a ‘revealed ideas’ approach that attempts to find ideas in the outcomes of policies. 
The interviews included many examples in which the policy process revealed behind the 
scenes was significantly different to the one portrayed in the ordered world of policy 
documents and parliamentary debates. That said, the interviews inevitably provided a more 
comprehensive picture of some periods than others and are reliant on the recall of 
interviewees about events that happened several years ago.  
 
8.5 CLOSING REMARKS AND POTENTIAL FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
The study has demonstrated the value of a policy paradigms approach in assessing policy 
change in housing since 2007 and shown what the housing case can contribute to an 
understanding of how ‘looser’ paradigms operate in fields lower down the policy hierarchy 
than Hall’s original case of macro-economic policy making within a system of ‘nested’ 
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paradigms. This suggests that research in policy fields other than housing might benefit 
from a similar approach.  
The scope of this study was restricted to England on the grounds that covering policy in 
other parts of the UK in the same depth would require more time and resources than are 
available for a DSocSci dissertation. However, extending the research to cover Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland would be an obvious next step. Since housing policy is devolved 
in all three nations, this would offer an opportunity to test the extent to which a housing 
policy paradigm can develop independently of related social security and economic 
paradigms and of political economy.  
Finally, my assessment of paradigmatic change in the case of housing policy in England since 
2007 must necessarily be provisional. It has not yet been tested by a change of political 
party in government and, amplifying the problems inherent in the interpretation of 
contemporary events, it is being made in the middle of a pandemic whose after-effects may 
play out in unpredictable ways. At the time of writing, the Covid-19 outbreak has shaken 
established ideas about the appropriate role of the state in the economy and wider society 
and ideas about the links between housing inequalities and health have returned to the 
policy agenda. This is one more in a series of exogenous shocks to the housing system and 
its policy paradigm and represents an obvious avenue for further research. The study has 
shown the potential of policy paradigms as a way of thinking about housing and the value of 
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APPENDIX A: TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS 
1980 Housing Act 1980 introduces Right to Buy for council tenants. Two million homes sold 
in England by 2018/19. 
1986 ‘Big Bang’ liberalisation of financial markets allows banks to compete with building 
societies in mortgage market. 
Building Societies Act allows building societies to demutualise and become banks.  
1988 Housing Act 1988 deregulates private rented sector with market rents and assured 
shorthold tenure for new tenancies, with Section 21 introducing no-fault evictions by 
landlords, and introduces private finance for housing associations, strategic role for local 
authorities and stock transfer of council housing to associations.  
1992 After a boom at the end of the 1980s, house prices crash, culminating on Black 
Wednesday in September 1992 when interest rates rise to 15 per cent in an unsuccessful 
attempt to keep Britain in the European Exchange Rate Mechanism. Repossessions and 
negative equity rise.  
1994 Government starts to phase out mortgage tax relief.  
1996 Buy to Let mortgage introduced. 
1997 Labour government gives Bank of England operational independence over monetary 
policy with targets for inflation. 
2000 Mortgage tax relief ends for home owners.  
2003 Inflation measure used for target for monetary policy changed to Consumer Price 
Inflation, which does not include housing costs.  
2007  Collapse of Northern Rock (a former building society converted into a bank). 
2008 Collapse of Lehman Brothers. 
2009 Bank of England cuts interest rates to 0.5 per cent and introduces first round of 
quantitative easing. 
2010 Conservative-Liberal Democrat government cuts social housing investment by 65 per 
cent and introduces first round of cuts in housing benefit. Introduces self-financing for local 
authority housing but with caps on borrowing.  
2011 Localism Act abolishes housebuilding targets in favour of incentives for local 
communities to approve new homes and allows social landlords to use fixed-term tenancies. 
2012 Welfare Reform Act introduces Universal Credit, benefit cap and more cuts in housing 
benefit.  
2013 Completion of new regulatory framework for financial system including macro-
prudential and micro-prudential regulation and a financial conduct regime for mortgage 
lenders that introduces affordability and stress tests on loans.  
Chancellor George Osborne introduces Help to Buy scheme with government-funded equity 
loans for buyers of new homes and a government guarantee on high loan-to-value 
mortgages.  
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2015 Conservative government elected on manifesto promising to extend Right to Buy to 
housing associations and build 200,000 Starter Homes for sale at a discount to first-time 
buyers. 
Government announces first cuts to tax reliefs for private landlords.  
2016 Housing and Planning Act legislates for manifesto commitments, plus a levy on sales of 
council homes in high-value areas as they fall vacant and mandatory fixed-term tenancies 
for new council tenants.  
UK votes to leave European Union. David Cameron resigns as prime minister succeeded by 
Theresa May 
2017 Help to Buy equity loans extended to 2020. 
May loses majority in general election. 
72 people die in fire at Grenfell Tower, a local authority tower block in London 
2018 Social housing green paper promises action on fire safety and against stigma faced by 
social housing tenants and abandons levy on high-value council sales and mandatory fixed-
term tenancies after feedback from tenants. Right to Buy extension and Starter Homes are 
quietly dropped.  
Government announces plans to scrap borrowing caps on council housing and abolish 
Section 21 for no-fault evictions. 
2019 May resigns after failure to agree Brexit deal and is succeeded by Boris Johnson who 
wins election on pledge to ‘get Brexit done’. Manifesto also promises a Right to Shared 
Ownership. 
2020 UK leave EU. Covid-19 outbreak. 
White papers propose action on social housing regulation and planning reform. 
Help to Buy equity loans extended to 2023 with regional price caps.  
2021 Government announces another guarantee scheme for high loan-to-value mortgages. 
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APPENDIX B: GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS AND KEY MINISTERS SINCE 1988 
 
The list below highlights the key individuals with influence on housing policy since 1988. 
Since ministerial appointments change so frequently, especially at junior levels, the list is 
not comprehensive, but is presented as a guide to the ministers mentioned in the main 
body of the thesis to allow the reader to put them in political context.  
The department directly responsible for housing policy was the Department of the 
Environment from 1979 to 1997, Department of the Environment, Transport and the 
Regions, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister and Department of Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG) from 1997 to 2010 and DCLG and Ministry for Housing, Communities 
and Local Government from 2010 to 2021.  
 
CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT 1979-1997 
Prime minister: Margaret Thatcher (to 1990); John Major (from 1990) 
Treasury - Chancellor of the Exchequer: Nigel Lawson (1983-89); Norman Lamont (1990-93)  
Kenneth Clarke (1993-97) 
Department of Social Security - Secretary of state: John Moore (1987-89); Tony Newton 
(1989-92); Peter Lilley (1992-97) 
Department of the Environment 
Secretary of state: Michael Heseltine (1979-83; 1990-92); Nicholas Ridley (1986-89) 
Housing minister: William Waldegrave (1985-88); George Young (1990-94) 
 
LABOUR 1997-2010 
Prime minister: Tony Blair (1997-2007); Gordon Brown (2007-10) 
Treasury - Chancellor of the Exchequer: Gordon Brown (1997-2008); Alistair Darling (2008-
10) 
Deputy prime minister: John Prescott (1997-2007) 
Housing minister: Yvette Cooper (2005-08); John Healey (2009-10) 
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CONSERVATIVE-LIBERAL DEMOCRAT COALITION 2010-2015  
Prime minister: David Cameron (2010-15) 
Deputy prime minister: Nick Clegg (2010-15) 
Treasury - Chancellor of the Exchequer: George Osborne (2010-15) 
Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) 
Secretary of state: Iain Duncan Smith (2010-15) 
Department of Communities and Local Government (DCLG) 
Secretary of state: Eric Pickles (2010-15) 




Prime minister: David Cameron (2015-2016); Theresa May (2016-2019); Boris Johnson 
(2019-) 
Treasury - Chancellor of the Exchequer: George Osborne (2015-16); Philip Hammond (2016-
2019); Sajid Javid (2019-20); Rishi Sunak (2020-) 
DWP -  Secretary of state: Iain Duncan Smith (2015-16); Therese Coffey (2019-) 
DCLG/Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government  
Secretary of state: Greg Clark (2015-16); Sajid Javid (2016-18); James Brokenshire (2018-
19); Robert Jenrick (2019-) 




APPENDIX C: KEY CHANGES IN THE HOUSING SYSTEM 
 
1. HOUSE PRICES 
The graph below shows average house prices in England over the last 50 years. The 
immediate aftermath of the financial crisis saw the average price fall from £237,000 in 2008 
to £234,000 in 2009 before recovering to £300,000 by 2019.  
 
Source: Office for National Statistics house price index 
2. HOUSEBUILDING 
The graph shows housebuilding completions in England based on ONS data. Total output 
should be treated with caution since other data series show higher total numbers of 
completions but the graph is intended to illustrate changes in the shares of homes delivered 
by the public sector (mostly local authorities), housing associations and private sector. 
 








































































































































































Housing completions in England
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3. INTEREST RATES 
The graph shows the Bank of England base rate at the end of each year since 1979. 
 
Source: Bank of England 
4. BUY TO LET LENDING 
The graph shows growth in the number of buy to let mortgages outstanding, which now 
stands at 1.9 million. 
 















































































































































The growth of Buy to Let
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5.  HOUSING TENURE CHANGE  
The table (next page) shows changes in the proportion of households living in the main 
three tenures in England. Within these categories, owner-occupation is broken down 
between households who own outright and those buying with a mortgage, while social 
housing is split between households renting from housing associations and from local 
authorities from 2008/09 onwards. 
The data show a consistent increase in owner-occupation up to the mid-2000s. Much of this 
growth was linked to the introduction of a Right to Buy for council tenants in 1980. That, 
plus reductions in investment in new homes, mean that the proportion of households in 
social housing has almost halved since 1980. The proportion living in council housing has 
fallen even faster thanks to stock transfer to housing associations.    
When the Housing Act 1988 deregulated rents and tenancies for new tenants, only 9.1 per 
cent of households were private renters. A slow revival of the sector accelerated after the 
creation of Buy to Let in 1996 and the proportion who are private renters is now 18.7 per 
cent. Linked to that, owner-occupation went into decline from 2004, although the 
proportion of households buying with a mortgage began to fall 10 years before that. Help to 
Buy and other government schemes have helped to stem this decline in the last few years, 
but around 65 per cent of households now own their home against a peak of 71 per cent in 




  Owner occupiers (%)   Social renters (%) 













1980  :   :  56.6 11.9  :   :  31.4 
1981 25.0 32.2 57.2 11.1  :   :  31.7 
1982  :   :  58.6 11.0  :   :  30.4 
1983  :   :  60.0 10.8  :   :  29.2 
1984 25.6 35.7 61.3 10.7  :   :  28.0 
1985  :   :  62.4 10.3  :   :  27.3 
1986  :   :  63.5 9.9  :   :  26.6 
1987  :   :  64.6 9.5  :   :  25.9 
1988 25.9 39.7 65.7 9.1  :   :  25.2 
1989  :   :  66.3 9.2  :   :  24.5 
1990  :   :  67.0 9.3  :   :  23.7 
1991 24.8 42.8 67.6 9.4  :   :  23.0 
1992 25.1 43.1 68.2 9.0  :   :  22.8 
1993 25.2 43.1 68.3 9.4  :   :  22.2 
1994 25.6 43.1 68.7 9.6  :   :  21.8 
1995 25.4 43.1 68.5 9.9  :   :  21.6 
1996 25.9 42.6 68.5 10.1  :   :  21.4 
1997 26.4 42.2 68.6 10.5  :   :  21.0 
1998 27.0 42.0 69.0 10.3  :   :  20.7 
1999 27.7 42.2 69.9 9.9  :   :  20.2 
2000 28.4 42.2 70.6 10.0  :   :  19.5 
2001 28.8 41.5 70.4 10.1  :   :  19.5 
2002 29.1 41.3 70.5 10.3  :   :  19.2 
2003 29.7 41.2 70.9 10.8  :   :  18.3 
2004 30.3 40.4 70.7 11.0  :   :  18.3 
2005 30.3 40.3 70.7 11.7  :   :  17.7 
2006 30.5 39.7 70.1 12.2  :   :  17.7 
2007 30.7 38.9 69.6 12.7  :   :  17.7 
2008 31.1 37.3 68.3 13.9  :   :  17.7 
2008/09 31.4 36.5 67.9 14.2 8.8 9.1 17.8 
2009/10 31.7 35.7 67.4 15.6 8.1 9.0 17.0 











2011/12 31.7 33.5 65.3 17.4 8.1 9.2 17.3 
2012/13 32.5 32.7 65.2 18.0 7.7 9.1 16.8 
2013/14 32.7 30.7 63.3 19.4 7.3 10.1 17.3 
2014/15 33.2 30.4 63.6 19.0 7.3 10.1 17.4 
2015/16 33.9 29.0 62.9 19.9 7.0 10.2 17.2 
2016/17 34.1 28.4 62.6 20.3 6.8 10.3 17.1 
2017/18 33.9 29.6 63.5 19.5 6.8 10.2 17.0 
2018/19 34.4 29.4 63.8 19.3 6.8 10.1 16.8 
2019/20 34.9 29.7 64.6 18.7 6.6 10.1 16.7 
 
Source: English Housing Survey 2019 to 2020, available at https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/english-
housing-survey-2019-to-2020-headline-report, accessed January 5, 2021 
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APPENDIX D: POLICY DOCUMENT ANALYSIS 
 
The analysis draws on three principal sources of data.  
The manifestos of the main political parties (for the general elections in 1987, 1992, 2001, 
2005, 2010, 2015, 2017 and 2019) offer a snapshot of their professed values, what they saw 
as their priorities, how they framed the policy problem and specific proposals on new 
policies.  
Green and white papers on housing that were published ahead of major legislation (from 
1987, 1995, 2000, 2008, 2017, 2018, 2020) set out the policies of the government of the 
day, the justifications for them and the means of delivering them in much more detail. Since 
no official green papers were published ahead of major legislation in 2011 and 2016, these 
are supplemented by three unofficial green papers published by the Conservative Party in 
2009 and 2010 that mapped out much of the policy agenda that followed.  
Parliamentary debates on major legislation affecting housing (Housing Act 1988, Housing 
Act 1996, Housing Act 2004, Housing and Regeneration Act 2008, Localism Act 2011, 
Welfare Reform Act 2012 and Housing and Planning Act 2016) offer a way to track the way 
that ministers framed the issues and the response from opposition MPs. The debates at 
second reading were chosen as this is the stage at which the main principles of the 
legislation are laid out and voted upon. 
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APPENDIX E: POLICY ACTOR INTERVIEWS 
 
In total, 27 interviews were conducted between October 2020 and January 2021 with actors 
from inside and outside government. The interviews are referenced by number in the main 
text of the thesis. Descriptions of the job functions of the interviewees are set out below: 
Interview 1: Senior official in government agency  
Interview 2: Policy advisor to housing sector organisation  
Interview 3: Chief executive of housing sector organisation  
Interview 4: Housing market analyst  
Interview 5: Senior civil servant  
Interview 6: Chief executive of housing sector organisation and cross-bench peer  
Interview 7: Senior civil servant and chief executive of housing association 
Interview 8: Policy director of housing sector organisation  
Interview 9: Senior civil servant and cross-bench peer  
Interview 10: Housing minister and Conservative MP  
Interview 11: Liberal Democrat special adviser and think-tank director  
Interview 12: Economist and government advisor  
Interview 13: Policy specialist in housing sector, civil service and local government  
Interview 14: Economist and think tank director  
Interview 15: Director of house builder  
Interview 16: Housing minister, shadow housing minister and Labour MP  
Interview 17: Policy specialist in mortgage industry  
Interview 18: Conservative councillor, MP and select committee member  
Interview 19: Shadow minister, select committee member and Labour MP  
Interview 20: Secretary of state and Conservative MP  
Interview 21: Senior official in government agency and housing association chief executive  
Interview 22: Private rented sector campaigner  
Interview 23: Policy specialist in mortgage industry and residential property  
Interview 24: Policy specialist in housing trade federation  
Interview 25: Senior government agency official  
Interview 26: Labour special adviser and think-tank policy analyst   
Interview 27: Special adviser at 10 Downing Street and housing policy specialist  
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APPENDIX F: INVITATION TO INTERVIEWEES 
 
1. RECRUITMENT EMAIL 
 
Assessing the changing dynamics of housing policy since 2007 – a policy paradigms 
approach 
 
Dear [xxxxxxxx xxxxx} 
I am writing to ask if you  would be interested in taking part in research I am conducting into 
changes in housing policy since 2007. This is primarily for the dissertation element of my 
studies for a Doctorate in Social Science at the University of Bristol.  
You are one of several people from different parts of the housing policy community I am 
approaching to get different perspectives on what has changed, and not changed, over the 
period and the reasons for this. It seeks to answer the following research questions: 
1) What have been the factors influencing policy change in housing in England since the 
Global Financial Crisis?  
2) Does this change amount to a change in policy paradigm? 
I am taking a policy paradigms approach to these questions, meaning that I am examining 
different elements of housing policy to assess changes (if any) in the underlying ideas 
behind them and changes (if any) in the relationship between housing and other policy 
areas.  
For those of you who may know me as a journalist, I should emphasise that this research is 
being conducted for academic purposes only, primarily for the DSocSci dissertation but 
potentially for subsequent academic outputs. The interviews will not be used for journalistic 
purposes. 
Ideally I would have liked to meet face to face to talk to you. However, in view of the Covid-
19 outbreak, interviews will have to be conducted at a distance rather than in person, 
preferably via Skype. 
I hope that you are interested in taking part. If so, please let me know and I can send you 
more information and arrange a convenient time for an interview.  
 
2. DIRECT MESSAGE ON TWITTER 
Dear [xxxxx xxxxx] 
Just getting in touch in the hope that you might consider taking part in research I am 
conducting into changes in housing policy since the Global Financial Crisis. This is for the 
dissertation element of my studies for a Doctorate in Social Science at the University of 
Bristol and would involve an interview via video call. You are one of several people from 
different parts of the housing policy community I am approaching to get different 
perspectives on what has changed, and not changed, over the period and the reasons for 
this.  
I hope that this sounds of interest. If so, please could you let me know the best email 




APPENDIX G: TOPIC GUIDE 
Questions to be adapted according to role of interviewee eg inside or outside government. 
Introduce the study and me. Ask if can record.  Read informed consent form.  
 
A) Introductory questions 
1) How long have you been involved with housing policy? 
2) How were you involved in a) 2007/08 and b) now? 
3) Can we agree a generic description of your role?  
 
B) What do you think are the most important changes in housing and housing policy since 
2007? 
Prompt: What do you think were the drivers for these changes?  
 
C) What would you say were the most influential ideas about housing and housing policy 
in this period? Have those changed since? Where were they coming from? 
Prompt: To what extent do you think they amounted to a coherent set of ideas within 
government about how the housing system works and should work? Has this changed 2007? 
Prompt: Ideas about what the problem is? What the solution is?  
Prompt: If so, how? Role of the state vs role of the market?  
 
D) Do you think there have been significant differences in the ideas underpinning the 
housing policies of the different Conservative-led governments since 2010 
Prompts: How much of a shift in ideas since 2007? Do you think the policies proposed under 
Theresa May were a passing phase or more meaningful change? Should we take policies as 
proposed at face value? Are there unresolved policy anomalies or policy failures that have 
not been addressed? 
 
E) Do you think housing and housing policy has become more or less important to other 
departments and/or other policy areas since 2007? What factors have influenced this? 
Prompts: Do you think the Treasury view of housing has changed? How has housing’s 
relationship with DWP changed? No 10? 
 
F) If not brought up already - Is the idea of a ‘housing crisis’ a helpful way to describe what 
is happening in the housing system? 
Prompts: How does this relate to wider notions of crisis (GFC, Brexit, Grenfell Tower fire, 
Covid-19)? Which crisis do you think has had the most impact on ideas about housing policy? 
 
(TO ASK IF TIME) 
G) Has your view of what the role of the main housing tenures should be changed since 
2007? If so, how? 
Prompts – owner-occupation, private rented sector, social housing. Do you think affordable 
housing has emerged as a distinct tenure in its own right? 
 
H) Summing up 
(To check my understanding of what interviewees are saying but also a final chance to 
clarify their views).  
Others to speak to? 
